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This study is a quantitative assessment of a transition to inflation targeting in
detail with a focus on the role of expectations in the adjustment process. To this ob-
jective, I construct and estimate inflation pressure indices to evaluate the performance
of monetary policy and its relationship with the underlying inflationary environment.
I innovate measures of expectations under different degrees of credibility to provide
insight into the way in which the monetary authority’s credibility evolves during a
transition period. My case study is Turkish economy during 1996-2005, a period
of multiple inflation reduction programs including a transitory semi-formal inflation
targeting program. The fact that Turkey was not part of the great moderation allow
me to consider with greater confidence that the expectational changes under investi-
gation are a consequence of the monetary authority’s inflation reduction programs1.
I choose to study the Turkish economy during a transition for several reasons.
1Many researchers studied the substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility, often referred to
“Great Moderation”, in major industrialized economies. Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000) were among the first to note the reduction in the volatility of output. Warnock
and Warnock’s (2000) analysis on goods-producing sectors documented the drop in the volatility of
employment. Blanchard and Simon (2001) reported the decline in the variability of inflation proving
that the drop in variability was not exclusive to the growth in employment and real output since
the mid-1980s in the U.S. Stock and Watson (2002) characterized the large drop in the cyclical
volatility of economic activity, which they named as the great moderation, using a large number of
U.S. economic time series. Kim, Nelson, and Piger’s (2003) concluded that reduction of volatility of
output was a multi-sectorial phenomenon during the great moderation.
Although the great moderation is well documented there is not a consensus among researchers in
regards to underlying reasons of the great moderation. Various studies offered different explanations
such as substantial structural changes, improved macroeconomic policies, or the substantial decline in
size and the frequency of the the shocks hitting the economy, often referred to good luck hypothesis.
Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2002), Campbell and Hercowitz (2005), and Gal´ı and Gambetti
(2009) were among the studies recognizing the significance of structural changes whereas Clarida,
Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) advocated
for the improved performance in macroeconomic policies. Finally, studies in line with the good luck
hypothesis include Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2002), Sims and Zha (2006), Arias, Hansen, and
Ohanian (2006), and Benati and Surico (2009).
1
Turkey is a developing economy which was not part of the great moderation as many
other industrialized economies underwent beginning early 1990s. Instead, throughout
1990s and early 2000s, the Turkish economy experienced high and volatile inflation,
three major crisis, and short-lived disinflation programs. The period of 2002-2005,
on the other hand, is described by major structural reforms and significant drops in
the inflation rate. The fact that Turkey was not part of the great moderation allow
me to study the impact of the monetary authority’s inflation reduction programs on
inflation expectations in isolation.
The period of 1996-2005 in Turkey is a long transition period. In the first half
the transition, non targeting disinflation programs were performed while semi-formal
inflation targeting was in place during 2002-2005 which eventually led to full-fledged
inflation targeting beginning 2006. Although the first half of the transition was rather
volatile, the transitory semi-formal inflation targeting period was characterized by
step by step structural reforms, systematic and transparent conduct of monetary pol-
icy. During 2002-2005, the monetary authority in Turkey initiated deliberate efforts
to communicate with the private sector in regards to the objectives of the monetary
authority and how it intend to reduce inflation. Surveying professional forecasters
and making the forecast data available online to public was as an intentional decision
for more transparent and effective communication. Turkey arises as a natural candi-
date to study the transition in detail due to such organized, clear-cut transition to
inflation targeting.
The role of expectations is significant in contemporary macroeconomics. It is well
known that inflationary expectations contribute to observed inflation substantially.
Therefore, the long-term success of an inflation reduction program depends on the
effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing the underlying economic conditions
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to reduce inflationary expectations. Expectations not only influence various macroe-
conomic variables they also respond to them as suggested by the Lucas critique.
Having said that, the expectations are not directly observable and the underlying
process through which they are formed is unknown. Therefore expectations must be
imputed using a model for the underlying expectation formation process. I consider
rational expectations hypothesis and private expectations formed consistent with the
adaptive learning process.
I propose an analytical small open economy model capable of characterizing the
Turkish economy during the period of 1996-2005. I assume the macroeconomic in-
dicators of the U.S. economy represent the rest of the world. The analytical model
includes four structural equations governing the domestic markets. Following the
contemporary approach, I use a hybrid type new Keynesian Phillips curve and IS
schedule. I innovate a hybrid type uncovered interest parity condition with a focus
on in sample representation of the foreign exchange rate movements and with less
consideration on forecasting. The model is closed using a forward looking Taylor
type monetary policy reaction function consistent with structural breaks throughout
the period of 1996-2005. In order to complete the open economy model, I use first
order autoregressive process to represent the behavior of exogenous foreign (the U.S.
economy in this case) variables such as inflation and short-term interest rates.
The period of 1996-2005 in Turkey is characterized by structural changes and re-
forms in the economic arena. In addition to several significant fiscal and financial
reforms including the grant of independence to the Turkish central bank, the Central
Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) implemented three distinct inflation reduction
programs during 1996-2005. Therefore, the structural equations in the model may be
subject to structural breaks. I use Bai and Perron’s (1998, 2003) multiple structural
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break analysis to estimate structural break dates as suggested by anecdotal evidence.
I provide empirical evidence that the Phillips curve, IS schedule, and the uncov-
ered interest parity condition were stable with no structural breaks during 1996-2005.
On the other hand, the monetary policy reaction function was subject to structural
breaks.
To estimate the analytical model, I apply empirical estimation methods of Gen-
eralized Method of Moments (GMM) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to monthly
data. The presence of endogenous forward looking expectations in the model requires
the use of certain empirical applications. I first estimate the model using GMM con-
sistent with the assumption of rational expectations. I then make use of the available
forecast data and apply Smith’s (2009) pooling forecast methodology to conduct sen-
sitivity analysis under rational expectations. I use the computational methodology
developed by Sims (2001) to obtain numerical rational expectations estimates corre-
sponding the minimum state variables (MSV) solutions. I consider the MSV solutions
as the underlying models of forecasting for private agents who are assumed to form
expectations consistent with the adaptive learning hypothesis pioneered by Evans and
Honkapohja (1995). I apply least squares learning algorithm to obtain private agents’
forecast series which are used to find model estimates consistent with adaptive learn-
ing. I provide empirical evidence that model estimates under rational expectations
and least squares adaptive learning are substantially close granting more confidence
in the capability of the analytical model in representing the Turkish economy during
1996-2005 and the precision of the estimates.
I construct model consistent operational indices to characterize the inflationary
environment, measure the changes in inflation expectations and evaluate the mone-
tary policy effectiveness using counterfactual experiments. I borrow extensively from
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the two-step methodology proposed by Weymark (1995, 1998) and the methods used
in Weymark and Shintani (2006) to set up counterfactual experiments and obtain
inflation pressure indices. The inflation pressure indices are defined as the change
in the inflation rate that would have been observed if the monetary authority had
held its interest rate instrument constant for a period. I construct ex-ante inflation
pressure to describe the inflationary environment that was faced by the monetary au-
thority prior to the policy change to measure the changes in inflation expectations in
response to exogenous shocks. Ex post inflation pressure is then obtained to measure
the remaining inflation pressure after the implementation of the interest change pol-
icy using post-policy expectations. The monetary policy effectiveness is determined
by the extent to which the monetary policy change was successful in reducing the
inflation pressure conditional on the inflationary environment that existed prior to
the implementation of the policy change. I obtain similar estimates for inflation pres-
sure and monetary policy effectiveness under both rational expectation and adaptive
learning. I show that the inflationary environment facing the Central bank of Repub-
lic of Turkey in period 2002-2005 was no favorable than that of 1996-2001 in regards
to reducing inflation. However, I find that the CBRT was much more effective in
reducing the inflation in 2002-2005 than it was during 1996-2001, especially when the
economy was hit by positive inflationary shocks. Evidence also shows that the CBRT
had a significantly passive stand in 1996-2001 in contrast to pre-emptive conduct of
monetary policy during the period of semi-formal inflation targeting , 2002-2005.
Finally, I innovate an index of policy credibility to evaluate the credibility of the
monetary authority’s disinflation programs and announcements and study the way
the monetary policy credibility evolved. I design new counterfactual experiments
that would help constructing the credibility index. I measure the change in inflation
expectations that would have been generated by the announcement of the inflation
5
target if the announcement had been perceived as perfectly credible. Under full cred-
ibility, the change in expectations is computed by considering the monetary authority
implemented the previous period’s interest policy instead of the interest rate that is
consistent with the announced inflation target. I refer to this measure as the expecta-
tions of inflation under full credibility and I use it as my benchmark measure. I then
obtain a measure for expectations of inflation under true credibility a qualitatively
similar measure to the ex post inflation pressure index. To obtain the measure for
expectations of inflation under true credibility, I compare the expectational changes
under the actual current interest policy versus the previous period. The degree to
which the changes in expectations of inflation under true credibility get closer to that
under full credibility is used to obtain monetary policy credibility index. I find that
the underlying assumption of rational expectations or adaptive learning does not pro-
duce significantly different credibility estimates. My findings suggest that there was
not a substantial change in the credibility of the CBRT during 1996-2005 and yet the
CBRT succeeded to undershoot its inflation targets for four consecutive years during
2002-2005 suggesting that the CBRT acted as though the credibility was worse than
it was during the semi-inflation targeting period.
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CHAPTER II
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TURKISH ECONOMY
Turkey has a long history of chronic inflation along with unsuccessful disinfla-
tion programs during the thirty years prior to the millennium1. The Consumer Price
Index (CPI) based annual average inflation rate in Turkey increased in a stepwise
fashion. Inflation was about 5% in late 1960s, 15% in early 1970s, 35% in late 1970s
and early 1980s, 65-70% in late 1980s and early 1990s, and finally over 80% in late
1990s, coupled with burst of inflation rates preceding the debt-foreign exchange crisis
of 1978-1980, the currency crisis of 1994, and the financial crisis of 2001 as presented
in Figure II.1.
An early attempt to stabilize the economy, reduce the inflation, and to promote
sustainable economic growth was launched on January 24, 1980. The government
declared a reform package to deregulate the financial market, and to pursue an ex-
port based growth policy. Extremely generous export subsidies were provided along
with managed floating exchange rates. Real exchange rate depreciation and exports
subsidies gave a way to significant increases in the volume of export and growth
in economic activity. The package also contained major structural steps toward a
market-based, liberal, financial system where most of the government-levied restric-
tions on the financial sector were removed often referred to the deregulation of the
financial sector. For instance, the foreign exchange market was liberalized which
finally led to fully convertible Turkish Lira beginning 1990, certain restrictions on
capital movements were removed, a short-term money market was established, and
the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) started to conduct open market
1Siklos (1995) defined the state of high and persistent inflation as “chronic” inflation.
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operations. While the reforms were taking place, a military regime took control of the
government via military coup de´tat in September, 1980. Celaˆsun and Rodrik (1989),
Ertug˜rul and Selc¸uk (2001), and Boratav and Yeldan (2006) provide a detailed ac-
count of the reforms, the resulting structural adjustments, and the changes in various

















Inflation rates are measured by December-to-December percentage changes in the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). The thick-shaded areas represent crisis which usually are preceded by or
accompanied with burst of inflation. The thin vertical line at 2002 marks the beginning of
semi-formal inflation targeting period which would last till December, 2005. Inflation was
relatively low and steady during 1965-1975. It increased and became more volatile starting
late 1970s. Following the currency crisis in 1994, inflation started to decline with still a fair
amount of volatility. Aftermath of the crisis in February 2001, inflation continued to decline
accompanied with relatively lower amount of volatility.
Source: TurkStat (Turkish Statistical Institute)
Figure II.1: Inflation Rate in Turkey, 1965-2005
Following the military takeover of September 1980, there was a subsequent drop
in inflation accompanied by a short lived recession. The annual average inflation rate
was reduced from about 90% in 1980 to an average of 33% in 1983-1985. However,
the inflation rate started to climb up again starting 1986. Boratav and Yeldan (2006)
reported that gross domestic product rose at an annual rate of 6.5%, and export rev-
enues rose at an annual rate of 10.8% in the period of 1983-87. On the other hand,
real wage income declined significantly. The decline in real wages was partly due to
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the restrictive wage policy that was used as part of an instrument to lower produc-
tion costs in order to stimulate exports in line with export based growth policy. In
addition, the presence of the military in the political arena and its aggressive actions
against organized labor exacerbated the erosion in the real wage income. Boratav
and Yeldan (2006) reported that the share of wage income in manufacturing value
added declined from an average of 35.6% in 1977-80, to 20.6% in 1988 whereas the
average mark up rates in private manufacturing increased from 31% to 38%.
Following the 1980’s economic reform package, the process of capital account liber-
alization was completed in 1989. Significant tariff reductions were implemented and a
number of other trade restrictions were removed. Celaˆsun (1998) reported large fiscal
and external imbalances following the capital account liberalization during 1989-1990
where the real exchange rate appreciated more than 20% on average. The removal
of restrictions on capital flows increased the interest rates as in other episodes of
financial liberalization studied by Sarac¸og˜lu (1996), and The World Bank (1997). A
rise in the share of capital inflows and outflows strand the financial markets and the
monetary authority in Turkey in early 1990s during which the Gulf War I would took
place. The substantial capital outflows were not only responsible for causing foreign
exchange reserves to decline precariously and leading to further deterioration of the
trade balance; they also played a pivotal role in triggering financial instability.
Large and growing fiscal imbalances changed the governments’ financing approach
in early 1990s. Due to the legislative act limiting the CBRT’s ability to finance the
Treasury by 15%, the public sector borrowing became increasingly dependent on for-
eign savings where the private commercial banks would borrow from external sources
and use those funds to obtain domestic debt instruments. This borrowing/lending
scheme made the short term capital inflows the main source of public debt financing.
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Ekinci (1996) reported that more than half of the 7.2 billion dollars of external debt
accumulated in early 1990s was short term liabilities in which the foreign liabilities
of the commercial banking sector constituted about 60%. Following the increased
burden of domestic debt, the CBRT started printing money to pay off the govern-
ment debt while Treasury auctions were put on hold in 1993. Paying off the govern-
ment short term liabilities was later interpreted as “insolvent” Turkish government
by Ozatay (1996). The bold shift towards CBRT financing the Treasury by printing
money played an important role in the arrival of 1994 crisis which eventually led to
three digits inflation rate.
The 1994 crisis was characterized by excessive short-term dept, capital outflows,
shortage of foreign exchange, exchange rate depreciation and eventually a sharp deval-
uation of the Turkish Lira. The private commercial banks enjoyed high rates of return
by holding domestic debt instruments and financing the public sector in expense of
operating on extensive open positions in foreign exchange. Several private commercial
bank and other sources of finance for the government rushed to the foreign exchange
market to recover their open foreign exchange positions as suspicion developed about
the government’s ability to meet its short term liabilities2. As a result, the foreign
exchange reserves of the CBRT drained out leading to devaluation of the Turkish
Lira and hence the currency crisis of 1994 verifying the empirical finding by Rodrik
and Velasco (1999) that the short-term debt to reserves ratio is a robust predictor of
financial crises. Immediately after the crisis, although the government announced a
series of resolutions, the April 5th Resolutions, to stabilize the economy and curb the
inflation in line with the Stand-by-Agreement with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), it would soon be abandoned due to disagreements among the members of the
2Ozatay (1996) reported a significant drop in the open foreign exchange positions of the private
commercial banks: a fall from USD 4.9 billion in December 1993 to USD 1.1 billion in June 1994
which highlights the extent of the rush into the foreign exchange market.
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coalition government and the resulting political turmoil. In the following years up to
1998 there would be no other serious attempt to stabilize the economy and govern
the inflation.
In June 26, 1998, the Turkish government declared a three-year Memorandum of
Economic Policies to be performed under the supervision of IMF’s Staff Monitored
Program (SMP). The memorandum contained explicit inflation targets along with
other targeted macroeconomic goals and noted the key reforms needed to be under-
taken. It was stated that the government’s three-year program is aimed to reduce
the wholesale price inflation from over 90 percent at the end of 1997, to 50 percent
by the end of 1998, 20 percent by the end of 1999, and single digits by the end of
20003. It was noted that the autonomy of the central bank is respected, the Trea-
sury should cease to borrow from the CBRT, and finally the CBRT, Treasury, and
the Ministry of Finance should publish their respective quarterly program targets to
achieve coordinated monetary policy. The disinflation program was slightly successful
in curbing the inflation as inflation started move downwards. However, by the end
on 1998, the inflation rate was still about 70% which was 20% points higher than
the aimed inflation target. Similarly some of the fiscal imbalances were removed, yet
the interest rates were still high and got worsened towards the end of 1998 when the
Russian financial crisis (aka the ”Ruble crisis”) hit. In the following year, Turkey was
struck by two consequent devastating earthquakes in August, and October 1999. The
earthquakes were heavily felt in Izmit, an industrialized and densely populated urban
area located in northwestern part of the country where oil refineries, several auto-
motive plants, and the Turkish navy headquarters are located. The earthquakes left
a devastating death toll besides severe economic consequences as reported in Selc¸uk
and Yeldan (2001).
3On December 9, 1999, the CBRT announced a revised list of inflation targets where 20 percent
by the end of 2000, 12 percent by the end of 2001, and 7 percent by the end of 2002 was aimed.
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Having experienced two devastating earthquakes and marginal macroeconomic
achievements, the Turkish government recognized the Memorandum of Economic
Policies of 1999 as unsustainable. Instead, the Turkish government pushed the button
for some structural reforms and adopted a new program, known as the Exchange Rate
Based Stabilization (ERBS) program, in conjunction with the Stand-by-Agreement
with IMF. The government enacted legislations aiming to reform the banking sec-
tor, and the social security system besides political reforms as discussed in Beris and
Gu¨rkan (2001). The central focus of the stabilization program was curbing the in-
flation and stabilizing the foreign exchange market. The program was announced to
be implemented for one and a half year period beginning in January 2000. During
the stabilization program, the CBRT announced a tablita plan where it committed
to keep the percent change in the value of the Turkish Lira against the basket of for-
eign currencies, 1 USD plus 0.7 Euro, fixed as announced on a daily basis beforehand4.
The exchange rate-based stabilization program could only be sustained for thirteen
months. In February 2001, Turkey experienced its deepest financial crisis following
the collapse of its soft exchange rate peg. The February 2001 crisis severely damaged
the country’s financial system and led to an unprecedented contraction in economic
activity. The most direct indicators of the February crisis over the financial markets
were the rapid rate of depreciation of the Turkish Lira (TL), and the sharp rise of
the interest rates on the government’s debt instruments. Yeldan (2002) reported that
the USD/TL nominal parity increased by 96.5%, 116.5%, and 114.5% in the following
three quarters of the crisis, and the real rates of interest on the government’s debt
instruments peaked at level of 117.5% by the end of the first quarter of 2001 casting
doubts on government’s ability to pay off its short-term domestic liabilities. Later in
4Tablita corresponds to a pre-announced crawling peg to some benchmark currency (usually
USD) or a basket of currencies as defined in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
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Table II.1: Foreign Exchange Rate Regimes, 1980-2005
Jan’80 - Apr’94 Crawling peg
Apr’94 - Dec’99 Managed float
Jan’00 - Feb’01 Tablita
Jul’01 - Present Free float
July 2001, the CBRT announced it will keep the exchange rate within a band around
a (fixed) exchange rate, and continue widening the band towards the end of 2002 in
line with a gradual shift towards a more flexible exchange rate program. Table II.1
summarizes the evolution of foreign exchange rate regimes in Turkey since 1980.
The period immediately after the failure of exchange rate stabilization program
and the financial crisis in 2001 is characterized by structural reforms and substantial
changes in laws and regulations vis-a´-vis the political and economic arena. The Turk-
ish Parliament passed several laws including the law granting jure independence to
the CBRT, a banking law, a law of complete reorganization, substantial downscaling
and privatization of the state banks, an agricultural law (removal of the distortive
price floors), a telecommunications law and privatization of Turk Telekom, a civil
aviation law and the introduction of market determined fares, tobacco and sugar in-
dustry regulations law, a public procurement law, and public debt management law in
about four months following the February crisis5. Contrary to the concerns expressed
by Sachs (1997) and Kenen (2002) on the drawbacks of aiming opportunistic and
far-reaching structural reforms in short periods of time, Dervis¸ (2005) argued how
the Turkish reformers “seized the moment” at a time of crisis and achieved several
structural reforms that would be extremely difficult in normal times.
Following the April 2001 amendment to the Central Bank Law, the CBRT ac-
5Beris and Gu¨rkan (2001) gave an extensive description of the enacted laws, regulations, and the
amendments.
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quired operational and jure independence from the political and fiscal authorities
which is often referred as the primary prerequisite for inflation targeting6. In April
2001, shortly after the operational and jure independence granted to the CBRT, the
CBRT declared its new monetary framework: a gradual transition to full-fledged
inflation targeting, starting in January 2002. The monetary framework during 2002-
2005 is often referred, with some ambiguity, to so-called “implicit inflation targeting”
by O¨zatay (2005), Kara (2006), Bas¸c¸ı, O¨zel, and Sarıkaya (2008)7. During the period
of 2002-2005, the CBRT employed two nominal anchors, an explicit “point target”
of inflation and base money in line with the transition period towards a full-fledged
inflation targeting which would become effective in January 2006. Due to the fact
that an announcement of an official inflation target lies at the core of explicit inflation
targeting, I call the period of 2002-2005 a semi-formal inflation targeting (instead of
implicit targeting) period in line with Leiderman and Svensson (1995), and Dueker
and Fischer (1996) where the CBRT announced a stepwise decreasing annual inflation
targets, beside other monetary targets, as a path towards its long-run goal of single
digit annual inflation rate by the end of 20058.
In April 2001, the CBRT explicitly stated and declared achieving and maintaining
price stability as its primary objective9. During the transition period of 2002-2005,
the CBRT started to officially announce its year-end CPI based inflation targets a
6The new law No. 4651 of April 25, 2001 amending Article IV of the Central Bank Law was
quoted as “The primary objective of the Bank shall be to achieve and maintain price stability. The
Bank shall determine on its own discretion the monetary policy that it shall implement and the
monetary policy instruments that it is going to use in order to achieve and maintain price stability.”
7Although official inflation targets were not announced as in explicit inflation targeting, Good-
friend (2003) argued that the FED had in fact committed to “implicit inflation targeting”’during
the Greenspan era of 1987-2006, where FED assigned clear priority to low and stable inflation rates
about 1 to 2 percent range.
8In its January 2, 2002 Press Release, the CBRT announced that it would switch to official full-
fledged inflation targeting when necessary conditions emerge. Later, at the beginning of 2004, the
CBRT declared that it intends to complete its transition by the end of 2005 and switch to full-fledged
inflation targeting effective January 2006.
9The declared mission statement of the CBRT “The primary objective of the Bank shall be to
achieve and maintain price stability has been published” has been published online since April 2001.
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year in advance along with monetary base targets, often considered as complementary
anchor. Ambitious year-end inflation targets of 35%, 20%, 12%, and 8% were officially
announced for the years of 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 respectively. The CBRT
continuously communicated with the general public regarding its targets and actions
it will undertake to reach the announced targets via publishing inflation reports and
press releases, and tried convincing the economic agents that even the most substantial






















Actual inflation rate measures the percentage change in prices over the past 12 months.
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT)
Figure II.2: Inflation Rates, Expectations and Targets, 2002-2005
During the transition period to inflation targeting, the CBRT achieved consider-
able success in terms of reaching its announced inflation targets and price stability
where actual annual inflation rates of 29.7% in 2002, 18.4% in 2003, 9.3% in 2004, and
7.7% in 2005 were reported. Compared to its announced year-end inflation targets,
the CBRT undershot for four consecutive years in transition to full-fledged inflation
targeting as presented in Figure II.2. It’s also shown that the gap between year-
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end inflation expectations and the inflation targets got smaller during the transition
period. Bas¸c¸ı, O¨zel, and Sarıkaya (2008) interpreted undershooting as the CBRT’s de-
liberate attempts to build credibility in line with Cukierman and Muscatelli’s (2002)
finding on the UK that monetary authorities focused heavily on keeping the infla-
tion expectations low in comparison to managing the business cycles when credibility
building was a concern. Carefully designed monetary policies coupled with deliberate
and timely announcements, and consistent policy actions to shape individual’s in-
flation expectations was crucial elements in Turkey’s experience towards successfully
reducing the inflation rates to a single digit level by the end of 200510.
10The significance of inflationary expectations was recognized by the CBRT in its January 2,





Inflation targeting, a twenty year old monetary framework as of 2010, has been
adopted by a number of industrial and emerging economies. As a result, a large lit-
erature has build upon this subject. Walsh (2009) provided a comprehensive survey
of the studies on the effects of inflation targeting on macroeconomic performance and
the provided evidence regarding the design of monetary policy. Inflation targeting
was first introduced by New Zealand in 1990. Although there is some controversy over
the issue of dating the adoption if inflation targeting, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2007) identified the earliest adoption dates of inflation targeting as New Zealand in
1990, Canada and Chile in 1991, United Kingdom in 1992, and Australia 1994. Fol-
lowing the early targeters, inflation targeting spread to several other countries where
it reached to 26 countries explicitly adopted inflation targeting as of 2009. Although
this research has noticeable attributes, it draws upon several empirical and theoretical
studies of inflation targeting and its macroeconomic impacts.
The existing literature that deals with inflation targeting, its relationship with
expectations and its influence on key macroeconomic variables can at least be sum-
marized in three main groups. The first group of studies deal with optimal design
and performance of inflation targeting policies under diverse institutional, legal, and
political environments along with the implications of alternative approaches to the
conduct of monetary policy. Bernanke et al. (1999), Bernanke and Woodford (2005),
and Mishkin (2006) summarized the debate on advantages and the drawbacks of in-
flation targeting policies for several economies. Truman (2003) focused on the impli-
cations of inflation targeting for the functioning of the international financial system
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and the performance of the world economy. Svensson and Woodford (2005) proposed
a rational expectations based theoretical model of inflation-forecast targeting as a
candidate for optimal monetary policy where they showed an inflation-forecast tar-
geting procedure is consistent with optimal equilibrium and it could be a desirable
approach for designing the decision making process in the conduct of a monetary
policy.
Cecchetti and Kim (2005) focused on the design of an optimal targeting policy
where the degree to which overshooting of the long-run target inflation rate should
be followed by deliberate undershooting for a set of, mostly, industrialized economies.
In a similar line of research, Jonas and Mishkin (2005) examined the experiences of
transition economies Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary with inflation targeting
where they documented radical restructuring, democratization process, and the rela-
tionship between government and the central bank is likely to make inflation targeting
more difficult to implement in such economies. They claimed, for the three transition
economies, the substantial restructuring reforms played a significant role in making
these economies often missed the announced inflation targets by large margins. Miss-
ing the announced targets by large margins, they argued, created a vicious cycle
where it is crucial for the central bank avoid under or overshooting of its inflation
targets in order not to jeopardize the fragile political support for the central bank
and its authority in the conduct of monetary policy.
The second group of research examines the persistence properties of inflation and
investigates whether the observed post World War II inflation persistence is structural
and invariant to the shifts in monetary regimes. Although this line of research han-
dles the concept of persistence in inflation from a general standpoint, it is especially
connected to my research question in regards to inflation persistence and whether it
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has any systematic relationship with inflation targeting policies. The general finding
of this second group of studies is that post inflation targeting periods are usually
associated with lower inflation persistence for industrial economies.
Fuhrer and Moore’s (1995) theoretical work on inflation persistence is a milestone
in exploring the mechanism to make inflation persistence found in the data. Their
research documented that the standard Phelps and Taylor overlapping wage contract
model lacks enough inflation persistency observed in post World War II U.S. data.
This finding led Fuhrer and Moore to argue that based on standard contract model,
the predictions on monetary policy goals e.g. the output sacrifice ratio and the vari-
ance of inflation and output, may be unrealistically small or insignificant. Fuhrer
and Moore’s relative contracting model instead concluded that an aggressive disinfla-
tionary policy would yield a marked increase in lost output whereas a credible and
extremely gradual disinflation program would significantly lower the output loss. A
related recent study in similar line of modeling intrinsic inflation persistence is by
Sheedy (2007). Although it’s parallel with Fuhrer and Moore in terms of intrinsic
inflation persistence, Sheedy (2007) proposed a model of price stickiness where firms
are assumed to adjust older rather than newer prices to generate intrinsic inflation
persistence which produced indispensable temporary reduction in economic activity.
Levin and Piger (2004) provided empirical evidence that the degree of inflation
persistence is not an inherent characteristic or structural phenomenon in the sense of
Lucas (1976) for a set of industrial economies. Their research applied Bayesian econo-
metric methods to characterize the dynamic behavior of inflation and persistence for
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Swe-
den, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Many of the countries
they considered went through substantial shifts in their monetary policy framework
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since 1990, particularly the widespread adoption of inflation targeting. Due to such
shifts in the monetary regimes, Levin and Piger (2004) considered possible structural
breaks at unknown dates in the inflation process for each country. They found strong
evidence of structural breaks in inflation series and once they allowed for a break in
intercepts, the inflation measures generally exhibited relatively low inflation persis-
tence. Following a similar line of reasoning, Benati (2008) documented that inflation
in the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, and New Zealand, under inflation target-
ing, followed a near white-noise process criticizing the notion of intrinsic inflation
persistence and that inflation persistence is invariant to shifts in monetary regimes
including the shifts towards inflation targeting.
O’Reilly and Whelan’s (2004) empirical analysis focused on the stability of infla-
tion over time for the Euro-area since 1970, particularly on the behavior of inflation
persistence. The authors documented the facts in relation to structural changes over
time in the processes of inflation persistence. They reported relatively little instabil-
ity in the parameters of the Euro-area inflation process which led them to conclude
that there hasn’t really been significant structural changes in the process of inflation
persistence contrasting the finding by Levin and Piger (2004), and Benati (2008).
The third and the last group of research offers critical evaluations of the macroe-
conomic impacts of inflation targeting for both developed and emerging economies as
it has been implemented in practice thus far. In this respect, there exist numerous
studies falling in this group which address the inflation targeting and its impact on
the level and variability of inflation, output and inflation expectations. Though these
studies can be summarized in different ways, I prefer to categorize them in three main
classes where the first set of studies address empirical and theoretical aspects of infla-
tion targeting and its macroeconomic impacts only for industrialized economies, the
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second set of studies are focused on emerging economies for the same subject matter,
and finally the third set of studies dealing with both industrialized and emerging
economies together. The evidence suggested by several of these studies is that a con-
siderable heterogeneity exists regarding the inflation targeting experiences of both
industrialized and emerging economies i.e. the impact of inflation targeting on vari-
ous macroeconomic variables varies from country to country.
Ball and Sheridan (2003) investigated the impact of inflation targeting for a collec-
tion of industrialized targeting and non targeting economies. They examined not only
the behavior of inflation but also output, and interest rates on various accounts such
as average levels, variability and persistence in these variables . The authors found
similar improvements in macroeconomic performance for both targeting and non tar-
geting economies. In some cases, they found evidence that the inflation targeting
economies performs better e.g. average inflation fell by a larger amount compared
to non targeting economies. However, once they controlled for inflation targeting
economies’ worse macroeconomic performance than non targeting economies prior to
the early 90s (the approximate date of adopting inflation targeting regime), the dif-
ference in macroeconomic performance disappeared which led them to conclude that
the data simply reflects regression to the mean phenomenon.
The empirical study by Wu (2004) which uses a different set of industrialized
targeting economies than Ball and Sheridan (2003) provided evidence that countries
which have officially adopted inflation targeting experienced a decrease in their aver-
age inflation rates after the adoption of the new regime and this estimated effect per-
sists even after controlling for the initial inflation rate. This is a finding negating the
regression to the mean phenomenon. In a similar line of reasoning, Pe´tursson (2004)
studied a collection of both industrialized and emerging inflation targeting economies
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where he provided evidence in favor of inflation targeting for bringing inflation and
its persistency down which is also consistent with the earlier conclusions by Corbo et
al. (2002), Neumann and von Hagen (2002). These findings supports the claim that
the experiences of the emerging economies with inflation targeting differ in compari-
son to industrialized economies. That is why studying individual countries’ targeting
experiences is necessary, especially for the developing or the transition economies,
to pinpoint the true underlying reasons characterizing the behavior of inflation and
expectations.
The empirical studies discussed so far, in one way or another, uses standard econo-
metric techniques where comparison of the economic performance of targeting to non
targeting economies or economic performance prior to post inflation targeting peri-
ods is the essence. There are empirical studies incorporating more recent economet-
ric techniques in addition to the standard empirical methods. Vega and Winkelried
(2005) used a propensity scoring approach to study the effects of inflation targeting
adoption for a sample of 109 countries of which 23 are inflation targeters. With this
approach they found inflation targeting helped reduce the level and volatility of in-
flation in the countries that adopted it and persistence of inflation is rather weak in
targeting economies. Lin and Ye (2007), on the other hand, used a comprehensive
new data set to evaluate the treatment effect of inflation targeting for seven industrial
countries adopted inflation targeting in the 1990s1. These authors provided statisti-
cally insignificant evidence for the treatment effects of inflation targeting on long-term
nominal interest rates often used by policymakers as an indicator of inflation expec-
tations. Empirical results in Willard (2006), and Dueker and Fischer (2006) are also
in line with the studies suggesting little evidence that produces divergence in macroe-
conomic performance of inflation targeting and non targeting economies. Lin and Ye
1These countries are: Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
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(2009), a more recent study utilizing propensity matching methods with a focus on
developing economies only, found statistically significant impact of inflation targeting
on inflation and inflation variability.
The matter that is most related to the objective of this study is the mechanism
and the extent of the impact of inflation targeting on inflation expectations. In this
respect there are several studies attempted to measure the direct impact of targeting
on inflation expectations. Empirical studies by Johnson (2002, 2003) investigated the
effect of inflation targeting on the behavior of inflation expectations for two differ-
ent sets of industrialized economies. Johnson (2002) constructed a panel of eleven
industrial inflation targeting and non targeting economies from 1984 to 20002. He
concentrated on the changes in three aspects of the behavior of expected inflation
following the announcement of inflation targets: the level and variability of expected
inflation and the average absolute size of inflation forecast errors. He found, after
controlling for country and time specific fixed effects, the actual rate of inflation fell
in both targeting and non-targeting economies, and the level of expected inflation in
targeting countries significantly falls following the announcement of inflation targets.
His work provided rather mixed evidence concerning the impact on inflation forecast
errors which seem to suggest that inflation expectations respond differently in target-
ing and non targeting economies. Following this evidence, Johnson (2003) reduced
the list of countries to only targeting industrialized economies, where the focus was
switched to a longer series of prior and post targeting periods. By doing so, he pro-
vided evidence that announced inflation targets reduced the level of expected inflation
for the targeting industrial economies under consideration with the exception of the
United Kingdom. Therefore, one tend to think that even among the targeting indus-
2Johnson (2002) considered targeting economies: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and
United Kingdom, and the non targeting economies: France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Japan,
and the United States.
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trialized economies there may be significant differences in how inflation expectations
respond to the targeting policies implemented.
Empirical studies support the idea that inflation targeting anchor inflation ex-
pectations. Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2006 and 2007) investigated the extent to which
inflation targeting helps the central banks to anchor long-run inflation expectations.
The authors compared the behavior of daily bond yield for some inflation targeting
economies, the United Kingdom and Sweden (2006), and Canada and Chile (2007), to
that of the United States, a non inflation targeting economy. They argued, if 10-year-
ahead forward inflation compensation is relatively insensitive to incoming economic
news, then that would suggest the financial market participants have fairly stable
views regarding the distribution of long-term inflation outcomes, and hence the mone-
tary policy framework has been reasonably successful in anchoring long-term inflation
expectations. They showed that, in the United States, long-term inflation expecta-
tions react to news, suggesting that these expectations were not firmly anchored. In
contrast, no such response was found for Sweden, United Kingdom, Canada and Chile
which are inflation targeting economies. The authors interpreted this finding as an
evidence for inflation expectations being anchored better under inflation targeting
monetary framework.
A closely related study to the current research is by Ravenna (2007) where he
studied whether it is the shift in the management of monetary policy or the reduction
in the volatility of exogenous shocks a more prominent explanation for the Canada’s
period of low and stable inflation3. In his DSGE model, he obtained historical shock
series, which were used to generate counterfactual experiments to examine whether
3The primary focus of Ravenna (2010) is the impact of inflation targeting in reducing inflation
volatility in Canada, which dropped from 2.28 over the 1981-1990 decade to 0.51 over the following
1991-2000 decade, and to 0.48 over the 1991-2005 period as reported in Longworth (2002) and
Murray (2006).
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the inflation time series would have been significantly different under an alternative
monetary policy than inflation targeting. Ravenna reported a significant decline in
inflation volatility in Canada under inflation targeting with most of this decline at-
tributed to the impact of the policy switch on expectations. Monetary policy shocks
are estimated to have non-negligible variance, yet they contributed very little to in-
flation stabilization. His result supports the claim that changes in policy regime can
dramatically affect the economy dynamics by altering private agents’ decision mak-
ing as discussed in Sargent (1999). Although Ravenna recognizes the importance of
managing expectations, he suggested it’s neither the adoption of inflation targeting
regime nor the change in the conduct of policies of the central bank that could ac-
count for the historical improvement in inflation performance in Canada. Instead, it’s
the reduction in the size and the frequency of the shocks hitting the economy, often
referred to as good luck hypothesis, and any other sensible monetary regime with a
focus on managing the expectations would resulted in success.
Levin et al. (2004) evaluated the extent to which inflation targeting has a mea-
surable influence on expectations formation and inflation dynamics. They compared
time-series data since 1994 for five targeting industrialized economies (Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) with that of seven non
targeting countries (the United States, Japan, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and
the Netherlands) where they found that inflation targeting has played a significant
role in anchoring long-run inflation expectations. In relation to emerging economies,
they provided graphical analysis for individual country’s experiences4. In regards to
the behavior of inflation expectations in emerging economies, they concluded that
inflation targeting were not associated with an instantaneous fall in private-sector
inflation forecasts and a marked reduction in the output costs of disinflation.
4The emerging economies they studied are Chile, Czech Republic, Israel, South Africa, South




I adopt a methodology that borrows extensively from Weymark (1995, 1998),
Weymark and Shintani (2006), and Siklos and Weymark (2009). I imagine the cen-
tral bank aiming to reduce inflation in a gradual manner where monetary policy is
conducted through announcements and interest rate changes. Each period the central
bank faces a trade off between inflation and the interest rate in an environment sub-
ject to constant exogenous disturbances. Any exogenous disturbance to the economy
has the potential to generate goods market disequilibria which alters the inflation
rate. Conditional on the nature of the shock and the subsequent potential change in
the inflation rate, the central bank decides whether or not to act the next time the
policy rate is set. When a positive (inflation increasing) shock hits the economy, the
central bank must counteract the potential inflationary pressure whereas a negative
(inflation reducing) shock may be accommodated given that the potential reduction
in the inflation rate is in accordance with the central bank’s timeline for the disinfla-
tion program.
Implementing the outlined methodology above is not straightforward. First, the
sequence of events are not fully observable. Second, there are multiple channels
through which the policy effects inflation. The observed change in the inflation rate
reflects not only the impact of the disturbance on the goods market but also the
changes in the policy variables and other economic variables stimulated by the policy
change. In order to be able to uncover the underlying shock and disentangle the
impact of the policy change, I conduct counterfactual experiments.
26
I am primarily concerned with developing measures that would reflect the environ-
ment, i.e. the nature and the size of the shock, that the monetary authority is faced
when undertaking policy initiative, and provide quantitative measures reflecting the
degree to which policy change influenced the inflationary environment. I use ex ante
inflation pressure to measure the magnitude of the initial disturbance to the economy.
To this end, I conduct a policy experiment where I ask what would have happened
to inflation rate if the central bank had kept its policy instrument constant and no
other variables had responded to that particular disturbance. This counterfactual
exercise gives a measure of the underlying inflationary environment in inflation units
that the policy authority faced at a given point in time, and to which it responded
by implementing the observed interest policy change.
Ex ante inflation pressure and its computation is perhaps most easily understood
through an illustrative example. Consider a closed economy described by the following
structural model:
pit = α0 + α1pit−1 + α2Etpit+1 + α3yt−1 + t (IV.1)
yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + β2Etyt+1 − β3[it−1 − Et−1pit] + ηt (IV.2)
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)[γ0 + γpiEtpit+2 + γyEtyt+1 + σt] (IV.3)
where pit is the inflation rate at time t, yt is the output gap in period t, and it is
the period t nominal interest rate. Etpit+1 is a forward looking variable denoting the
expectation that rational agents form about the future level of inflation in t+1 condi-
tional on information observed through time period t. Similarly Etyt+1 is the rational,
one period ahead expectation of the output gap. Equation (IV.3) is the monetary
authority’s interest rate rule where ρ indicates the degree of interest rate smoothing
reflecting the monetary authority’s tendency to smooth changes in the interest rate
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to reach its nominal target rate. γpi and γy reflects the relative weights placed by the
monetary authority on the expected future inflation and output gap. t, ηt, and σt
are zero mean, independent and identically distributed random disturbance terms.
The structural model used later in this study is different than what is outlined
for illustrative purposes. I use a small open economy framework as opposed to closed
economy. The estimated forward and backward looking lag structure of the empirical
model is more complex than that of the illustrative example. However, the illustrative
example is rich enough to allow addressing all of the technical and methodological
issues that arise in computing inflation pressure in the empirical application in later
chapters.
According to equation (IV.2), the output gap responds to the monetary authority’s
interest policy change one period after the policy is implemented. Similarly, the
inflation rate, in equation (IV.1), responds to output gap with one period delay. To
find the direct impact of the interest rate policy changes on inflation, I lag (IV.2) one
period and substitute it into (IV.1) to get:
pit = α0 + α1pit−1 + α2Etpit+1 + t
+ α3 {β0 + β1yt−2 + β2Et−1yt − β3[it−2 − Et−2pit−1] + ηt−1} (IV.4)
Equation (IV.4) shows that there is a two period control lag between the mone-
tary authority’s policy tool, i, and the inflation rate in this economy. The relationship
between interest rate changes and the inflation rate described in (IV.4) is represented
graphically in Figure IV.1. The trade off curves, IR0, IR1, and IRz, depict the in-
verse relationship between inflation and the interest rate that exists at various points
in time with different sets of state variables describing the environment. The low-
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est curve, IR0, represents the trade-off that existed in period t − 3. The difference
in the position of IR0 and highest curve, IRz, represents the shift in the trade-off
caused by changes in any of the predetermined explanatory variables on the right hand
side of (IV.4) other than it−2. I assume for simplicity that there are no exogenous
expectational shocks, though this framework can handle exogenous expectational dis-
turbances as well.
The distance between IR0 and IRz is a measure of the inflationary environment
that the monetary authority faced at the beginning of time t − 2 and to which it
yet to respond. This distance can be measured horizontally (in interest rate units)
or vertically (in inflation units). I choose to measure the distance between the trade
off curves vertically because I focus on the inflation outcomes as it is the primary
indicator of monetary policy effectiveness.













It is possible to measure the vertical distance between IR0 and IRz at different
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points along the horizontal axis, however, to derive more operational measures, it is
advisable to use as many directly observable variables as possible. I therefore use
the past period’s interest rate, it−3, as benchmark. The impact of the disturbance
that is represented by the shift in the trade off from IR0 to IRz is therefore given by
the vertical distance from pit−1 to pixat in Figure IV.1 at it−3. The vertical distance
between IR0 and IRz, measured at it−3 provides a quantitative characterization of the
inflationary environment that the policy authority faced at the beginning of period
t − 2, and to which it responded when it implemented its interest rate policy in
period t − 2. The size of the vertical distance between IR0 and IRz is the ex ante
inflation pressure at time t, EAIPt, determining the inflation rate that would have
been realized if the interest rate had been held constant and this policy decision had
been correctly anticipated by the economic agents. Using the notation in Figure IV.1,




t − pit−1 (IV.5)
where pixat denotes the inflation rate that would have been observed in period t if
the monetary authority had held its policy instrument constant for a period i.e.
it−2 = it−3.
I have defined a measure to characterize the underlying inflationary environment
that was faced by the monetary authority. Now, I conduct a measurement experi-
ment where I ask to find the magnitude of the inflation pressure left subsequent to
the interest policy change. The size of the inflation pressure that remains after the
implementation of monetary policy is called the ex post inflation pressure.
The observed change in inflation in response to the policy change is a combination
of two forces. When agents form expectations rationally, their expectations about the
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future path of endogenous variables are affected by changes in policy variables as sug-
gested by Lucas critique. In Figure IV.1, the impact of the period it−2 interest rate
policy on expectations is shown as an inward shift of (i.e., improvement in) in the
trade off curve from IRz to IR1. Changes in the interest rate has also a direct im-
pact on inflation through its influence on observed output gap. The direct impact of
interest change on inflation is shown as a movement along the IR1 trade off curve
when interest rate changes from it−3 to it−2 on the horizontal axis. The ex post infla-
tion pressure at time t is graphically measured by the distance between IR1 and IR0
which can be computed by measuring the vertical distance between pixpt and pit−1 at
it−3. However, once the policy change is initiated, the distance between IRz to IR1 is
not observable as it incorporates changes in the expectations which are not observable.
Once the policy rate is changed into it−2, the policy rate itself and the resulting
inflation rate, pit, are observable. The observed information can be used to back out
the position of the IR1 trade off curve. In Figure IV.1, ceteris paribus, I show the
conversion factor between the horizontal distance from it−3 to it−2 and change in
inflation rate attributed to that policy change in inflation units (vertically) to back
out the location of IR1 trade off curve at it−3 and compute the ex post inflation
pressure. Verbally, ex post inflation pressure is defined more precisely as the change
in the inflation rate that would have occurred under the monetary policy actually
implemented in a given period, if the policy authority had unexpectedly maintained
its policy instrument at the same level as in the previous period.
Using the notation in Figure IV.1, the formal definition of Ex Post Inflation Pres-
sure index (EPIP) for period t is given by:
EPIPt = pi
xp
t − pit−1 (IV.6)
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where pixpt denotes the inflation rate that would have been observed in period t if the
monetary authority had unexpectedly held it−2 = it−3.
Up to this point, I went through a graphical exposition of ex ante and ex post
inflation pressure measures. Now, I show the analytical procedure required to per-
form the counter factual experiments needed to obtain measures of ex post and ex
ante inflation pressure. Equation (IV.4) indicates that there is a two period control
lag between the monetary authority’s policy tool, i, and the inflation rate in this
economy. Thus, the conduct of counterfactual experiments and obtaining measures
of ex ante and ex post inflation pressure requires all variables that appear in (IV.4)
expressed in terms of it−2 and earlier. Initially I carry forward the expectation terms
as they appear in (IV.4), but eventually in order to obtain ex ante inflation pressure,
all variables including the expectation terms must be expressed in terms of it−2 and
earlier.
The first step in deriving the counterfactual experiments for inflation pressure is
to recognize the relationships between variables in (IV.4), and how these variables
depend on it−2. According to (IV.4), pit−1 depends on Et−1pit. Et−1pit is a function of
yt−1 which depends on it−2. Lagging (IV.1) and making appropriate substitutions in
(IV.4) yields
pit = A0 + α
2
1pit−2 + A1yt−2 − α3β2it−2 + α2Etpit+1 + α1α2Et−1pit + α3β3Et−2pit−1
+ α3β2Et−1yt + t + α1t−1 + α3ηt−1 (IV.7)
where A0 = α0(1 + α1) + α3β0, and A1 = α3(α1 + β1).
In order to obtain the ex post inflation pressure ∆it−2 has to be expressed in
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inflation equivalent units at it−3. Equation (IV.7) provides conversion factor as−α3β2.
That is to say, ceteris paribus, if the monetary authority had unexpectedly held
it−2 = it−3, the counterfactual inflation rate that would prevail would be pi
xp
t which
can be described as
pixpt = A0 + α
2
1pit−2 + A1yt−2 − α3β2it−3 + α2Etpit+1 + α1α2Et−1pit + α3β3Et−2pit−1
+ α3β2Et−1yt + t + α1t−1 + α3ηt−1 (IV.8)
Notice that the expectations are not adjusted to reflect the counterfactual change in
it−2. This is because I am not asking the question “What would the inflation pressure
has been under a different policy?” I merely try to ascertain what the overall under-
lying inflation pressure is when measured in commensurate inflation units. Thus,
analytically, the ex post inflation pressure is give by
EPIPt = pi
xp
t − pit−1 (IV.9)
Measuring pixpt as given in (IV.9) would pose significant practical problems. However,
a much simpler operational measure can be obtained using observed data. Comparing
(IV.7) and (IV.8) reveals that pixpt can be expressed as
pixpt = pit + α3β2∆it−2 (IV.10)
Thus, the ex post inflation pressure can be measured as1
EPIPt = ∆pit + α3β2∆it−2 (IV.11)
The ex post inflation pressure intends to provide a quantitative measure for the
1Note that the ex post inflation pressure is dated at period t taking into account the two period
control lag between the policy authority’s interest rate instrument, i and the inflation rate.
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remaining inflation pressure subsequent to the implementation of the interest rate
policy. In order to assess the degree to which the policy succeeded in moderating the
inflation pressure that was present prior to the implementation of policy, the overall
response of the variables, including the expectation terms, must be known. Policy
changes have an impact on expectations as suggested by Lucas critique. I back out
the impact of the observed policy change ∆it−2 on the expectational terms and in
order to compute the ex ante inflation pressure. To this end, some assumptions have
to be made in regards to private sector’s expectation formation process. For the sake
of illustration, here I consider rational expectations only. However, in later chapters,
I consider both rational expectations and adaptive learning algorithm to obtain in-
flation pressure measures for comparison.
I consider rational private agents forming expectations where they use both con-
temporaneous and lagged observations of the endogenous variables, pi, y, and i
whereas they observe only the lagged disturbances, , η, and σ. For appropriate
coefficient values, the model described by (IV.1)-(IV.3) has a unique minimal state
variable (MSV) solution. In order to obtain expressions for the expectations appear
in (IV.7) as functions of it−2 and earlier, I conjecture that the MSV solutions for the
endogenous variables, pit, yt, and it, are in the following form.
pit = g0 + g1pit−1 + g2yt−1 + g3it−1 + g4t + g5ηt + g6σt (IV.12)
yt = h0 + h1pit−1 + h2yt−1 + h3it−1 + h4t + h5ηt + h6σt (IV.13)
it = k0 + k1pit−1 + k2yt−1 + k3it−1 + k4t + k5ηt + k6σt (IV.14)
where gi, hj, and kl for i, j, l = 0, 1, 2, . . . 6 are constants.
Equation (IV.7) contains four expectational terms that needs to be expressed in
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terms of it−2 and earlier. These expectations are Etpit+1, Et−1pit, Et−2pit−1, and Et−1yt.
In Appendix (A.1), I explicitly show the steps that need to be undertaken to derive
the expectational terms as functions of it−2 and earlier as in (A.5)-(A.8). Substituting
(A.5)-(A.8) into (IV.7) gives the following expression for pit
pit = Γ0 + Γ1pit−2 − α3β2it−2 + Γ3it−2 + t + (α1 + α2Q4)t−1
+ (α3 + α2Q5)ηt−1 + α2Q6σt−1 (IV.15)
where
Γ0 = A0 + α2Q0 + α1α2G0 + α3β3g0 + α3β1H0
Γ1 = α
2
1 + α2Q1 + α1α2G1 + α3β3g1 + α3β1H1
Γ2 = A1 + α2Q2 + α1α2G2 + α3β3g2 + α3β1H2
Γ3 = α2Q3 + α1α2G3 + α3β3g3 + α3β1H3
Notice that there are two it−2 variables appearing in (IV.15). The former term mea-
sures the direct impact of interest rate changes on inflation through changes in ob-
served variables whereas the latter comes from the expectational terms measuring the
impact of the monetary policy implemented at time t − 2 on the period t inflation
through expectations channel. Setting it−2 = it−3 in (IV.15) to compute pixat in Figure
IV.1 gives
pixat = Γ0 + Γ1pit−2 − α3β2it−3 + Γ3it−3 + t + (α1 + α2Q4)t−1
+ (α3 + α2Q5)ηt−1 + α2Q6σt−1 (IV.16)
Ex ante inflation pressure is defined as EAIPt = pi
xa
t − pit−1. The operational EAIP
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index can be obtained by using (IV.15) and (IV.16) such that
EAIPt = ∆pit + α3β2∆it−2 − Γ3∆it−2 (IV.17)
Although the illustrative example was used to motivate the definitions for ex ante
and ex post inflation pressure, the definitions themselves are model independent. This
means that the methodology described here is completely general and flexible can be
applied to any other model one might prefer.
Monetary policy effectiveness depends not only on the impact of the policy change
on observed inflation but also on the underlying inflationary environment. When a
policy initiative successfully moderates the impact of a disturbance on observed infla-
tion, the remaining observed inflation only partially reflects the inflationary environ-
ment after the implementation of the policy. This is because part of the inflationary
pressure that still exists is absorbed by the interest rate change. Depending on the
degree to which the initiated policy change influenced private agent’s expectations,
smaller or larger interest rate changes might be required to achieve a similar inflation
outcome subsequent to a given shock. Thus, evaluating the overall monetary policy
effectiveness requires measuring the amount of inflation pressure that was dissipated
by the change in the interest rate in addition to the observed change in the inflation
rate. In Figure IV.1, the vertical distance between pixpt and pit−1 is the ex post in-
flation pressure showing the magnitude of inflation pressure that still exist after the
implementation of the policy change. The vertical distance between pixat and pit−1 is
the ex ante inflation pressure that existed before the policy initiative was undertaken.
Comparison of these two measures tells us how much of the existing inflation pressure
was relieved due to the implementation of the policy change i.e. the monetary policy
effectiveness.
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In a situation in which one is concerned with assessing the effectiveness of a stabi-
lization policy, moderation of ex ante inflation pressure is always desirable as studied
by Weymark and Shintani (2006) where they primarily focus on evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of the stabilization policy of the U.S2. The U.S. economy has enjoyed low
levels of inflation especially since the early 1990s and hence the monetary authority’s
focus was on to stabilize prices through moderating the positive or negative distur-
bances hitting the economy. Under such circumstances, it is reasonable to assess
the monetary authority’s effectiveness based on the degree to which the prices were
stabilized. However, measuring policy effectiveness of a central bank with a primary
goal of reducing the inflation to moderate levels requires a slightly different approach
where distinguishing between the nature of the shocks hitting the economy and to
which should the central bank respond in the sake of moderation is important.
A central bank aiming to reduce inflation may accommodates some shocks to
some extent if these shocks are inflation reducing. I study Turkish economy during
a period where the central bank’s goal was to reduce inflation in a gradual manner.
Thus, I measure the monetary authority’s effectiveness by comparing how much of
the inflation pressure was relieved due to the policy initiative and its accordance
with the goal of lowering the inflation level. The monetary authority facing a though
economic environment with significantly high inflationary pressure implements a suc-
cessful interest rate policy which reduces the observed inflation and alleviates part of
the inflationary pressure existed before. That would mean a highly effective monetary
policy has been implemented. On the other hand, an inflation reducing shock hitting
the economy may cause a significant drop in the observed inflation rate where the
respond of the monetary authority to this shock is not the deriving force behind the
2Weymark and Shintani (2006) defined effective price stabilization (EPS) index as EPSt =
1 − ∆pitEAIPt . The EPS index was intended to measure the extent to which the policy authority was
successful in moderating any disturbances hitting the economy.
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observed decline in the inflation rate. The monetary policy action aiming to mod-
erate the impact of the disturbance may even exacerbate the inflation if the policy
change was unnecessarily strong enough reversing the impact of the inflation reducing
exogenous shock. Therefore, evaluating monetary policy effectiveness in reference to
the inflationary environment under which the policy was implemented is crucial.
The ex ante inflation pressure index describes the inflationary environment that
was faced by the monetary authority prior to the policy change. An estimated positive
EAIP value represents a positive (inflation increasing) shock to the economy whereas
a negative EAIP value shows a negative (inflation reducing) shock. If the economy





if EAIPt > 0 (IV.18)
If the economy is subject to a negative shock (NS), the monetary policy effectiveness




if EAIPt < 0 (IV.19)
Notice that the monetary policy effectiveness indices are dated at t−2 recognizing the
fact that there is a two period control lag between the implementation of the policy
and its impact on inflation. So, MPEt−2 essentially tells how successful the monetary
policy implemented in time t − 2 was in reducing the inflation pressure in period t.
Careful reader will also notice that the proposed monetary policy effectiveness indices
compare ex ante and ex post inflation pressure measures which differ only through
an interest rate component as can be seen by comparing (IV.11) and (IV.17). Unlike
the ex post inflation pressure measure, ex ante inflation pressure measure contains an
interest rate component (the second interest rate term) reflecting the impact of inter-
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est policy change on inflation through expectations channel. Therefore, the monetary
policy indices essentially measure the magnitude of the response of the expectations
to the implemented policy change and their subsequent influence on observed infla-
tion.
Under both definitions of policy effectiveness, an index value of 1 indicates that
policy was effective in removing all inflation pressure that existed prior to the im-
plementation of the policy change. An index value of 0, on the other hand, implies
completely ineffective policy. Index values between 0 and 1 indicate partial effective-
ness in reducing the inflation pressure.
When ex ante inflation pressure is positive, MPE index value greater than 1 in-
dicates that monetary policy has more than counteracted the positive shock and
achieved to alleviate all inflation pressure and reduce observed inflation. Negative
MPE index values show highly ineffective policy where the action of the monetary
policy reinforced the impact of the shock increasing the inflation in the economy.
Negative values of ex ante inflation pressure describes a favorable inflationary envi-
ronment for a monetary authority wishing to reduce inflation. When ex ante inflation
pressure is negative, MPE index value greater than 1 indicates highly effective policy
where the monetary authority took advantage and reinforced the inflation reducing
shock and successfully reduced the inflation. A negative MPE index value, on the
other hand, is a sign of highly ineffective policy where the monetary policy action ex-
acerbate the inflation reversing the impact of the inflation reducing exogenous shock.
The methodological procedures explained above consider situations in which the
predominant shock to the status quo is some exogenous disturbance that does not
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originate with the policy authority itself. In this case, the policy authority would
respond to exogenous shocks hitting the economy. However, when the monetary au-
thority implements a regime, such as inflation targeting, where announcements are
made on a systematic basis, the sequence of events is different which makes disen-
tangling the impact of the exogenous shock more difficult. In this environment, the
policy initiative is two dimensional; making announcements and conduct of interest
rate policy. The sequence of the events is such that the monetary authority’s an-
nouncement and the exogenous shock disturb the economy, then the interest rate
policy is undertaken. No matter the timing between the announcements made and
the shocks hitting the economy, the environment faced by the monetary authority
at the beginning of the implementation of the interest rate policy is described by
the inflationary pressure generated by the exogenous shocks and the announcements
made by the monetary authority. Under such circumstances, the ex ante and ex post
inflation pressure indices become indistinguishable.
When the monetary authority make announcements directed towards changing the
underlying inflationary environment, there no longer exists a pure exogenous change
to the environment which can be used to assess the impact of the overall policy ini-
tiative. The interest rate policy changes are made in an environment described by
inflationary expectations due to some exogenous shock and the announcements made.
Therefore, the monetary policy effectiveness measure discussed above reflects the ef-
fectiveness of the interest rate policy changes only. Quantifying the impact of the
announcements to be able to assess the effectiveness of the monetary policy overall
requires a new benchmark. I consider the change in inflation expectations that would
have been generated by the policy (announcements and interest rate changes) that
was implemented if that policy had been perceived as perfectly credible as the new
benchmark.
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There are two reasons for choosing this benchmark. First, it may allow us to
gain some insight into the ongoing controversy that centers around the unresolved
question of whether the observed reduction in inflation after inflation targeting is the
result of targeting or whether the inflationary environment improved on its own at
the time of the inflation targeting was implemented so that virtually any sensible
regime would have been just as successful. Second, we may be able to quantify the
evolution of credibility under inflation targeting or other monetary regimes associated
with making periodical inflation target announcements.
The main problem that arises with the new benchmark is that it is not in any
sense exogenous. Rather, it is one possible endogenous response to the policy initia-
tive itself and will only be observed when the policy is, in fact, perfectly credible.
As in the case of ex ante inflation pressure, conduct of counterfactual experiments is
required to obtain a measure of the benchmark. Unlike the ex ante inflation pressure
which captures the size of an exogenous shock, the new benchmark can be obtained
by imputing, from the observed data and the structure of the economy, the magnitude
of the expectational change that would have occurred under full credibility. I call the
measure for this new benchmark expectations of inflation under full credibility (XIFC)
which clearly requires somewhat more complex counterfactual experiment than that
needed to obtain ex ante inflation pressure. I then obtain a measure for expectations
of inflation under true credibility (XITC) which essentially is identical to the ex post
inflation pressure index to construct an index of monetary policy credibility.
I use the illustrative model above described by (IV.1)-(IV.3) to derive analytical
constructs for the measures of inflation expectations under full credibility (XIFC),
inflation expectations under true credibility (XITC), and monetary policy credibility
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index (MPCI). It is apparent from (IV.4) that there is a two period control lag be-
tween the monetary authority’s policy tool, i, and the inflation rate. Consider that
the monetary authority publicly announces piTt in advance as its inflation target for
period t prior to the implementation of its interest rate policy. Given the publicly
known announcement, the best the policy authority can do with the information
available in period t− 2 is to set it−2 at the level that will ensure Et−2pit = piTt .
Taking expectation of both sides in (IV.4) conditional on the information available
in period t− 2 results in:
Et−2pit = α0 + α1Et−2pit−1 + α2Et−2[Etpit+1]
+ α3 {β0 + β1yt−2 + β2Et−2[Et−1yt]− β3[it−2 − Et−2pit−1]}(IV.20)
where it has been assumed that yt−2 is contemporaneously observable by the mone-
tary authority. The policy instrument, it−2, must, of course, be known to the policy
authority. The notation Et−2[Etpit+1] reflects the expectation that the policy author-
ity forms in period t − 2 about the expectations that the private sector will hold in
period t+ 1. The interpretation of Et−2[Et−1yt] is analogous. Under the assumption
that the policy authority announces its inflation targets one period ahead, and that
these inflation targets are fully credible, Et−2[Etpit+1] = piTt+1. Given that the policy
authority is committed to inflation targeting program, it must also be the case that
Et−2[pit−1] = piTt−1 and Et−2pit = pi
T
t . The monetary authority’s expectation about
Et−1yt depends on how much information it has about the way in which the pri-
vate agents formulate their expectations of output gap. I consider that the monetary
authority knows whether the private agents are fully rational or form expectations
according to the process of adaptive learning and that the monetary authority use
this information in forming its own expectations in period t− 2. For the purposes of
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the present illustration, I assume rational private agents and that the minimum state
variable solutions for pit, yt, and it are given by (VII.8)-(VII.10).
In order to conduct counterfactual experiments as in obtaining ex ante inflation
pressure, Et−2[Et−1yt] must be expressed in terms of it−2 and earlier. Appendix A.1
shows the analytical steps needed to obtain Et−2[Et−1yt] as a function of it−2 and
earlier as described by (A.9) . Substituting (A.9), Et−2pit = piTt , Et−2[pit−1] = pi
T
t−1,
and Et−2[Etpit+1] = piTt+1 into (IV.20) and solving for it−2 yields the interest rate





piTt − Λ0 − Λ1pit−2 − Λ2yt−2 − Λ4piTt−1 − Λ5piTt+1
}
(IV.21)
where Λi for i = 0, 1, 2 . . . , 5 are constants as defined in Appendix A.1.
Under fully credible targeting regime, Etpit+1 = pi
T
t+1, Et−1pit = pi
T
t , and Et−2pit−1 =
piTt−1 must hold turning (IV.7) into
piFCt = A0 + α
2
1pit−2 + A1yt−2 − α3β2it−2 + α2piTt+1 + α1α2piTt + α3β3piTt−1
+ α3β2Et−1yt + t + α1t−1 + α3ηt−1 (IV.22)
where piFCt stands for fully credible inflation rate at time t. In order to solve for
inflation rate that would have been achieved under a fully credible inflation targeting
regime, Et−1yt must be expressed in terms of it−2 and earlier as shown in Appendix







2yt−2 − α3β2iTt−2 + α3β2H3iTt−2 + α2piTt+1 + α1α2piTt
+ α3β3pi
T








1 + α3β2H1, and Γ
′
2 = A1 + α3β2H2.
In order to determine the expectational change that would have occurred under
a fully targeting system, the part of piFCt that is attributable to expectations and
the implementation of the impact of the interest rate policy must be distinguished.
To this end, I conduct a counterfactual policy experiment in which I ask what the
inflation rate would have been if private agents had considered the announced targets
to be fully credible, but the monetary authority had then held the interest rate at
its previous level, it−2, rather than implementing iTt−2. This counterfactual policy
experiment results in counterfactual fully credible inflation rate give by:
pˆiFCt = pi
FC
t − α3β2(H3 − 1)∆iTt−2 (IV.24)
where pˆiFCt is the counterfactual fully credible inflation rate at time t and ∆i
T
t−2 =
iTt−2− it−3. When piTt is publicly known, then the inflation rate that is attributable to
expectations under full credibility is given by
pˆiFCt = pi
T
t + α3β2(1−H3)∆iTt−2 (IV.25)
Thus, the benchmark measure for expectations of inflation under full credibility
(XIFC) is obtained as
XIFCt = [pi
T
t − pit−1] + α3β2(1−H3)∆iTt−2 (IV.26)
Under true degree of credibility, the inflation rate is given by (using (IV.22))
piTCt = A0 + α
2
1pit−2 + A1yt−2 − α3β2it−2 + α2piTt+1 + α1α2piTt + α3β3piTt−1
+ α3β2Et−1yt + t + α1t−1 + α3ηt−1 (IV.27)
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The impact of expectations under true credibility is obtained by setting it−2 = it−3 in
(IV.27) with expectations held constant under actual policy. Thus, the expectations
of inflation under true credibility (XITC) is given by
XITCt = [pit − pit−1] + α3β2∆it−2 (IV.28)
Given the measures for the expectations of inflation under full credibility and true





Measures of expectations of inflation under full credibility and true credibility,
and the associated estimated index values are perhaps understood the best using an
illustrative diagram. Figure IV.2 depicts changes in the expectations due to fully
and partially credible, and non credible announcements. Change in expectations
under full credibility is given by the vertical distance between pˆiFCt − pit−1 < 0. The
vertical distance between piACPt − pit−1 < 0 shows the change in expectations under
true partial credibility. In general, if the announced inflation targets are not credible
and private agents don’t believe in the inflation reduction program, then the change
in expectations is given by the vertical distance between piACNt − pit−1 > 0.
Monetary policy credibility index value of 1 indicates perfectly credible policy
whereas an index value of 0 reflects complete lack of credibility. Intermediate degrees
of credibility lie between 0 and 1. While index values grater than 1 indicates super
credibility, negative index values refer to negative credibility.
Negative credibility may occur due to political or economic conditions. Credibility
index can take negative values if private agents don’t believe the monetary authority
can continue reducing the inflation at the current rate because piTt has been undershot
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too many times. If the credibility index is negative due to successive undershooting,
this does not necessarily reflect the lack of credibility of the whole inflation reduction
program, but rather a temporary disbelieve in the current announcement.
The monetary policy credibility index takes values greater than 1 (super cred-
ibility) when people believe the policy authority’s true inflation target lies below
the announced target due to observing successive undershooting. In this case, the
announced target itself may be not credible, but the monetary authority’s inflation




I consider a small open economy version of the monetary model in Clarida, Gal`ı
and Gertler (2000), Fuhrer (2002), and Rudebusch (2002). My goal is to lay out
an appropriate representation of the underlying structural model and assess mone-
tary policy effectiveness in Turkey in 1996-2005. I use hybrid type IS and Phillips
curves, forward looking interest rate rule, and a hybrid type uncovered interest parity
condition. The model considered here has a much more complex lag structure than
the illustrative model employed in Chapter IV. However, thanks to the model in-
dependent inflation pressure indices, the same methodology is appropriately applied.
Numerous estimations has been undertaken to arrive at the specified equations with
the described backward and forward looking lag structure. The structural model
considered here was selected based on the goodness of fit and the reliability of the
in sample estimates to be able to demonstrate the underlying model for the Turkish
economy.
The period under investigation is characterized by structural reforms and changes
in political and economic arena as discussed in Chapter II. Thus, I use anecdotal
evidence and Bai and Perron’s (1998, 2003) multiple structural break analysis to
locate possible structural break dates in the structural model. Empirical results show
no significant evidence for structural breaks in the Phillips curve, IS schedule, and the
uncovered interest parity condition. However, the monetary policy reaction function
is subject to several breaks which I discuss in detail below in Section V.3. The fact
that no structural breaks have been found in the structural equations reflects the
stability of the underlying structural model.
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V.1 The IS curve
I consider an open economy version of the forward looking expectational IS curve
specification as the benchmark. The IS curve can be described as
yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + β2yt−2 + β3Etyt+1 + β4[it−2 − Et−2pit−1]− β5∆qt−1 + ηt (V.1)
where yt is the output gap, it is the nominal interest rate, pit is the domestic inflation
rate, qt is the real depreciation of the domestic exchange rate, and Et is the expec-
tation operator conditional on information observed through time period t. Output
gap is measured as the deviation from its long-run trend. This form of IS curve
is also known as hybrid IS curve specification as in Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004),
and Goodhart and Hofmann (2005). The IS curve specification includes both back-
ward and forward looking elements to capture the extent of endogenous persistence
in output and inflation. The current specification differs from the traditional IS curve
formulation mainly because current output gap depends on expected future output
gap as well as real interest rate, it−2 − Et−2pit−1. Theoretically, β4 is expected to be
negative, so that a rise in the real interest rate reduces the current output gap due to
intertemporal substitution of consumption. Output gap persistence is expected to be,
a priori, positive, so that β1 > 0, β2 > 0, and β3 > 0 as suggested by the consumption
smoothing hypothesis. The last coefficient, β5, reflects the responsiveness output gap
to real exchange rate variations in contrast to the canonical open economy framework
in Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2002) where the responsiveness output gap to real ex-
change rate variations is assumed to be zero. As the real exchange rate changes,
domestic output is affected by a magnitude depending on the size of import and ex-
port elasticities of demand i.e there is no strong prior for the sign of the last coefficient.
By definition, the real exchange rate depreciation reflects both nominal exchange
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rate depreciation, ∆et, and the difference between domestic and foreign inflation
rates1.
∆qt−1 = ∆et−1 − (pit−1 − pi∗t−1) (V.2)
V.2 The Phillips curve
I use a version of the hybrid econometric specification for the Phillips curve following
Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999, 2000, 2002). The Phillips curve is described as
pit = α0 + α1pit−1 + α2Etpit+2 + α3yt−4 − α4∆qt−1 + t ; α1, α2, α3 > 0 (V.3)
with all variables as previously defined. The hybrid specification allows inflation de-
pend on a convex combination of lagged inflation as well as expected future inflation
to permit measuring the degree of inertia in inflation. In theory, inflation has inertia
implying α1 > 0. Expected inflation pressures the current inflation upward which
implies α2 > 0. Similarly, an anticipated rise in the output gap is considered to be in-
flationary, so that α3 > 0. I use alternative output gap measures, instead of marginal
cost, as the relevant indicator of real economic activity. In doing so, I rely on the claim
that marginal cost has a close relationship with correctly measured output gap sug-
gested by Woodford (2001), Gal´ı (2002), and Nelson and Kalin (2003). Using output
gap measure also facilitates comparison with the related studies. The last coefficient,
α4, reflects the responsiveness of inflation to real exchange rate variations, and there
is not a strong prior for it’s sign. The use of hybrid Phillips curve specification is
usually praised by empirical studies as it provides a better first-order approximation
to the inflation process. It is also important to note that, under a hybrid specification
Phillips curve, disinflation is a costly process leading to reductions in output.





where Pt and P
∗
t are the domestic and foreign
price levels respectively. Log differencing the both sides of the equation gives ∆qt = ∆et− (pit−pi∗t ).
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V.3 Monetary policy reaction function
I consider a version of forward looking interest rate rule following Clarida, Gal´ı, and
Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000). The interest rate rule is described as
iTt = i
∗ + γpi[Etpit+k − piT ] + γyyt−q + γ′yEtyt+s (V.4)
where iTt is the target nominal interest rate in period t, i
∗ is the benchmark real inter-
est rate i.e. the long run equilibrium real interest rate, piT is the inflation target rate,
pit+k is the inflation rate from period t to t+k, yt−q is the lagged output gap between
periods t and t − q, and yt+s is the output gap from period t to t + s. Output gap
is defined as the level of deviation from its long run trend i.e. the level of deviation
from its potential.
As in Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1998, 2000), I allow for gradual adjustment of
the nominal interest rate to the target as described by
it = (1− ρ)iTt + ρit−1 + ζt (V.5)
where the parameter ρ indicates the degree of (positive) interest rate smoothing, it
is the actual nominal interest rate, and ζt is an i.i.d error term . Partial adjustment
mechanism given in (V.5) reflects the central bank’s tendency to smooth changes
in the interest rate by eliminating the gap between its current nominal target rate
and the previous periods actual rate. Substituting the interest rate rule, (V.4), into
the partial adjustment equation, (V.5), yields the monetary policy reaction function
described as
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)
[








y, γy > 0, k, q, s > 0
where ρ indicates the degree of (positive) interest rate smoothing, γpi, γ
′
y, and γy mea-
sure the relative weights placed by the central bank on the expected future inflation,
expected future and past output gap, i is the nominal interest rate, and σt is the error
term. The Taylor principle implies that γpi > 0, so that a rise in expected in infla-
tion results in a proportionately larger response in the domestic policy instrument, it.
Theoretical considerations suggest that γ
′
y, γy > 0 i.e. an increase in output gap, an
excess demand, pulls inflation up which prompts the monetary authority to raise the
interest rates to stabilize the prices. The values for k, q, and s are determined based
on the goodness of fit of the estimates obtained as a result of numerous estimations
with different lag length and combinations of forward and backward looking compo-
nents.
The period under investigation is characterized by structural changes concerning
both fiscal and monetary authorities as summarized in Chapter II. Besides, the mon-
etary authority adopted distinct monetary stabilization programs e.g. the major shift
towards inflation targeting occurred during 1996-2005. The existence of structural
changes and hence the implied changes in the conduct of monetary policy signals for
potential structural breaks in the monetary policy reaction function. These structural
breaks need to be handled carefully in order to be able to characterize the central
bank’s policy reactions properly. I take a step-by-step approach to deal with the
possible structural breaks in the monetary policy rule.
The monetary policy reaction function with m structural breaks (m + 1 regime)
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can be re-written as
it = ρ











where j = 1, ...,m+ 1. In this formulation, j = 1 would mean there is a single regime
(no structural breaks), or j = 2 would mean that there were two distinct regimes (one
structural break) associated with significantly different estimates for the coefficients
in the monetary policy reaction function. Moreover, under distinct monetary regimes,
the forward and backward looking lag structure in the monetary policy reaction func-
tion may differ.
First, I use anecdotal evidence to find structural break dates in the monetary pol-
icy reaction function. I consider February 2001 as a potential break date. There are
several reasons behind this consideration. Turkey experienced a deep financial crisis
in February 2001 following the collapse of its soft exchange rate peg in line with the
exchange rate based stabilization program launched in January 2000. In the following
few months after the crisis, several structural reforms took place along with several
amendments to major legislations governing the fiscal and financial sector including
the amendment to the central bank law recognizing the the central bank as an inde-
pendent entity capable of designing and conducting monetary policies independent
from the fiscal authorities. In line with the undertaken structural reforms granting the
central bank’s independence, the CBRT announced it will implement, which I call,
semi-formal inflation targeting beginning January 2002 in April 2001. Given that
several structural and operational steps concerning the monetary policy were taking
place right after February 2001, and these steps ended up at the clearly distinct mone-
tary framework, it’s reasonable to consider February 2001 as a structural break point.
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The existence of a structural break date in February 2001 in the monetary policy
reaction function produces two regimes i.e. two segments of data: the data associated
with, generally speaking, exchange rate based stabilization programs, and the data
observed during the period of semi-formal inflation targeting. There maybe addi-
tional structural breaks within each segment of data before and after February 2001
supported by some anecdotal evidence. During the period of Jan’1996 - Feb’2001, the
CBRT went through two different exchange rate based price stabilization programs.
Mar’01 - Dec’05, on the other hand, is a transition period to full-fledged inflation
targeting during which several legislative reforms, and adjustments took place. It
is reasonable to think that implementation of the reforms in practice required time
which means, for instance, that the operational conduct of monetary policy substan-
tially differed during the earlier and later stages of the transition period. That’s to
say, there may be substantial differences between the estimates describing the mone-
tary policy reaction function in the earlier and later phases of the transition period.
I described the possibility of additional break dates occurring at unknown dates
within the monetary policy reaction functions before and after February 2001. To test
this conjecture and provide statistical evidence, I use the methodology developed by
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to estimate break dates. Bai and Perron’s methodology
can be described in two parts where they provide a least squares based algorithm
for estimating the unknown break dates, and conducting inference based on a series
of significance tests, and suggestions for how to interpret the various tests based on
asymptotic critical values. I refer the reader to Appendix (A.2) for more details on
the Bai and Perron’s methodology. Below, I apply Bai and Perron’s methodology to
the monetary policy reaction function described in (V.7) for each segment of the data
before and after February 2001 to locate structural break dates (if any).
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First, I investigate potential structural break dates in Mar’01 - Dec’05. For that
purpose, I apply the Gauss routine provided by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to the
interest rate rule in (V.7). I assume k = 3, q = 6, and γ
′
y = 0 since the period of
Mar’01 - Dec’05 is best characterized by such forward and backward lag structure2.
Following Bai and Perron, I consider homoskedastic and not serially correlated distur-
bance terms as the lag of the dependent variable is included in the regression. I allow
up to two breaks and use a trimming  = 0.25 which secures at least 14 observations
in each subsample given that breaks are found. The empirical results are presented
in Table V.1.
Table V.1: Estimated structural break dates in Mar’01 - Dec’05
Specifications
zt = 1 q = 4 p = 0
m = 2  = 0.25 h = 14
Tests 
supFT (1) supFT (2) UDMax WDMax
36.51∗ 26.23∗ 36.51∗ 36.51∗
supF (2|1)
17.74∗








Estimated break dates §
T1 T2
April’02 Oct’03
(Mar’02 - Jun’02) (Jun’03 - Feb’04)
Notes: The residuals are pre-whitened using a VAR(1). I use the sequential test
supFT (k+1|k) at the significance level of 5%. §In parentheses are the 95% confidence
intervals for Ti (i = 1, 2) using corrected standard errors (robust to serial correlation).
* Significance at the 5% level. ′′ LWZ is the Modified Schwarz Criterion proposed
by Liu, Wu, and Zidek (1997). ′ Bayesian Information Criterion.
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) suggest choosing the number of breaks first by check-
2The Gauss code to implement Bai and Perron’s (1998, 2003) methodology is available online at
Perron’s home page, http://people.bu.edu/perron/code.html
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ing supF (m|0) and confirm that there is at least one break, and if so, then the largest
k can be found where the supF (k + 1|k) value is no longer significant based on the
critical values. Following this procedure, I first consider supFT (m|0) tests to deter-
mine all possible and statistically significant candidates for the structural break dates
in the data. Empirical findings show that supFT (1|0) and supFT (2|0) tests are signif-
icant at the 5% significance level. This suggests at least one break is present in the
monetary policy reaction function.
Next, supF (2|1) test takes the value of 17.74 which is significant at the 5% level
suggesting two break dates in the monetary policy reaction function. The estimated
break dates are April’02, and Oct’03. Note that the estimated break date Oct’03
coincides with the date of the announcement made by the CBRT in Jan’04 that it
will switch to full-fledged inflation targeting beginning Jan’06. While the sequential
procedure (using a 5% significance level) finds two breaks, the BIC, and the modified
Schwarz criterion of Liu, Wu, and Zidek (1997) find a single break. It is documented
that the information criteria are usually biased downward and that the sequential
procedure tests perform better suggesting in favor of two break dates. Having said
that, the empirical estimation of the monetary reaction function using the estimated
two break dates may be problematic due to the poor performance of estimation with
small sample size. Hence, I decide to operate using the estimated break date at Oct’03
only in line with the conjecture that monetary authority obtained more expertize in
the conduct of semi-formal inflation targeting and that its policy initiatives became
even more influential. This decision results in two segments of data during Mar’01 -
Dec’05; Mar’01 - Sep’03 and Oct’03 - Dec’05. The first segment contains thirty one,
and the second segment has twenty seven observations securing enough sample size
to overcome the poorer empirical performance that would have occurred with smaller
samples.
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Second, I turn my focus on locating potential structural break dates in Jan’96 -
Oct’003. As before, I apply the Gauss routine to (V.7) where k = 3, q = 5, and
γ
′
y = 0 is assumed since the entire period of Jan’96 - Oct’00 is best characterized by
such forward and backward lag structure. I consider homoskedastic and not serially
correlated disturbance terms as the lag of the dependent variable is included in the
regression. I allow up to three breaks and use a trimming  = 0.20 which secures at
least 11 observations in each subsample given that breaks are found. The empirical
results are presented in Table V.2.
Table V.2: Estimated structural break dates in Jan’96 - Oct’00
Specifications
zt = 1 q = 4 p = 0
m = 3  = 0.20 h = 11
Tests 
supFT (1) supFT (2) supFT (3) UDMax WDMax
18.31∗ 16.68∗ 15.55∗ 18.31∗ 22.61∗
supF (2|1) supF (3|2)
16.88∗ 22.99∗








Estimated break dates §
T1 T2 T3
Nov’96 Nov’98 Oct’99
(Oct’96 - April’97) (Sep’98 - Dec’98) (Jul’99 - Feb’00)
Notes: The residuals are pre-whitened using a VAR(1). I use the sequential test supFT (k + 1|k) at the
significance level of 5%. §In parentheses are the 95% confidence intervals for Ti (i = 1, 2) using corrected
standard errors (robust to serial correlation). * Significance at the 5% level. ′′ LWZ is the Modified Schwarz
Criterion proposed by Liu, Wu, and Zidek (1997). ′ Bayesian Information Criterion.
Empirical findings in Table V.2 show that supFT (1|0), supFT (2|0), and supFT (3|0)
3Note that four outlier data points are dropped off the sample. These data points belong to the
period of Nov’00 - Feb’01 which is associated with severe financial crisis of February 2001. Given
that there is a small number of observations at hand, outlier data points are dropped to have a
better representation of the entire period of Jan’96 - Oct’00.
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tests are significant at the 5% significance level. This finding suggests that at least one
break date exist in the monetary policy reaction function during the period of Jan’96 -
Oct’00. It also shown that supF (2|1) and supF (3|2) tests take the values of 16.88 and
22.99 respectively. These test values are significant at the 5% level suggesting three
break dates in the monetary policy reaction function. The estimated break dates
during Jan’96 - Oct’00 are given by Nov’96, Nov’98, and Oct’99. It is important
to note that the estimated break dates of Nov’98, and Oct’99 coincides with the
declaration of the Memorandum of Economic Policies in Jun’98 and the beginning of
Exchange Rate Based Stabilization (EBRS) program in Jan’00. While the sequential
procedure (using a 5% significance level) finds three breaks, the BIC, and the modified
Schwarz criterion of Liu, Wu, and Zidek (1997) find a single break. As I discussed
before, small sample size is a serious problem when it comes to empirical estimation.
Hence, I decide to operate using the estimated break date at Nov’98 only which has a
rather narrower confidence interval, besides it’s supported by the anecdotal evidence.
This decision results in two segments of data during Jan’96 - Oct’00; Jan’96 - Nov’98
and Dec’98 - Oct’00. The first segment contains thirty five, and the second segment
has twenty three observations providing enough sample size to overcome the poor
empirical performance that would have occurred with smaller samples.
V.4 Uncovered Interest Parity condition
Turkey is considered to be small open economy. To close the small economy model,
I innovate a hybrid style uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition to represent the
exchange rate movements. Uncovered interest parity is usually rejected in empirical
data (aka the forward premium puzzle), but is, nevertheless, widely used as a bench-
mark for the purpose of explaining international interest rate differentials4. I consider
4There is a vast literature on the forward premium puzzle including Frankel (1979), Hansen and
Hodrick (1980), Fama (1984), and Froot and Thaler (1990). Engel (1996) provided an extensive
survey of the early studies on the forward premium anomaly. More recent contributions to the
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the following uncovered interest parity condition
et = φ1et−1 + φ2Etet+1 + φ3(it−1 − i∗t−1) + νt (V.8)
where et is the nominal exchange rate (USD per Turkish Lira, TL), i
∗
t−1 is the short-
term foreign (U.S.) nominal interest rate that is comparable to the domestic nominal
interest rate, it−1, and νt is random disturbance term. The hybrid style uncovered
interest parity incorporates both backward and forward looking components, and an
interest rate differential term which is not conventional. The traditional UIP condi-
tion incorporates forward looking exchange rate and interest rate differential with no
reference to the lagged exchange rate term. Recent empirical studies attempted to
explain exchange rate movements using random walk process. Having recognized the
existing controversy in modeling exchange rate movements and forecasting, I applied
both of the approaches commonly used in the literature. It turns out using a mixture
of the two approaches gives the best in sample representation of the exchange rate
movements in Turkey during 1996-2005 which is the primary concern in this study.
problem are made by Meredith and Ma (2002), Engel and West (2006), Burnside, Eichenbaum,
Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2008), Backus, Gavazzoni, Telmer, and Zin (2010) among several others
surveyed by Engel (2011).
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CHAPTER VI
DATA & PRELIMINARY EMPIRICS
This study uses monthly frequency data covering the period of 1996m1-2005m12.
Table VI.1 gives an overview of the data, definitions, and the sources. The domestic
inflation rate, pi, is defined as the monthly percentage changes in the Consumer Price
Index for all items (CPI General) obtained from the Central Bank of the Republic
of Turkey. The corresponding foreign inflation rate, pi∗, representing the price level
in the “rest of the world” is the U.S. monthly inflation rate measured by percentage
changes in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers for the U.S.
Table VI.1: Data Description
Data Sources:
TURKSTAT : Turkish Statistical Institute
CBRT : Central Bank of Republic of Turkey
OECD : Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
FRED : Federal Reserve Economic Data
Turkish Variables
pit : Inflation rate, monthly % changes in the CPI, Overall
it : Interest rate, interbank overnight rate (monthly average) (%)
yt : Output gap, Industrial Production Index (1997=100)
et : Nominal exchange rate, USD/TL (monthly average)
U.S. Variables
pi∗t : Inflation rate, monthly % changes in the CPI for
all urban consumers (1982-84=100)
i∗t : Interest rate, Federal Funds Rate (monthly average) (%)
I consider overnight interbank interest rate to measure the domestic short-term in-
terest rate, i, the policy instrument of the CBRT’s monetary policy. Following the line
of reasoning and the empirical evidence provided by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) on
the use of federal funds rate as the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy stance, Kalkan,
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Kipici, and Peker (1997), and Berument and Malatyalı (2000) provided empirical evi-
dence that overnight interbank interest rates in Turkey can be used as an appropriate
measure of the CBRT’s monetary policy stance. I obtain monthly measure of the
domestic short-term interest rate, i, by taking the weighted average of the daily in-
terbank overnight interest rates. The corresponding foreign short-term interest rate,
i∗, is the U.S. Federal Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS) measured as the monthly average
of the daily rates.
I use monthly series of Industrial Production (IP) Index published by the Turk-
ish Statistical Institute to obtain a measure for the output gap. Figure VI.1 gives a
sketch of the IP index over the period of Jan’96 - Dec’05 in Turkey. The IP index
measures output in manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities industries
in Turkey. Ideally one would like to have monthly GDP or GNP figures to measure
output gap. However these indicators are not available on a monthly basis. The high-
est frequency for the GDP and the GNP data is on quarterly basis in Turkey. Due
to unavailable monthly GDP or GNP figures and the fact that changes in industrial
production closely follows the changes in GDP and GNP figures, I rely on IP index
figures to derive measures of output gap. Having said that, I consider different output
gap measures using linear and non-linear de-trending techniques.
Following the usual practice, I first apply Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to the
monthly IP index data with smoothing parameter, λ = 14, 400. I then experiment
HP filtering using a smoothing parameter of λ = 129, 600.1. Next, I apply quadratic
and cubic de-trending techniques to measure output gap. Finally, I employ Dufour,
Khalaf and Kichian’s (2006) iterative de-trending procedure to obtain a measure for
1Common wisdom has been to use λ = 1600 when applying the HP filter to quarterly economic
data. For other frequencies, Ravn and Uhlig (2002) have shown that quite different values should
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Figure VI.1: Industrial Production Index, 1997=100
the output gap. Dufour, Khalaf and Kichian’s (2006) de-trending procedure is way
of de-trending of the variable of interest iteratively rather than de-trending observa-
tions using the full sample of observations all at once. To implement the iterative
de-trending procedure, first HP filter is applied to a sub sample of the observations
to find the value of the gap (the cycle) at time t using the data ending in time t
only. Then the sample is extended by one more observation and the HP de-trending
re-applied which yields a value for the gap at time t + 1. This process is repeated
until the end of the sample is reached. In this procedure, the resulting gap measure
obtained for time t does not use information beyond that period when the de-trending
is implemented, and therefore can be used as a valid instrument if needed. For com-
parison, I display the model estimates using different output gap measures.
This research also utilizes forecast data on expectations derived from the Survey
of Expectations conducted by the CBRT since August 2001. The survey of expecta-
tions were conducted to find out the expectations of experts, decision makers from
the financial and real sectors, and professionals, pertaining to consumer price (CPI)
inflation, interest rates, exchange rate, current account balance and GNP growth rate.
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I display the questionnaire form used for the conduct of the Survey of Expectations by
the CBRT in Figure VI.2 for documentation purposes. The surveys were conducted
twice a month, in the first and third weeks of every month. The available forecast
data is used to re-estimate the model and conduct sensitivity analysis regarding the
estimates obtained by certain econometric techniques.
Table VI.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller’s Unit Root Tests
Alternative Hypothesis
Intercept term Intercept term








Notes: Data is for Jan’1996-Dec’2005. Monthly frequency. Four lags are
used. MacKinnon’s 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for rejection of the null
hypothesis of a unit root are −3.505, −2.889, and −2.579 respectively for
the model with constant term and no time trend. When a linear time trend
is included in addition to an intercept term, the critical values are −4.035,
−3.448, and −3.148, respectively.
The econometric estimation procedures used in this study, and the presence of
time series data requires the variables to be stationary. In this regard, I first provide
graphical representations of the data in Figure VI.3. Next, following the standard
practice, I apply Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) stationarity tests to detect unit
roots. The ADF test results are reported in Table VI.2. The test results shows that
the domestic inflation rate series, pit, is trend stationary, the nominal exchange rate,
et, and the U.S. short-term interest rate, i
∗
t , series are difference stationary. On the
other hand, the null hypothesis of a unit root in the domestic short-term interest
rate, it, and the U.S. inflation rate, pi
∗
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End of the 
year
End of the 
next 12 
months
What is your expectation of the US Dollar rate in the interbank foreign exchange market? 
(Turkish Lira-TRY) (Please indicate in four decimal)
Current Year Next Year 
(Jan. - Dec.) (Jan. - Dec.)
What is your expectation of the annual current account balance?  ( (+)Surplus, (-)Deficit ) ($ Million)
Current Year Next Year 
(Jan. - Dec.) (Jan. - Dec.)
What is your expectation of the GNP Growth Rate?      ( (+) Increase,  (-) Decrease )   %
All individual response information will be kept confidential. Please fill in the appropriate boxes. Provide only numbers (e.g. 1 or 1.7), NOT ranges (e.g. 3 – 4). 
Please leave the boxes of the questions empty, in case you don't want to answer. 
Monthly Inflation Annual Inflation
CENTRAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
STATISTICS DEPARTMENT
REAL SECTOR DATA DIVISION
SURVEY OF EXPECTATIONS
End of the 
year (January-
December)
Thank you for participating in our survey.
What do you expect for the secondary market annually compounded interest rate of fixed rate TRY 
denominated  government bond with maturity of about five years? % 
Please send an e-mail to beklenti.anketi@tcmb.gov.tr in case there is a change in your e-mail address.
What do you expect for the secondary market annually compounded interest rate of the zero coupon
government bond with maturity of about six months? %
What is your expectation of one-week CBRT repo 
auction interest rate? %
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(f) Federal Funds Rate, U.S. %
1 This diagram is drawn excluding two data points: 183.2 % in Dec’00 and 400.27 % in Feb’01.
Figure VI.3: Raw Data in Graphics
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CHAPTER VII
EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPUTATION
In this chapter, I present estimates from three alternative approaches, numerical
solutions to the model, and the corresponding values of the operational indices. The
model consists of three forward looking expectational variables which reflect the ex-
pectations formed by private agents about the future inflation rate, the future output
gap, and the future nominal exchange rate. True expectations are not observable
and the actual underlying process by which they are formed is unknown. There-
fore estimating the model requires either adoption of some assumptions in regards
to the expectation formation process or using survey forecast data if data for the
related expectational variables were available. I implement both. I first assume ratio-
nal expectations hypothesis and rely on standard single-equation generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimation of the model described by (V.1)-(V.3), (V.7), and
(V.8). Next, I utilize the available survey forecast data published by the CBRT and
undertake ordinary least squares (OLS) to re-estimate the model under rational ex-
pectations to check for the sensitivity of the results. I conclude by finding numerical
solutions to the analytical model under rational expectations.
Rational expectations hypothesis, an equilibrium concept, may not provide enough
room to understand the dynamics of an economic model in a transition period. To
address this issue, I assume adaptive learning approach to impute expectations, and
OLS estimate the analytical model. Under adaptive learning, individuals are assumed
to be bounded rational where they lack some information about the underlying eco-
nomic system i.e they don’t know the the true size of the coefficients of the underlying
model. Instead, the economic agents constantly update their beliefs through adopt-
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ing new information as it becomes available. A key aspect of the adaptive learning
approach is that it accounts for the fact that macroeconomic variables depend on
the economic agent’s forecast estimates and in turn those estimates are constantly
updated in response to the changes in the macroeconomic variables.
VII.1 Empirical Implementation under Rational Expectations
I obtain my benchmark estimates relying on standard single-equation GMM estima-
tion of the model described by (V.1)-(V.3), (V.7), and (V.8). Next, I employ the
available survey forecast data published by the CBRT and estimate the model using
OLS as in Smith (2009) to check for the sensitivity of the model estimates.
VII.1.1 Generalized Method of Moments Estimation
I use single-equation GMM to estimate the forward looking IS and the Phillips curves,
the monetary policy reaction function, and the uncovered interest parity condition
described by (V.1), (V.3), (V.7), and (V.8), respectively. All estimation are for the
periods of Jan’96-Dec’05.
I use an instruments set of a constant, fifteen lags of inflation rates and overnight
interest rates, eighteen lags of output gap, and twelve lags of M2 growth rates to
estimate the IS curve with GMM. The GMM estimates for the IS curve are displayed
in Table VII.1. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the estimates for the IS curve described in
(V.1) using alternative output gap measures. Column 1 measures output gap as de-
viations from the HP trend using smoothing parameter of 14,400, column 2 measures
output gap as deviations from the HP trend using smoothing parameter of 129,600,
and column 3 measures output gap as deviations from the Khalaf-Kichian’s iterative
66
HP trend using smoothing parameter of 14,400. The signs of all of the estimates are
consistent with theory and with the results obtained in other empirical studies. I find
that both expected future and lagged output gap are positive and significant. The
output gap responds negatively to increases in the real interest rate. The coefficient
on the lagged real exchange rate depreciation is negative and significant in columns 1
and 2 whereas in column 3 it has a negative sign but not significant at conventional
levels. Hansen’s J statistics in columns 1, 2, and 3 are small enough not to reject the
joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid i.e. the instruments are uncorre-
lated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded
from the estimated equation.
Table VII.1: GMM Estimates of the IS curve




yt−1 0.2512∗∗∗ 0.2852∗∗∗ 0.2475∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.049) (0.055)





it−2 − Et−2pit−1 -0.0041∗∗∗ -0.0041∗∗∗ -0.0033∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆qt−1 -0.0274∗∗ -0.0281∗∗ -0.0146
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
R-squared 0.33 0.42 0.38
χ2(56) [p-value] 63.56 [0.22] 61.75 [0.27] 63.96 [0.21]
rk Wald F † 49.61∗∗ 29.26∗∗ 41.34∗∗
Notes: The estimation is for the periods of 1996m1-2005m12. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses underneath the coefficients. The GMM instruments
set includes a constant, 15 lags of inflation rates, 18 lags of output gap, 15 lags of overnight
interest rates, and 12 lags of M2 growth rates. χ2(56) stands for the J-statistic and (the number
of over identifying restrictions). Estimation (1), (2), and (3) differ based on how the output gap is
measured. (1) measures output gap as deviations from the HP trend using smoothing parameter
of 14,400, (2) measures output gap as deviations from the HP trend using smoothing parameter of
129,600, and (3) measures output gap as deviations from the Khalaf-Kichian’s iterative HP trend
using smoothing parameter of 14,400.
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. ** 5% maximal IV relative bias, * 10% maximal IV relative
bias using the Stock and Yogo’s (2005) weak instruments test critical values.
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I use GMM to estimate the Phillips curve using an instruments set that is com-
posed of a constant, six lags of monthly inflation rates, output gap, and overnight
interest rates. The GMM estimates for the Phillips curve are reported in Table VII.2.
Estimates in column 1, 2, and 3 are obtained using alternative output gap measures
as explained for the IS schedule. Using different output gap measures does not seem
to affect the results substantially and the signs of all of the estimates are consistent
with theory. I find significantly positive coefficients on expected future inflation and
lagged inflation, and the lagged output gap. The impact of the lagged real exchange
rate depreciation is found to be negative and significant. The joint null hypothesis of
valid instruments, and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the es-
timated equation can not be rejected using the Hansen’s J statistics in all estimations.
Table VII.2: GMM Estimates of the Phillips curve
Equation Variable (1) (2) (3)
pit constant -0.0302 -0.0229 -0.0123
(0.088) (0.090) (0.085)





yt−4 0.2025∗∗∗ 0.1798∗∗∗ 0.1851∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.062) (0.053)
∆qt−1 -0.0629∗∗∗ -0.0639∗∗∗ -0.0691∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
R-squared 0.29 0.28 0.28
χ2(15) [p-value] 11.97 [0.68] 12.73 [0.62] 12.73 [0.62]
rk Wald F † 16.32∗ 15.89∗ 17.51∗
Notes: The estimation is for the periods of 1996m1-2005m12. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses underneath the coefficients. The GMM instruments
set includes a constant, 6 lags of monthly inflation rates, output gap, and overnight interest rates.
χ2(15) stands for the J-statistic and (the number of over identifying restrictions). Estimation
(1), (2), and (3) differ based on how the output gap is measured. (1) measures output gap as
deviations from the HP trend using smoothing parameter of 14,400, (2) measures output gap as
deviations from the HP trend using smoothing parameter of 129,600, and (3) measures output gap
as deviations from the Khalaf-Kichian’s iterative HP trend using smoothing parameter of 14,400.
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. ** 5% maximal IV relative bias, * 10% maximal IV relative
bias using the Stock and Yogo’s (2005) weak instruments test critical values.
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Next, I estimate the UIP condition representing the nominal exchange rate move-
ments in Turkey. Exchange rate series may have non-normal data generating process
which would raise suspicion on the reliability of the UIP estimates obtained by us-
ing GMM. The first differences in the exchange rates are known to have non-normal
distribution as documented by Westerfield (1977) and McFarland, Pettit, and Sung
(1982). Boothe and Glassman (1987) showed high frequency data, e.g. daily or
weekly, usually exhibits non-normal or fat-tail distributions due to the presence of
extreme observations. To abstain from exchange rate series subject to fat-tail distri-
butions, I use a less frequent exchange rate data. In addition, I use monthly averages
of exchange rates where the averaging process is considered to substantially reduce
the probability of extreme observations appear in the series as in Frankel (1979).
Therefore, I consider GMM estimation controlled for heteroskedastic and autocorre-
lated errors an appropriate technique to obtain reliable UIP estimates.
Estimation of the uncovered interest parity condition was conducted using and
instruments set that contain a constant, nine lags of exchange rates, three lags of
(domestic) inflation rates, six lags of (domestic) overnight interest rates, and three
lags of (foreign) interest rates. Table VII.3 shows the GMM estimates for the UIP
condition. Estimation (1) and (2) differ based on the choice of lag structure of the in-
terest rate differential. Estimation (1) uses one period lagged interest rate differential
whereas estimation (2) considers contemporaneous interest rate differentials. Em-
pirical evidence shows that the coefficients on both expected future and one period
lagged nominal exchange rate are positive and significant. Estimation (1) suggests a
negative but significant impact of the one period lagged interest rate differentials on
the variability of the nominal exchange rate. On the other hand, estimation (2) finds
positive and significant coefficient on the contemporaneous interest rate differentials.
Hansen’s J statistics are small enough not to reject the validity of instruments. I rely
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Table VII.3: GMM Estimates of the UIP condition
Equation Variable (1) (2)






it−1 − i∗t−1 -0.0418∗∗ . . .
(0.016)
it − i∗t . . . 0.0721∗∗∗
(0.014)
R-squared 0.37 0.39
χ2(19) [p-value] 14.58 [0.74] 16.33 [0.63]
rk Wald F † 3.54 2.91
Notes: The estimation is for the periods of 1996m1-2005m12. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation (HAC) robust
standard errors (based on Bartlett kernel function with bandwidth K=2) are in
the parentheses underneath the coefficients. The GMM instruments set includes
a constant, 9 lags of exchange rates, 3 lags of (domestic) inflation rates, 6 lags
of (domestic) overnight interest rates, and 3 lags (foreign) interest rates .χ2(19)
stands for the J-statistic and (the number of over identifying restrictions).
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. ** 5% maximal IV relative bias, * 10%
maximal IV relative bias using the Stock and Yogo’s (2005) weak instruments
test critical values.
on UIP estimates obtained in (1) in my analysis later in this study.
The monetary policy reaction function is subject to structural breaks as discussed
in detail in Chapter V. The estimated break dates are Nov’98, Feb’01, and Sep’03
following Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) and the available anecdotal evidence. I report
the GMM estimates of the monetary policy reaction functions for each sub period
in Table VII.4. The GMM instruments set used consists of a constant, six lags of
monthly inflation rates, output gap, and overnight interest rates in all periods, except
the period of Mar’01-Sep’03 where a constant, three lags of monthly inflation rates,
output gap, and overnight interest rates are used. The estimates are in line with the
theory and those of Berument and Tas¸c¸ı (2004), Yazgan and Yılmazkuday (2007),
and Aklan and Nargelec¸ekenler (2008). There is evidence of substantial interest rate
smoothing during the period of Mar’01-Dec’05 vis-a´-vis the transition period toward
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Table VII.4: GMM Estimates of the Monetary Reaction Function
Jan’96 - Dec’98 - Mar’01 - Oct’03 -
Equation Variable Nov’98 Oct’00 Sep’03 Dec’05
it constant -3.1188
∗ 7.7013 . . . . . .
(1.6185) (1.5940)
it−1 0.6188∗∗∗ 0.3689∗∗∗ 0.8672∗∗∗ 0.9347∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.072) (0.1350) (0.013)
Etpit+2 4.5288
∗∗∗ . . . 7.9209∗∗ . . .
(1.1804) (2.7536)
Etpit+3 . . . 9.0144
∗∗∗ . . . 8.1975∗∗∗
(0.9459) (0.6556)
yt−5 5.3237∗∗∗ 5.2955∗∗∗ . . . . . .
(1.2644) (0.1614)
yt−6 . . . . . . 4.2048∗∗∗ . . .
(1.0316)
Etyt+1 . . . . . . . . . 5.6217
∗∗∗
(0.5031)
R-squared 0.32 0.60 0.41 0.92
χ2(15) [p-value] 12.19 [0.66] 15.03 [0.44] . . . 12.96 [0.60]
χ2(7) [p-value] . . . . . . 6.01 [0.53] . . .
rk Wald F † 7.65 1.85 1.58 5.20
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors are in the parentheses underneath the
coefficients. The GMM instruments set includes a constant, 6 lags of monthly inflation rates, output gap, and
overnight interest rates for all periods, except the period of Mar’01-Sep’03 which uses a constant, 3 lags of monthly
inflation rates, output gap, and overnight interest rates. χ2(15) and χ2(7) stands for the J-statistic and (the number
of over identifying restrictions) for the corresponding periods.
† Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. ** 5% maximal IV relative bias, * 10% maximal IV relative bias using the
Stock and Yogo’s (2005) weak instruments test critical values.
full-fledged inflation targeting. The coefficients on the expected future inflation rates
are positive and significant. The lagged output gap variables have a positive and sig-
nificant coefficients in periods of Jan’96-Nov’98, Dec’98-Oct’00, and Mar’01-Sep’03.
The Sep’03-Dec’05 period is best characterized by having expected future output
gap instead of lagged output gap in the model where positive and significant coeffi-
cient on the expected output gap is estimated. The Hansen’s J statistics are 12.19,
15.03, 6.01, and 12.96, respectively, for the periods of Jan’96-Nov’98, Dec’98-Oct’00,
Mar’01-Sep’03, and Oct’03-Dec’05 respectively. The J statistics are small enough to
fail to reject the joint null hypothesis of valid instruments and correct specification.
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VII.1.2 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
GMM based inference has been heavily criticized since its estimators are inconsis-
tent when weak instruments (sometimes referred to underidentification in non-linear
GMM) problem is present. Weak instruments problem arise when instruments are
only weakly correlated with the included endogenous variables. If instruments are
weak, then the sampling distributions of GMM and IV estimators are in general non-
normal and therefore the standard GMM and IV point estimates, hypothesis testing,
and the confidence intervals can be misleading.
Table VII.1, VII.2, VII.3, and VII.4 report the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statis-
tics which can be used to test for weak instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F
statistics for the estimations of the IS and Phillips curves are higher than the Stock
and Yogo’s (2005) weak instruments test critical values rejecting the null hypothesis
of weak instruments. On the other hand, the null hypothesis of weak instruments for
the UIP condition and the monetary policy reaction functions can not be rejected. In
order to improve my estimation results, and conduct sensitivity analysis, I make use
of the forecast survey data to re-estimate the model using standard OLS estimation
following the pooling forecasts methodology proposed by Smith (2009).
Linear rational expectations models with endogenous expectations variables can
be estimated in different ways using forecast survey data. Roberts (1995) pioneered
the use of the forecast surveys in estimating the new Keynesian Phillips curve. Rude-
busch (2002) replaced endogenous inflation expectations by the Michigan survey of
inflation expectations to OLS estimate a version of the Phillips curve. Orphanides
and Williams (2002, 2005), Adam and Padula (2003), and Brissimis and Magginas
(2008) use inflation forecasts of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) or the
Federal Reserves Greenbook as proxies for expectations to estimate the Phillips curve.
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Smith (2009) shows how using the actual future values of the endogenous expectations
variables in addition to the forecast survey data improves the statistical efficiency of
estimating a hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curve for the U.S. I follow the reasoning
provided by Smith to re-estimate the model in a more efficient way.
The structural model in this study consists of three forward looking expectational
variables; the expectations about the future inflation rate, the future output gap, and
the future nominal exchange rate. Unfortunately, the CBRT’s forecast surveys did not
contain questions in relation to output gap until the beginning of full-fledged inflation
targeting in Jan’06. Therefore I will not be able to re-estimate the equations contain-
ing expected future output gap terms, namely the IS curve and the monetary policy
reaction function for the sub period of Oct’03-Dec’05. The CBRT’s forecast surveys
collected expectations data on nominal exchange rate by the end of the month, CPI
inflation rate for the current month and the second month ahead which can be used
for the estimations.
Smith’s pooling forecasts methodology requires two pre-condition to be met. First,
the instrumented actual values should have no incremental predictive ability for the
endogenous regressors beyond that provided by the forecast value, and second, the
forecast survey value should be an unbiased predictor of the corresponding endogenous
variable. I first estimate the following regressions using OLS to test for relevance of
supplementary instruments used in the GMM estimation of the UIP condition.
et+1 = φ1et−1 + φ2Est et + φ3(it−1 − i∗t−1) + φ
′
zuipt + νt (VII.1)
In equation (VII.1), Est et is the forecast series for the nominal exchange rate by the
end of the month and zuipt is the vector instrumented actual values used in the GMM
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estimation of the UIP condition. I then test the hypothesis H0 : φ
′
= 0. The standard
F-statistic, [F (20, 27) = 3.42], is large enough to reject the null hypothesis. That’s to
say the first pre-condition fails to hold where the supplementary instruments do have
predictive ability for the endogenous regressors beyond that provided by the forecast
value.
Next, I check whether Est et is an unbiased estimator of et+1. To check for un-
biasedness, I run the following OLS regression and test for the joint hypothesis
H0 : φ0 = 0, φs = 1
et+1 = φ0 + φsE
s
t et + ν
s
t (VII.2)
where νst is an i.i.d. error term. I obtain an F statistics [F (2, 49) = 20.94], and a
p-value of 0.00 rejecting the null hypothesis of unbiasedness. Since neither the first
nor second pre-condition of Smith’s pooling forecasts methodology is met, forecast
series on nominal exchange rate by the end of the month can not be used to improve
the efficiency of the GMM estimation. Therefore, I skip using his methodology to
re-estimate the UIP condition.
Next, I look at whether the forecast value of the CPI inflation rate for the second
month ahead can be appropriate used to OLS estimate the Phillips curve. I first
estimate the following regressions using OLS to test for relevance of supplementary
instruments used in the GMM estimation of the Phillips curve.
pit = α0 + α1pit−1 + α2Est pit+2 + α3yt−4 − α4∆qt−1 + α
′
zpct + t (VII.3)
In equation (VII.3), Est pit+2 is forecast series of the CPI inflation rate for the second
month ahead and zpct = (pit−2, yt−5, it−1) is the vector of the major instrumented ac-
tual values used in the GMM estimation of the Phillips curve. I then test the null
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hypothesis of H0 : α
′
= 0. The standard F-statistic is [F (3, 43) = 0.27] with a p-value
of 0.84 suggesting the null hypothesis can not be rejected.
Next, I check whether Est pit+2 is an unbiased estimator of pit+2. To check for
unbiasedness, I run the following OLS regression and test for the joint hypothesis
H0 : α0 = 0, αs = 1
pit+2 = α0 + αsE
s
t pit+2 + 
s
t (VII.4)
where st is an i.i.d. error term. I obtain an F statistics [F (2, 49) = 0.76], and a
p-value of 0.47 failing to reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness. Since both the
first and second pre-condition of Smith’s pooling forecasts methodology are met, the
forecast value of the CPI inflation rate for the second month ahead can be used to
re-estimate the Phillips curve. Estimating the Phillips curve described by (V.3) using
OLS gives the following relationship
pit = 0.0660 + 0.3730
∗∗pit−1 + 0.7848∗Etpit+2 + 0.0532yt−4 + 0.0375∆qt−1 (VII.5)
with R-squared value of 0.44. The fit of the Phillips curve is improved by some extent
measured by the rise in the R-squared value from 0.29 to 0.44 comparing the GMM
results in column 1 of Table VII.2 and the OLS estimation results. In general, the
OLS estimates are in line with the GMM estimates obtained before. Both lagged and
expected future inflation rates have positive and significant coefficients. However, the
output gap has a positive but insignificant coefficient at the conventional significance
levels. It’s also important to note that the size of the coefficient on the expected fu-
ture inflation rate is about three times bigger when Phillips curve is estimated using
OLS.
Finally, I turn to estimating the monetary policy reaction function in Mar’01-
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Sep’03 using the forecast data available for Aug’01 and onwards. The monetary
reaction function for the period Oct’03-Dec’05 is not re-estimated since forecast data
on expected future output gap is not available. As in the previous analysis, I look at
whether the forecast value of the CPI inflation rate for the second month ahead can be
appropriate used to OLS estimate the monetary reaction function in Mar’01-Sep’03.
For this purpose, I estimate the following regression using OLS to test for relevance
of supplementary instruments used in the GMM estimation of the monetary reaction
function.









In equation (VII.6), Est pit+2 is forecast value of the CPI inflation rate for the sec-
ond month ahead and ztrt = (pit−1, pit−2, pit−3, yt−1, yt−2, yt−3, it−2, it−3) is the vector of
the instrumented actual values used in the GMM estimation of the monetary reac-
tion function. I then test the hypothesis H0 : γ
′
= 0. The standard F-statistic is
[F (8, 41) = 1.06] with a p-value of 0.40 suggesting the null hypothesis can not be
rejected.
It was shown that Est pit+2 is an unbiased estimator of pit+2. Hence, both of the
pre-conditions of the Smith’s pooling forecasts methodology are met which allow me
to estimate the following monetary reaction function using OLS for the period of
Mar’01-Sep’03. OLS estimation predicts the following relationship
iˆt = 0.7582
∗∗∗it−1 + 4.2113∗∗Est pit+2 + 1.6348
∗∗yt−6 (VII.7)
with R-squared value of 0.81. Comparing the R-squared values, an increase from
0.41 to 0.81, reveals a large increase in the fit of the model when OLS is employed.
The coefficients are similar to that of the GMM results. The interest rate smoothing
parameter, and the coefficient of the output gap, and the coefficient on the expected
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future inflation rate are lower when OLS is used. However, they all have the same
sign and are significant as in the GMM results.
VII.2 Numerical Rational Expectations Solutions
Calculating the operational indices requires the use of the estimates of the coefficients
in the model as well as the rational expectations solutions for the endogenous variables
pit, yt, it, and et. The presence of several expectations variables make the analytical
model too complex to obtain analytically derived closed form solutions. Therefore,
I adopt Sim’s (2002) numerical methodology and use his Matlab code, the “gensys”
program, to obtain numerical rational expectation solutions1. Appendix A.3. provides
detailed explanation on how the rational expectations solutions were obtained for each
sub period once the structural break dates in the monetary policy reaction function
considered. Table VIII.1-VIII.4 display estimated rational expectations solutions also
known as the minimum state variables (MSV) solutions.
VII.3 Empirical Implementation under Adaptive Learning
Rational expectations is a very strong assumption because it assumes economic agents
to know the correct form of the underlying structural model and the parameters de-
scribing the model. Besides, rational expectations is an equilibrium concept which
may not be the appropriate way to characterize the way expectations are formed in
periods of transition. To reach a more realistic view and for comparison, I now adopt
adaptive learning approach which allows me to re-estimate the model using OLS.
Later, I compute operational indices under both rational expectations and adaptive
learning assumptions and discuss the implications of these assumptions on the oper-
ational indices.
1The “gensys” program is available online at http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/gensys/
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The adaptive learning theory pioneered by Evans & Honkapohja (1995) considers
rational expectations solutions as a natural benchmark which is eventually learned by
the economic agents through constant updating as new information become available.
Agents are assumed to act like econometricians in formulating their expectations and
constantly engage in a process of learning about the structure of the economy and the
parameters describing it. I borrow an illustrative example by Evans & Honkapohja
(2009) to provide further insight on the formal implementation of adaptive learning.
There are two key building blocks to adaptive learning; a forecasting model describing
the agents’ beliefs and the method agents obtain estimates for the parameters in the
forecasting model. Suppose agents are assumed to use the following perceived law of
motion to formulate their expectations
pt = a+ b
′
wt−1 + ηt
where the true values of a and b are not known. Assume further that agents use
Least Squares (LS) technique to find estimates of the parameters in the perceived
law of motion. Agents estimate a and b by recursive least squares using past data
{pi, wi}t−1i=0, and they formulate their expectations as
E˜t−1pt = at−1 + b
′
t−1wt−1
where at−1 and bt−1 are the estimated parameters obtained using available data up
to the date t− 1.
I apply the adaptive learning algorithm described above to derive series of pri-
vate agent’s expectations that appear in the IS and Phillips curves, and the UIP
condition. These expectational variables are Etpit+2, Etyt+1, Et−2pit−1, and Etet+1.
I assume that the central bank has rational expectations therefore I don’t estimate
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adaptively learned expectations series for the expectation terms appearing in the
monetary reaction function. I then use the generated expectations series to obtain
estimates for the IS and Phillips curves, and the UIP condition using OLS. Following
the standard approach, I consider the form of the MSV solution displayed in Ta-
ble VIII.1-VIII.4 as the underlying forecasting model describing the private agents’
beliefs. The forecasting models of pit, yt, and et are given by
pit = g0 + g1pit−1 + g2yt−1 + g3it−1 + g4et−1 + g5pi∗t−1 + g6i
∗
t−1 + g7pit−2 + g8yt−2
+g9yt−3 + g10yt−4 + g11yt−5 + g12yt−6 + g13it−2 + g14it−3 + g15et−3 + g16pi∗t−2
−g17t − g18ηt − g19σt − g20νt − g21∗t − g22σ∗t (VII.8)
yt = h0 + h1pit−1 + h2yt−1 + h3it−1 + h4et−1 + h5pi∗t−1 + h6i
∗
t−1 + h7pit−2 + h8yt−2
+h9yt−3 + h10yt−4 + h11yt−5 + h12yt−6 + h13it−2 + h14it−3 + h15et−3 + h16pi∗t−2
−h17t − h18ηt − h19σt − h20νt − h21∗t − h22σ∗t (VII.9)
et = s0 + s1pit−1 + s2yt−1 + s3it−1 + s4et−1 + s5pi∗t−1 + s6i
∗
t−1 + s7pit−2 + s8yt−2
+s9yt−3 + s10yt−4 + s11yt−5 + s12yt−6 + s13it−2 + s14it−3 + s15et−3 + s16pi∗t−2
−s17t − s18ηt − s19σt − s20νt − s21∗t − s22σ∗t (VII.10)
I use recursive least squares, which weights more recent data more heavily, to
estimate (VII.8)-(VII.10) with an initial window size of twenty observations. This
procedure generates expectations series, E˜tpit+2, E˜tyt+1, E˜t−2pit−1, and E˜tet+1, consis-
tent with the underlying forecasting model and least squares learning algorithm. I
then use ordinary least squares to re-estimate the IS and Phillips curves, and the UIP
condition using the private agent’s estimated forecast series. The OLS estimation
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results are displayed in Table VII.5. Column 1, 2 and 3 report OLS estimates for the
IS schedule, Phillips curve, and the uncovered interest parity condition. The signs of
the OLS estimates are consistent with theory and in general with the results obtained
using GMM estimation.
Table VII.5: OLS Estimates of IS, PC, and UIP
(1) (2) (3)
yt pit et

























it−1 − i∗t−1 −0.0518∗
(0.0285)
R-squared 0.33 0.49 0.26
N 101 101 101
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 OLS estimation is used.
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses underneath the coefficients.
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VII.4 Expectational Stability
Expectational stability also known as E-stability deals with the stability of a ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium under adaptive learning. To motivate the concept of
E-stability consider a rational expectations equilibrium, φ¯, for an economic model
where φ¯ contain the estimated rational expectations, or the minimum state variables
solution, of the model. Under adaptive learning the private agents are assumed not
to know φ¯, but try to estimate it using data from the economy. Constant updating
the data and estimation of the model leads to estimates φt at time t. The con-
cern is whether φt → φ¯ as t → ∞. In Appendix A.5, I show that the estimated
minimum state variables solutions for the periods of Jan’96-Nov’98, Dec’98-Oct’00,
Mar’01-Sep’03, and Oct’03-Dec’05 are E-stable under least squares learning.
VII.5 Comparison of RE and Adaptive Learning Estimates
The estimates for the IS schedule are substantially close under rational expectations
and adaptive learning. Under rational expectations, the coefficients on the expected
future output gap and the real interest rate are 0.3701 and −0.0041 respectively vis-a`-
vis 0.3841 and −0.0045 under adaptive learning. Under both expectations formation,
expected future output gap and the real interest rate have significant impact on the
current output gap. I obtain similar estimates for the second lag of output gap under
rational expectations and learning though the coefficient on the first lag of output
gap under learning is not significant and lower than the estimate obtained assuming
rational expectations.
Comparison of the estimates for the Phillips curve indicates that rational expec-
tations estimates of the inflation terms are lower than that of adaptive learning. The
difference between the estimates is much larger for the expected future inflation term.
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According to GMM estimation, one period lagged and the expected two period ahead
inflation rates have coefficients of 0.4513 and 0.2898, respectively. The correspond-
ing estimates under adaptive learning are 0.4606 and 0.4383. The estimates of the
lagged and expected inflation rates are significant at 1% significance level under both
expectations formation. Under adaptive learning, although the sign is in line with
the theory, the coefficient on the lagged output gap is substantially lower than that of
rational expectations. I obtain estimates of 0.2025 under rational expectation versus
0.1079 under learning where the former is significant at 1% and the latter is signif-
icant at 10% significance level. The impact of the real exchange rate depreciation
on inflation is negative under both expectation formation processes. However, real
exchange rate depreciation seem to have a larger and significant impact on inflation
only when estimation is through GMM.
The point estimates are the closest when I estimate the uncovered interest parity
condition using rational expectations and adaptive learning approaches. The esti-
mates of the one period lagged and one period forward looking exchange rate are
0.4018 and 0.4733 under rationality assumption. Under learning, the estimates turn
into 0.3885 and 0.4097, respectively. Although the estimates obtained under learning
are lower than that of rational expectations, they all are significant at conventional
significance levels. The lagged domestic-foreign interest rate differential has a neg-
ative impact on current nominal exchange rate under both expectation formation
processes. I obtain −0.0418 under rational expectations and −0.0518 under learning
for the coefficient on the interest rate differential where the former is significant at
5% and the latter is significant at 10% significance level.
Comparison of the estimates obtained under different expectation formation pro-
cesses is considered a sensitivity analysis. The estimation results indicate that esti-
82
mates for the uncovered interest parity condition, the IS schedule, and the Phillips
curve are substantially close though different assumptions governing the underlying
process of expectations formation are used. I interpret this finding as an evidence
supporting the reliability of the estimates for the structural model. On the other
hand, it is important to note that the way the learning methodology is conducted
may inherently have a tendency towards producing similar estimates as in rational
expectations approach. Given the lag structure of the forecasting models of adaptive
learning given by (VII.8)-(VII.10), estimating the forecast series requires mainly the
use of lagged values of inflation rate, output gap, and interest rate. These lagged
terms constitute a major part of the instruments sets used in the GMM estimations
which are used in the first stage regressions determining the relevance of the instru-
ments. The use of similar set of lagged terms, and analogous methods of least squares
learning and the first stage regressions seem to play a role in obtaining close estimates
for the structural model under the alternative assumptions of rational expectations
and adaptive learning.
VII.6 Formulae for Operational Indices
VII.6.1 Formulae for Ex Ante and Ex Post Inflation Pressure
In order to find the impact of the interest rate policy changes on inflation through
the output gap, I lag (V.1) four periods and substitute it into (V.3) to get:
pit = α0 + α1pit−1 + α2Etpit+2 − α4∆qt−1 + t (VII.11)
+ α3 {β0 + β1yt−5 + β2yt−6 + β3Et−4yt−3 + β4[it−6 − Et−6pit−5]− β5∆qt−5 + ηt−4}
According to (VII.11) there is a six period control lag between the implementation
of the interest rate policy and its impact on the inflation. Following the methodol-
ogy explained in Chapter IV, the conduct of the counterfactual experiments require
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keeping the interest rate constant for a period. I consider a quarter to be the bench-
mark period to be able to observe the full impact of the counterfactual experiment
as in Weymark and Shintani (2006). Hence, using monthly data, where a quarter is
equivalent to three months, requires setting it−4 = it−5 = it−6 = it−7 to undertake the
counterfactual experiments described in Chapter IV and obtain measures of ex ante
and ex post inflation pressure. Therefore, all variables that appear in (VII.11) must
be expressed in terms of it−4 and earlier. Initially I carry forward the expectation
terms as they appear in (VII.11), but eventually I express the expectation terms as
functions of it−4 and earlier in order to obtain ex ante inflation pressure measure.
Using (VII.11), an operational formulae for ex post inflation pressure can be ob-
tained. Although the derivation is straightforward, it is tedious. Appendix A.6 shows
the details of the derivation. The resulting ex post inflation pressure formulae is given
by
EPIPt = ∆pit − Z6∆3it−4 − Z7∆2it−5 − Z8∆it−6 (VII.12)
where
Z6 = α4φ3(ρ
2 + φ21)− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(ρ+ φ1 + (α1 − α4))
Z7 = φ
3
1α4φ3 − α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(φ21 + φ1(α1 − α4) + (α1 − α4)2)
Z8 = φ
4
1α4φ3 + α3(β5φ3 + β4)
Notice that the formulae for the ex post inflation pressure is obtained considering
the post-policy expectations constant. Since expectations terms are kept constant,
there is no room for different processes of expectations formation leading to different
outcomes i.e. the formulae for the ex post inflation pressure is identical under rational
expectations and adaptive learning and given by (VII.12).
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Solving for ex ante inflation pressure requires the expectations terms that appear
in (A.25)-(A.28) in Appendix A.6 represented as functions of it−4 and earlier. I use
the form of the MSV solutions reported in Table (VIII.1)-(VIII.1) to successfully ex-
press all of the expectations in terms of it−4 and earlier. Appendix A.6 shows the
details of the derivation.
Under rational expectations, ex ante inflation pressure formulae is given by
EAIP it = ∆pit− (Z6 +Zxa,i6 )∆3it−4− (Z7 +Zxa,i7 )∆2it−5− (Z8 +Zxa,i8 )∆it−6 (VII.13)
for each period where i = I, II, III, and IV . Appendix A.6 shows that Zxa,i6 , Z
xa,i
7 ,
and Zxa,i8 are constants obtained from complex combinations of the MSV solution
values reported in Table VIII.1-VIII.4. Comparison of (VII.12) and (VII.13) reveals
that Zxa,i6 , Z
xa,i
7 , and Z
xa,i
8 reflect the impact of the interest change policy on inflation
through changes in the expectations.
Deriving the formulae for the ex ante inflation pressure index under adaptive learn-
ing requires several ordinary least squares estimations to obtain private agents’ fore-
cast series of expectations and the corresponding counterfactual series. In Appendix
A.6, I report a detailed derivation of the formulae for ex ante inflation pressure. The
ex ante inflation pressure index under adaptive learning is given by




Λj[E˜ − E˜cf ] (VII.14)
for periods of i = I, II, III, and IV . The term E˜ stands for various expectational
terms with different lag length as described in Appendix A.6 and the term E˜cf is the
85
corresponding counterfactual forecast series. According to Appendix A.6, Zre,i6 , Z
re,i
7 ,
and Zre,i8 are constants obtained from complex combinations of the MSV solution val-
ues reported in Table VIII.1-VIII.4. Finally, Λj correspond to the coefficients denoted
by Z, Z
′
, Za, or Zb which are functions of the model estimates. Notice that, there
two distinct expectations channels through which the interest rate changes affect the
inflation rate. The coefficients, Zre,i6 , Z
re,i
7 , and Z
re,i
8 , measures the impact of interest
rate changes on the inflation through rational expectations terms while Λj measures
the impact through the private agents’ adaptive expectations.
VII.6.2 Formulae for XIFC & XITC Indices
According to (VII.11) there is a six period control lag between the implementation of
the interest rate policy and its impact on the inflation. In order to be able to conduct
the counterfactual experiments introduced in Chapter IV, all variables which appear
in(VII.11) must be expressed in terms of it−6 and earlier as shown in Appendix A.7.
Initially I carry forward the expectation terms as they appear in (VII.11) to solve
for the index of expectations of inflation under true credibility. I, then express the
expectation terms as functions of it−6 and earlier as well to obtain index formula for
expectations of inflation under full credibility.
The impact on expectations under true credibility is obtained by setting it−6 = it−7
in (A.55)-(A.57) with expectations held constant under actual policy. Thus, a measure
of expectations of inflation under true credibility (XITC) is computed by
XITCt = ∆pit −W8∆it−6 (VII.15)
where W8 is a constant made of estimates of the structural model as defined in
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Appendix A.7. Notice that the formula for XITC index is identical under rational
expectations and adaptive learning as the post-policy expectations are kept constant
when undertaking the counterfactual experiment to derive XITC. However, the es-
timated index values of XITC will vary due to different estimates for the coefficient
that appear in W8 under rational expectations and adaptive learning.
In Appendix A.7, I solve for the interest rate, iTt−6, that ensures inflation target,
piTt . I then conduct counterfactual experiments to obtain the expectations of inflation




t − pit)− θj[iTt−6 − it−7] (VII.16)
for the periods of j = II, III, IV . The coefficients θj are functions of W8. The indices
of expectations of inflation under full credibility for each period and the coefficients,
θj, are explicitly defined in Appendix A.7 in (A.65)-(A.67).
In Appendix A.7, I show the index of expectations of inflation under full credibility
under adaptive learning can be computed as
XIFCjt = (pi
T





T − E˜CF ] (VII.17)
for the periods of j = II, III, IV . Private agents’ estimated forecast series using iTt−6
and it−7 are representd by E˜T and E˜CF , respectively. The coefficients Wi and Ωj are
defined in Appendix A.7. Each forecast model of learning has a distinct lag structure




indicates the impact of the interest change policy on inflation via output changes
through rational expectations channel. In periods II and III, Ωj = 0 holds whereas
ΩIV 6= 0 due to the expectations of future output gap term appearing in the monetary
authority’s reaction function in period IV.
VII.7 Estimated Indices under RE and Adaptive Learning
VII.7.1 Monetary Policy Effectiveness Index
Over the period of 1996-2005, the CBRT implemented three major disinflation pro-
grams; the 1998-2000 IMF-sponsored program, the exchange rate based stabilization
program during 2000-Feb’01, and finally the semi-formal inflation targeting since
the beginning of 2002. The former two disinflation and stabilization programs were
abandoned since very marginal improvement was realized in terms of the decline in
inflation rate and achieving stable prices. However, the CBRT’s semi-formal inflation
targeting launched in 2002 was extremely successful in terms of getting the inflation
under control and reducing it to moderate levels. A simple comparison of the infla-
tion rate of 75% at the beginning of 2002 and about 8% by the end of 2005 is broad
enough to appreciate the success achieved in the pursuit of reducing inflation. Having
experienced significant inflation reductions under semi-formal inflation targeting, the
CBRT turned into implementing full-fledged targeting beginning January 2006. The
estimated ex ante and ex post inflation pressure measures and the monetary policy
effectiveness index reported in Table VIII.5-VIII.8 are intended to help us understand
the true driving force behind unsuccessful attempts prior to inflation targeting as well
as successfully reducing the inflation rate in transition to full-fledged inflation target-
ing.
Did the economic conditions contribute significantly to the CBRT’s disinflation
and stabilization efforts? Answering this question requires having an appropriate
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measure of the inflationary environment in hand. The ex ante inflation pressure
index values describe the inflationary environment that was faced by the CBRT. Ac-
cording to Table VIII.5 and VIII.6, there were 52 months of negative ex ante inflation
pressure during Jan’96-Dec’05 under rational expectations. Half of these negative ex
ante inflation pressure values were in Jan’96-Oct’00 and the other half was in the
inflation targeting transition period, Mar’01-Dec’05. Similarly, there were 32 and 36
positive ex ante inflation pressure values during Jan’96-Oct’00 and Mar’01-Dec’05,
respectively. Although the number of the negative ex ante inflation pressure measures
are equal for the periods Jan’96-Oct’00 and Mar’01-Dec’05, the number of positive
ex ante inflation pressure values in Mar’01-Dec’05 were higher than that of Jan’96-
Oct’00.
I used t-tests to evaluate whether the average size of the exogenous shocks were
significantly different during the Mar’01-Dec’05 period as compared that of Jan’96-
Oct’00. The estimated t-test statistic, −2.40, is large enough to reject the null hy-
pothesis at the 5% significance level that the positive exogenous shocks, as measured
by positive ex ante inflation pressure index values, during the semi-formal inflation
targeting period are significantly smaller in size than the positive shocks in Jan’96-
Oct’00. Moreover, the t-test statistic, 1.42, is large enough to reject the null hy-
pothesis at 10% significance level that the negative exogenous shocks, as measured
by negative ex ante inflation pressure index values, during the semi-formal inflation
targeting period are significantly larger in size than the negative shocks in Jan’96-
Oct’00. The frequency analysis and the t-tests provide evidence that the pre-policy
inflationary environment, measured in terms of ex ante inflation pressure, over the
period Mar’01-Dec’05 was at least as disadvantageous as it was in the Jan’96-Oct’00
period in terms of the size and the frequency of the shocks hitting the economy.
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Conditional on the nature of inflationary environment as measured by the ex
ante inflation pressure, I obtain monetary policy effectiveness index values which are
reported in Table VIII.5-VIII.8. As discussed in Chapter IV, monetary policy effec-
tiveness index is defined as MPEt−6 = 1 − EPIPtEAIPt if there is an inflation increasing
shock (EAIPt > 0), and MPEt−6 = EPIPtEAIPt if there is an inflation reducing shock
(EAIPt < 0) to the economy. Figures VII.1 and VII.2 display the monetary policy
effectiveness index values under rational expectations for positive and negative values
of ex ante inflation pressure.
According to Figure VII.1, CBRT had completely ineffective monetary policy
initiatives prior to 2002 when the economy was subject to inflation increasing shocks.
The transition period to full-fledged inflation targeting, on the other hand, was a
period where the CBRT had, in general, partially effective policy changes. Prior to
Jan’2004, the date in which the CBRT officially announced that it will switch to full-
fledged inflation targeting beginning January 2006, there are four negative monetary
policy effectiveness index values in contrast to two negative values afterwards. This
suggests improvement in the implementation of the monetary policy over time during
the semi-formal targeting years.
Figure VII.2 shows that, when inflation reducing shocks hit the economy, the
CBRT had completely effective monetary policy changes prior to 2002, and effective
or partially effective policy changes during 2002-2005. There are seven data points
indicating partial monetary policy effectiveness as opposed to thirteen data points
reporting completely or very effective policy changes during 2002-2005. The data
points indicating partially effective policy show that the inflation would have fallen
more about thirty five percent of the time if the CBRT had not implemented any
interest rate changes. On the other hand, the data points higher than 1 indicate that
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This diagram is drawn excluding the outlier data point of -10.1 in Jan’04.
Figure VII.1: Monetary Policy Effectiveness | EAIP > 0, RE
sixty five percent of the time. Comparison of Figure VII.1 and VII.2 reveals that the
CBRT had been more successful in reducing inflation when the inflationary environ-
ment was advantageous.
I used t-test analysis to evaluate the remaining post-policy inflationary pressure,
as measured by the ex post inflationary pressure values, during the non targeting pe-
riod of 1996-2001 and semi-formal inflation targeting period of 2002-2005. The t-test
statistic, 0.52, is small enough not to reject the null hypothesis that the remaining
post-policy inflationary pressure is smaller during the period of semi-formal inflation
targeting period than in the non targeting period. Overall, Figures VII.1 and VII.2
provide evidence that the CBRT pursued pre-emptive monetary policies during the
period 2002-2005 rather than the accommodative policies of the earlier 1996-2001
period. Notice that using the ranges given above, the monetary policy effectiveness
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This diagram is drawn excluding the outlier data point of 67.5 in Jul’03.
Figure VII.2: Monetary Policy Effectiveness | EAIP < 0, RE
decisions because, at the very least, the central bank did not counteract inflation
reducing shocks that were in line with its stated objective (i.e., reducing inflation).
However, because the central bank fully accommodated both negative and positive
shocks, the intent behind the central bank’s actions and therefore also the effective-
ness of its monetary policy become suspect.
The monetary policy effectiveness as measured by the MPE index values under
adaptive learning does not show a significant difference in policy effectiveness com-
paring the period prior to and during the implementation of the semi-formal inflation
targeting. Figures VII.3 and VII.3 show the estimated policy effectiveness measures
conditional on the inflationary environment as described by the ex ante inflation
pressure.
The estimated policy effectiveness index values suggest that the monetary policy
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Figure VII.3: Monetary Policy Effectiveness | EAIP > 0, A. Learning
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Figure VII.4: Monetary Policy Effectiveness | EAIP < 0, A. Learning
When private agents are assumed to form expectations based on adaptive learn-
ing, the CBRT’s policy changes don’t seem to be effective in reducing the inflation if
the economy is subject to positive shocks. However, as the estimates in Figure VII.4
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indicates, the CBRT was very effective in reducing inflation pressure when the econ-
omy was hit by inflation reducing negative shocks. The observed inflation rates in
periods of 1996-2001 and 2002-2005 are distinct suggesting different degrees of policy
effectiveness of the CBRT. From this angle, the predictions under adaptive learning
seem problematic. Due to the structural breaks present in the monetary reaction
function, the sub periods under investigation are short. As a result, the least squares
learning algorithm seem to put similar weight on recent observations and older ones.
That is to say, estimated private agents’s forecast series reflect convex combination of
the past high and recent lower inflation rates and other associated variables. Thus,
under learning with small sample sizes, the monetary policy effectiveness predictions
for each period are dragged closer2.
VII.7.2 Monetary Policy Credibility Index
Since the declaration of the Memorandum of Economic Policies (MEP) in 1998, the
Central Bank of Republic of Turkey began to announce target inflation rates to align
private sector’s expectations. The timing of the announcements during 1998-2001
was not systematic whereas in 2002-2005 announcement were made consistently at
the beginning of each year. An announced objective in the MEP was to reduce the
wholesale price inflation to 50 percent by the end of 1998, 20 percent by the end of
1999, and to single digits by the end of 2000. In December 1999, the CBRT announced
a revised list of inflation targets where 20 percent by the end of 2000, 12 percent by
the end of 2001, and 7 percent by the end of 2002 was aimed. Following the Feb’01
financial crisis, the CBRT adopted a semi-formal inflation targeting program in which
the CBRT began to announce explicit end of year inflation targets at the beginning of
each year starting in Jan’02. During 2002-2005, inflation targets of 35%, 20%, 12%,
2It is important to note that this does not necessarily mean that the conduct of adaptive learning
approach is not helpful to study transition periods. In fact, assuming expectations formed through
adaptive learning during transition periods seem more plausible as long as the length of the transition
period is long enough to allow adaptive learning algorithm work in the appropriate way.
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and 8% were officially announced by the CBRT for the end of 2002, 2003, 2004, and
2005, respectively.
The actual inflation rates were 69 percent by the end of 1998, 68 percent by the
end of 1999, 39 percent by the end of 2000, and 68 percent by the end of 2001.
The observed end of year inflation rates prior to 2002 were significantly larger than
the announced targets. The observed inflation rates by the end of the year 2002,
2003, 2004, and 2005 were about 29%, 18%, 9%, 7%, respectively. During the period
2002-2005, the transition period towards full-fledged inflation targeting, the CBRT
undershot the announced inflation targets for four consecutive years.
Considering the periods in which explicit inflation targets were announced, I study
the credibility of the monetary authority’s announcements and in general the evolu-
tion of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey’s credibility. To this end, I follow
the methodology explained in Chapter IV to compute the monetary policy credibility
index of the CBRT prior to 2002, and during the transition period of 2002-2005. I
consider rational private agents besides private expectations formed using the process
of adaptive learning to obtain reliable credibility estimates. The credibility index for-
mulae under different expectations formation are shown in VII.6.23. Table VIII.9 and
VIII.10 report the estimated monetary policy credibility index values under rational
expectations and adaptive learning during 1998-2005.
The scatter diagram Figure VII.5 displays the estimated monetary policy credibil-
ity index values in 1998-2005 under the assumption that private agents are rational.
The diagram suggests no significant change in the credibility comparing the period of
3Note that the index formulae in VII.6.2 requires the use of target rates at each point in time
t. Since I use monthly data and all other variables are on a monthly basis, I convert the CBRT’s
announced end of year targets into implicit monthly targets by dividing the annual target to twelve.
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semi-formal targeting to the previous non targeting period in 1998-2001. The average
estimated credibility during 2002-2005 is 0.52 in comparison to 0.48 in 1998-20014.
The diagram also shows that there are times of super as well as negative credibility
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Monetary Policy Credibility Index values under Rational Expectations. This scatter diagram is
drawn excluding the following twelve outlier data points: −3.79 in Dec’98, 7.48 in Apr’99, −3.20
in Sep’99, −18.85 in Dec’99, 12.61 in Dec’01, 8.10 in Apr’03, 7.15 in Oct’03, 4.80 in Dec’03, −21.84
in Apr’04, 12.47 in Aug’04, −9.75 in Oct’04, and −13.18 in Feb’05.
Figure VII.5: MPCI, Rational Expectations
There are two major predictions of the credibility index for the period that starts
with the disinflation program of the Memorandum of Economic Policies in 1998. The
estimated credibility index values are very high at the very beginning of the program
and rapidly decreasing as the time approaches to the year-ends for which some specific
inflation targets were announced. The high credibility estimates at the beginning of
the disinflation program in early 1998 seem to reflect the private agents’ complete
disbelief in the disinflation program itself. The private agents seem to have believed,
from the beginning, that the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey would not take
4The (arithmetic) average credibility is computed excluding the outlier index values reported
underneath the Figure VII.5.
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appropriate action to reduce inflation to the level consistent with the program and
the announced inflation targets. The fact that these expectations of policy failure
were fulfilled is what is being captured by high credibility index values at the be-
ginning of 1998. The estimated credibility index values for the period of 1998-2001
are rapidly decreasing, which indicates that the private agents lost their belief in
the credibility of the announced targets themselves at each point in time due to the
excessive overshooting of inflation targets for three successive years during 1998-2001.
During 2001-2005 overall, there don’t seem to be a clear upward or downward
pattern in the estimated credibility index values. However, credibility index values
become larger towards the end of the year within the years of 2002, 2003, 2004, and
2005. Comparing the credibility index values among the the end of years of 2002,
2003, 2004, and 2005 suggest that credibility went down from super credibility about
the end of 2002 to perfectly credible level by the end of 2005 picking up the extent
of undershooting and that it got smaller towards 2005.
There are significantly large negative estimates for the credibility reported un-
derneath of the Figure VII.5. The credibility estimate of −18.85 in Sep’99 seem to
reflect the complete loss of confidence in the disinflation program due to significant
overshooting as found by comparing the announced target rate of 20% and the ob-
served actual rate of 68% by the end of 1999. Following this loss of credibility, the
CBRT abandoned the its disinflation program embedded in the Memorandum of Eco-
nomic Policies in 1998. Besides, I estimate negative credibility index values of −21.84
and −9.75 in Dec’03 and Oct’04, respectively. These negative estimates seem to re-
flect loss of credibility in the announcements themselves rather then the disinflation
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Monetary Policy Credibility Index values under Adaptive Learning. This scatter diagram is drawn
excluding the following twelve outlier data points: 3.61 in Mar’03, −4.86 in Sep’01, 5.09 in Nov’02,
−17.08 in Dec’02, 12.43 in Jan’03, −12.41 in Mar’03, 36.59 in Oct’03, 9.47 in Dec’03, 4.63 in
Mar’04, 3.11 in Aug’04, −4.61 in Oct’04, and 5.95 in Feb’05.
Figure VII.6: MPCI, Adaptive Learning
Estimated monetary policy credibility index values under adaptive learning are
displayed in the scatter diagram VII.65. The diagram suggests no significant change
in the credibility overall, during 2002-2005. The arithmetic average of the estimated
credibility index is 0.50 during 2002-2005 and 0.43 in 1998-20056. These credibility
estimates are extremely close to that of under the assumption of rational expec-
tations. Negative or positive outlier credibility estimates reported underneath the
Figure VII.6 are also aligned with the timing of the outliers predicted when agents
are rational. However, there seem to be lower variability in the estimated index values
under adaptive learning. The credibility estimates are dragged closer due to recursive
5I use an initial window size of twenty observations when OLS estimating the private agents’
forecast series utilizing iTt−6 and the announced target rates consistent withe the process of adaptive
learning. The estimated credibility index values displayed in VII.6 represents credibility between
time t and twenty months earlier. There are no announced inflation targets prior to 1998. Besides,
there is data loss during the computation of iTt−6. Therefore, there are no credibility estimates for
the periods prior to Jul’07.
6The average credibility is computed excluding the outlier index values reported underneath the
Figure VII.6.
98
estimations undertaken consistent with adaptive learning.
The scatter diagrams of Turkish monetary policy credibility index under rational
expectations and adaptive learning are substantially variable across the periods 1998-
2005. Nevertheless, the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey was able to come in
below its announced inflation targets for four consecutive years during 2002-2005.
This indicates that the CBRT was very watchful with regard to perceived credibility
and also very conservative in that no matter how bad (or good) the credibility was,
the CBRT always acted as though credibility was worse than it was and came in




The impact of inflation targeting on inflation and expectations is still an open
question. Studies focusing on industrialized economies usually reject the hypothesis
that inflation targeting matter in reducing inflationary expectations whereas studies
on non industrialized economies find a considerable heterogeneity across countries.
This dissertation provides quantitative assessment of a transition to inflation tar-
geting in detail with a focus on the role of expectations in the adjustment process.
Counterfactual experiments are conducted to produce measures of inflation pressure
to characterize the behavior of inflation expectations during the transition. I analyze
the Turkish economy during 1996-2005, a long period of transition. By focusing on
a developing country which was not part of the great moderation, I provide detailed
evidence for the impact of targeting on inflation expectations in isolation.
I provide statistical evidence accompanied with anecdotal information that the
monetary reaction function of the CBRT was subject to structural breaks during the
transition to full-fledged inflation targeting. However, the structural model under-
lying the Turkish economy is shown to be stable during the transition. In order to
represent expectations better, I consider empirical application of adaptive learning
besides the standard rational expectations approach. I show that neither the model
estimates nor the computed inflation pressure indices seem to differ significantly un-
der rational expectations or adaptive learning approach confirming the reliability of
the model estimates.
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I construct ex ante inflation pressure index on a monthly basis to describe the in-
flationary environment that was faced by the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. Ex
post inflation pressure index, on the other hand, shows the magnitude of the renaming
inflation pressure. Monetary policy effectiveness index is then estimated to assess the
effectiveness of the monetary policy conditional on the inflationary environment. I
show that, although the inflationary environment during 2002-2005, the semi-formal
targeting period, was at least as disadvantageous as it had been during the non infla-
tion targeting period of 1996-2001, the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey was able
to reduce inflation from excessive levels to about 8% by the end of 2005. This in-
dicates highly effective monetary policy during the transition to full-fledged targeting.
Some might argue that significant disinflation in a short period of time may be
a very costly process. However, in the case of Turkey, the central bank’s success
in reducing inflation significantly during the semi-formal inflation targeting period
(2002-2005), was accompanied by improvements in the real side of the economy as
well. It is apparent, using Brazil, Russian, India, and China (BRIC) economies as a
basis of comparison, that the Turkish economy had a high growth rate during 2002-
2005. Turkey had an average annual GNP (Gross National Product) growth rate of
7.8% whereas the BRIC economies experienced an annual average GDP growth rate
about 6.2% during the 2000-2005 period. High growth performance of the Turkish
Economy was also maintained in 2006. During 2006, the Turkish economy started
implementing full-fledged inflation targeting monetary framework while the economy
grew at an annual GNP growth rate of 6%.
It is usually believed that monetary authorities build credibility under inflation
targeting regimes. To evaluate this hypothesis and assess the credibility of the Cen-
tral Bank of Republic of Turkey, I introduced a new measure of monetary policy
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credibility to the literature. Surprisingly, I found that although the credibility in
the disinflation programs of the CBRT and the inflation target announcements was
high and rapidly decreasing during 1998-2001, it did not follow a dominant upward
or downward pattern overall during the period of 1996-2005.
Successive overshooting of the inflation targets during 1998-2001 and continuous
undershooting in the period of 2002-2005 provide strong evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that the monetary policy of the Turkish central bank was much more
effective in controlling the inflation during the semi-formal inflation targeting than it
had been during the period of non targeting monetary frameworks. High credibility
estimates at the beginning of non targeting disinflation programs during 1998-2001
seem to indicate the degree of the disbelief of the economic agents in the Turkish
central bank’s disinflation programs and announced targets during that time and that
the poor performance of the monetary policy was fully anticipated. In order to obtain
more directly interpretable credibility index values during non targeting periods of
pre-2002 periods, moderate artificial inflation targets may be used as benchmarks to
evaluate monetary policy credibility. The fact that announcements are not explicitly
modeled in the structural model also suggests that new avenues can be explored
by incorporating inflation target announcements more explicitly into the structural
model recognizing the announcements as important elements in the expectational
formation process of the private agents.
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Table VIII.1: Rational Expectations Solution, Jan’96-Nov’98
pit yt it et
g0 -0.0089 h0 0.2620 k0 -2.9916 s0 0.4493
pit−1 g1 0.4067 h1 -0.0378 k1 0.1085 s1 -0.0064
yt−1 g2 0.0255 h2 0.3707 k2 0.1522 s2 -0.0702
it−1 g3 -0.0010 h3 -0.0040 k3 0.6129 s3 -0.0918
et−1 g4 0.0562 h4 0.0233 k4 -0.0402 s4 0.5442
pi∗t−1 g5 0.0725 h5 0.0357 k5 0.0571 s5 -0.0067
i∗t−1 g6 0.0008 h6 0.0013 k6 0.0050 s6 0.0936
pit−2 g7 . . . h7 0.0019 k7 0.0003 s7 -0.0001
yt−2 g8 0.0700 h8 0.1886 k8 0.4170 s8 -0.0699
yt−3 g9 0.0233 h9 -0.0033 k9 0.1390 s9 -0.0577
yt−4 g10 0.2096 h10 -0.0057 k10 0.0423 s10 -0.0780
yt−5 g11 -0.0036 h11 -0.0035 k11 2.0082 s11 -0.1175
yt−6 g12 . . . h12 0.0000 k12 0.0000 s12 0.0000
it−2 g13 -0.0001 h13 -0.0047 k13 -0.0007 s13 0.0003
it−3 g14 -0.0668 h14 -0.0305 k14 -0.0232 s14 0.0030
et−3 g15 . . . h15 -0.0003 k15 0.0000 s15 0.0000
pi∗t−2 g16 . . . h16 0.0003 k16 0.0001 s16 0.0000
t g17 1.0489 h17 -0.0177 k17 0.2915 s17 -0.0205
ηt g18 0.0301 h18 1.1576 k18 0.1793 s18 -0.0624
σt g19 -0.0007 h19 -0.0009 k19 0.3772 s19 -0.0220
νt g20 -0.0048 h20 0.0136 k20 -0.0287 s20 1.3480
∗t g21 0.0168 h21 0.0148 k21 0.1002 s21 -0.0109
σ∗t g22 0.0017 h22 0.0011 k22 0.0098 s22 0.0590




g13it−2 + g14it−3 + g15et−3 + g16pi∗t−2 − g17t − g18ηt − g19σt − g20νt − g21∗t − g22σ∗t
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Table VIII.2: Rational Expectations Solution, Dec’98-Oct’00
pit yt it et
g0 -0.0764 h0 0.2118 k0 6.9606 s0 -0.9686
pit−1 g1 0.4069 h1 -0.0377 k1 0.1310 s1 -0.0029
yt−1 g2 0.0222 h2 0.3668 k2 1.5372 s2 -0.1705
it−1 g3 -0.0004 h3 -0.0033 k3 0.3721 s3 -0.0731
et−1 g4 0.0563 h4 0.0234 k4 -0.1146 s4 0.5489
pi∗t−1 g5 0.0723 h5 0.0355 k5 0.1051 s5 -0.0115
i∗t−1 g6 0.0009 h6 0.0013 k6 -0.0005 s6 0.0944
pit−2 g7 . . . h7 0.0019 k7 0.0009 s7 -0.0002
yt−2 g8 0.0692 h8 0.1877 k8 0.5635 s8 -0.0917
yt−3 g9 0.0229 h9 -0.0037 k9 0.1477 s9 -0.0700
yt−4 g10 0.2093 h10 -0.0065 k10 0.0035 s10 -0.0992
yt−5 g11 -0.0042 h11 -0.0052 k11 3.3351 s11 -0.1553
yt−6 g12 . . . h12 0.0000 k12 0.0000 s12 0.0000
it−2 g13 -0.0001 h13 -0.0047 k13 -0.0022 s13 0.0006
it−3 g14 -0.0667 h14 -0.0304 k14 -0.0379 s14 0.0052
et−3 g15 . . . h15 -0.0003 k15 -0.0001 s15 0.0000
pi∗t−2 g16 . . . h16 0.0003 k16 0.0002 s16 0.0000
t g17 1.0492 h17 -0.0176 k17 0.3712 s17 -0.0174
ηt g18 0.0266 h18 1.1544 k18 0.5277 s18 -0.1506
σt g19 -0.0008 h19 -0.0012 k19 0.6297 s19 -0.0293
νt g20 -0.0045 h20 0.0139 k20 -0.1698 s20 1.3574
∗t g21 0.0166 h21 0.0145 k21 0.1984 s21 -0.0182
σ∗t g22 0.0017 h22 0.0011 k22 0.0105 s22 0.0598




g13it−2 + g14it−3 + g15et−3 + g16pi∗t−2 − g17t − g18ηt − g19σt − g20νt − g21∗t − g22σ∗t
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Table VIII.3: Rational Expectations Solution, Mar’01-Sep’03
pit yt it et
g0 -0.0315 h0 0.2456 k0 -0.0048 s0 -0.0183
pit−1 g1 0.4065 h1 -0.0377 k1 0.0660 s1 -0.0057
yt−1 g2 0.0272 h2 0.3716 k2 0.0989 s2 -0.0428
it−1 g3 -0.0024 h3 -0.0051 k3 0.8585 s3 -0.1237
et−1 g4 0.0562 h4 0.0232 k4 -0.0245 s4 0.5434
pi∗t−1 g5 0.0725 h5 0.0358 k5 0.0350 s5 -0.0051
i∗t−1 g6 0.0008 h6 0.0013 k6 0.0031 s6 0.0936
pit−2 g7 . . . h7 0.0019 k7 0.0002 s7 -0.0001
yt−2 g8 0.0715 h8 0.1896 k8 0.2596 s8 -0.0388
yt−3 g9 0.0251 h9 -0.0020 k9 0.0911 s9 -0.0204
yt−4 g10 0.2113 h10 -0.0036 k10 0.0322 s10 -0.0206
yt−5 g11 -0.0013 h11 0.0001 k11 -0.0045 s11 -0.0273
yt−6 g12 -0.0016 h12 -0.0016 k12 0.5526 s12 -0.0435
it−2 g13 -0.0001 h13 -0.0047 k13 -0.0005 s13 0.0002
it−3 g14 -0.0668 h14 -0.0305 k14 -0.0143 s14 0.0022
et−3 g15 . . . h15 -0.0003 k15 0.0000 s15 0.0000
pi∗t−2 g16 . . . h16 0.0003 k16 0.0000 s16 0.0000
t g17 1.0489 h17 -0.0175 k17 0.1774 s17 -0.0173
ηt g18 0.0315 h18 1.1583 k18 0.1145 s18 -0.0407
σt g19 -0.0004 h19 -0.0004 k19 0.1314 s19 -0.0103
νt g20 -0.0048 h20 0.0136 k20 -0.0175 s20 1.3473
∗t g21 0.0169 h21 0.0149 k21 0.0613 s21 -0.0086
σ∗t g22 0.0017 h22 0.0011 k22 0.0060 s22 0.0592




g13it−2 + g14it−3 + g15et−3 + g16pi∗t−2 − g17t − g18ηt − g19σt − g20νt − g21∗t − g22σ∗t
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Table VIII.4: Rational Expectations Solution, Oct’03-Dec’05
pit yt it et
g0 -0.0332 h0 0.2445 k0 0.1328 s0 -0.0506
pit−1 g1 0.4068 h1 -0.0375 k1 0.0019 s1 0.0010
yt−1 g2 0.0278 h2 0.3715 k2 0.2730 s2 -0.0421
it−1 g3 -0.0030 h3 -0.0055 k3 0.9251 s3 -0.1361
et−1 g4 0.0561 h4 0.0232 k4 -0.0152 s4 0.5421
pi∗t−1 g5 0.0726 h5 0.0358 k5 0.0188 s5 -0.0032
i∗t−1 g6 0.0008 h6 0.0013 k6 0.0011 s6 0.0937
pit−2 g7 . . . h7 0.0019 k7 0.0004 s7 -0.0001
yt−2 g8 0.0729 h8 -0.0015 k8 0.0177 s8 -0.0016
yt−3 g9 0.0262 h9 -0.0014 k9 0.0176 s9 -0.0016
yt−4 g10 0.2125 h10 -0.0029 k10 0.0041 s10 -0.0002
yt−5 g11 . . . h11 0.0010 k11 0.0002 s11 0.0000
yt−6 g12 . . . h12 . . . k12 . . . s12 . . .
it−2 g13 -0.0001 h13 -0.0047 k13 -0.0009 s13 0.0002
it−3 g14 -0.0669 h14 -0.0306 k14 -0.0072 s14 0.0014
et−3 g15 . . . h15 -0.0003 k15 -0.0001 s15 0.0000
pi∗t−2 g16 . . . h16 0.0003 k16 0.0001 s16 0.0000
t g17 1.0495 h17 -0.0169 k17 0.0180 s17 -0.0004
ηt g18 0.0316 h18 1.1579 k18 0.2165 s18 -0.0498
σt g19 -0.0002 h19 -0.0002 k19 0.0648 s19 -0.0056
νt g20 -0.0049 h20 0.0135 k20 -0.0030 s20 1.3450
∗t g21 0.0170 h21 0.0150 k21 0.0341 s21 -0.0054
σ∗t g22 0.0017 h22 0.0011 k22 0.0020 s22 0.0595




g13it−2 + g14it−3 + g15et−3 + g16pi∗t−2 − g17t − g18ηt − g19σt − g20νt − g21∗t − g22σ∗t
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Table VIII.5: EPIP, EAIP, and MPE under Rational Expectations
Jan’1996 - Dec’2001
EPIP EAIP MPE EPIP EAIP MPE
1996:1 . . . . . . . . . 1999:1 1.50 1.50 0.00
1996:2 . . . . . . . . . 1999:2 -1.53 -1.52 1.00
1996:3 . . . . . . . . . 1999:3 0.89 0.89 -0.01
1996:4 . . . . . . . . . 1999:4 0.82 0.82 0.00
1996:5 . . . . . . . . . 1999:5 -1.81 -1.81 1.00
1996:6 . . . . . . . . . 1999:6 0.34 0.34 0.00
1996:7 . . . . . . . . . 1999:7 0.59 0.59 0.00
1996:8 . . . . . . . . . 1999:8 0.41 0.41 0.00
1996:9 0.51 0.51 0.00 1999:9 1.73 1.73 0.00
1996:10 0.72 0.71 0.00 1999:10 0.36 0.36 0.00
1996:11 -1.24 -1.23 1.01 1999:11 -1.98 -1.98 1.00
1996:12 -1.70 -1.69 1.00 1999:12 1.70 1.70 0.00
1997:1 2.35 2.36 0.00 2000:1 -0.99 -0.99 1.00
1997:2 -0.20 -0.21 0.98 2000:2 -1.06 -1.06 1.00
1997:3 -0.25 -0.24 1.02 2000:3 -0.72 -0.72 1.00
1997:4 1.16 1.15 0.00 2000:4 -0.54 -0.54 1.00
1997:5 -1.82 -1.82 1.00 2000:5 -0.06 -0.07 0.88
1997:6 -1.74 -1.74 1.00 2000:6 -1.48 -1.48 1.00
1997:7 3.25 3.25 0.00 2000:7 1.58 1.58 0.00
1997:8 -0.04 -0.04 1.23 2000:8 -0.04 -0.02 1.44
1997:9 1.06 1.06 0.00 2000:9 0.92 0.91 -0.01
1997:10 0.96 0.97 0.00 2000:10 0.06 0.06 0.08
1997:11 -1.56 -1.56 1.00 2000:11 . . . . . . . . .
1997:12 -1.38 -1.38 1.00 2000:12 . . . . . . . . .
1998:1 1.99 1.99 0.00 2001:1 . . . . . . . . .
1998:2 -2.62 -2.62 1.00 2001:2 . . . . . . . . .
1998:3 -0.07 -0.07 1.00 2001:3 . . . . . . . . .
1998:4 0.38 0.38 0.00 2001:4 . . . . . . . . .
1998:5 -1.08 -1.08 1.00 2001:5 . . . . . . . . .
1998:6 -1.00 -1.00 1.00 2001:6 . . . . . . . . .
1998:7 0.94 0.94 0.00 2001:7 . . . . . . . . .
1998:8 0.62 0.62 0.00 2001:8 . . . . . . . . .
1998:9 2.67 2.66 0.00 2001:9 . . . . . . . . .
1998:10 -0.59 -0.59 0.99 2001:10 0.25 -0.47 -0.53
1998:11 -1.63 -1.63 1.00 2001:11 -1.68 -2.35 0.72
1998:12 -0.93 -0.93 1.00 2001:12 -0.90 -1.19 0.75
Notes: EPIP is the ex ante inflation pressure. EAIP is the ex ante inflation pressure. MPE
is the monetary policy effectiveness.
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Table VIII.6: EPIP, EAIP, and MPE under Rational Expectations
Jan’2002 - Dec’2005
EPIP EAIP MPE EPIP EAIP MPE
2002:1 2.09 2.13 0.02 2005:1 0.26 0.31 0.16
2002:2 -3.37 -3.49 0.96 2005:2 -0.51 -0.47 1.09
2002:3 -0.48 -0.46 1.04 2005:3 0.26 0.29 0.09
2002:4 0.93 1.16 0.20 2005:4 0.47 0.51 0.08
2002:5 -1.38 -1.15 1.20 2005:5 0.22 0.19 -0.13
2002:6 0.09 0.28 0.69 2005:6 -0.79 -0.87 0.91
2002:7 0.93 0.93 0.00 2005:7 -0.66 -0.67 0.99
2002:8 0.81 0.63 -0.29 2005:8 1.44 1.46 0.02
2002:9 1.34 1.00 -0.35 2005:9 0.18 0.20 0.10
2002:10 -0.10 -0.26 0.38 2005:10 0.77 0.84 0.08
2002:11 -0.28 -0.26 1.07 2005:11 -0.37 -0.27 1.36
2002:12 -1.16 -1.04 1.12 2005:12 -0.96 -0.83 1.16
2003:1 1.01 1.11 0.10
2003:2 -0.95 -0.86 1.10
2003:3 0.49 0.62 0.20
2003:4 -0.89 -0.78 1.13
2003:5 0.04 0.13 0.67
2003:6 -0.80 -0.63 1.27
2003:7 -0.20 0.00 67.57
2003:8 0.41 0.59 0.30
2003:9 1.24 1.28 0.03
2003:10 -0.36 -0.49 0.73
2003:11 0.40 0.17 -1.36
2003:12 -0.78 -1.11 0.70
2004:1 0.29 0.03 -10.1
2004:2 -0.10 -0.48 0.21
2004:3 0.49 0.29 -0.70
2004:4 -0.42 -0.52 0.80
2004:5 -0.03 -0.05 0.58
2004:6 -0.52 -0.51 1.03
2004:7 0.64 0.57 -0.12
2004:8 0.31 0.37 0.16
2004:9 0.21 0.33 0.36
2004:10 1.30 1.48 0.12
2004:11 -0.89 -0.71 1.25
2004:12 -0.96 -0.79 1.22
Notes: EPIP is the ex ante inflation pressure. EAIP is the ex ante inflation pressure. MPE
is the monetary policy effectiveness.
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Table VIII.7: EPIP, EAIP, and MPE under Adaptive Learning
Jan’1996 - Dec’2001
EPIP EAIP MPE EPIP EAIP MPE
1996:1 . . . . . . . . . 1999:1 1.50 1.49 0.00
1996:2 . . . . . . . . . 1999:2 -1.52 -1.50 1.02
1996:3 . . . . . . . . . 1999:3 0.89 0.96 0.07
1996:4 . . . . . . . . . 1999:4 0.82 0.94 0.13
1996:5 . . . . . . . . . 1999:5 -1.81 -1.91 0.95
1996:6 . . . . . . . . . 1999:6 0.34 0.23 -0.49
1996:7 . . . . . . . . . 1999:7 0.59 0.62 0.05
1996:8 . . . . . . . . . 1999:8 0.41 0.40 -0.03
1996:9 . . . . . . . . . 1999:9 1.73 1.68 -0.03
1996:10 . . . . . . . . . 1999:10 0.36 0.44 0.17
1996:11 . . . . . . . . . 1999:11 -1.98 -1.89 1.04
1996:12 . . . . . . . . . 1999:12 1.70 1.59 -0.07
1997:1 . . . . . . . . . 2000:1 -0.99 -0.99 1.00
1997:2 . . . . . . . . . 2000:2 -1.06 -1.07 0.99
1997:3 . . . . . . . . . 2000:3 -0.72 -0.67 1.07
1997:4 . . . . . . . . . 2000:4 -0.54 -0.50 1.09
1997:5 . . . . . . . . . 2000:5 -0.07 -0.12 0.56
1997:6 . . . . . . . . . 2000:6 -1.48 -1.23 1.21
1997:7 . . . . . . . . . 2000:7 1.58 1.55 -0.02
1997:8 -0.04 -0.22 0.20 2000:8 -0.03 -0.12 0.29
1997:9 1.06 1.10 0.03 2000:9 0.91 0.96 0.05
1997:10 0.96 0.95 -0.02 2000:10 0.06 0.09 0.37
1997:11 -1.56 -1.49 1.04 2000:11 . . . . . . . . .
1997:12 -1.38 -1.48 0.93 2000:12 . . . . . . . . .
1998:1 1.99 1.96 -0.02 2001:1 . . . . . . . . .
1998:2 -2.62 -2.53 1.03 2001:2 . . . . . . . . .
1998:3 -0.07 -0.10 0.72 2001:3 . . . . . . . . .
1998:4 0.38 0.50 0.23 2001:4 . . . . . . . . .
1998:5 -1.08 -1.08 1.00 2001:5 . . . . . . . . .
1998:6 -1.00 -1.09 0.92 2001:6 . . . . . . . . .
1998:7 0.94 1.05 0.11 2001:7 . . . . . . . . .
1998:8 0.62 0.51 -0.22 2001:8 . . . . . . . . .
1998:9 2.67 2.66 0.00 2001:9 . . . . . . . . .
1998:10 -0.59 -0.52 1.12 2001:10 0.23 0.02 0.89
1998:11 -1.63 -1.59 1.02 2001:11 -1.70 -1.79 0.95
1998:12 -0.93 -1.03 0.90 2001:12 -0.90 -0.77 1.17
Notes: EPIP is the ex ante inflation pressure. EAIP is the ex ante inflation pressure. MPE
is the monetary policy effectiveness.
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Table VIII.8: EPIP, EAIP, and MPE under Adaptive Learning
Jan’2002 - Dec’2005
EPIP EAIP MPE EPIP EAIP MPE
2002:1 2.09 1.92 -0.09 2005:1 0.26 0.26 -0.01
2002:2 -3.37 -3.03 1.11 2005:2 -0.51 -0.44 1.17
2002:3 -0.48 -0.63 0.75 2005:3 0.26 0.24 -0.07
2002:4 0.94 1.06 0.12 2005:4 0.47 0.52 0.10
2002:5 -1.37 -1.38 1.00 2005:5 0.22 0.21 -0.06
2002:6 0.09 0.06 -0.57 2005:6 -0.79 -0.91 0.88
2002:7 0.93 0.83 -0.12 2005:7 -0.66 -0.64 1.04
2002:8 0.81 0.74 -0.10 2005:8 1.44 1.42 -0.02
2002:9 1.34 1.39 0.04 2005:9 0.18 0.14 -0.28
2002:10 -0.11 -0.14 0.77 2005:10 0.77 0.89 0.14
2002:11 -0.28 -0.25 1.13 2005:11 -0.37 -0.47 0.79
2002:12 -1.16 -1.06 1.09 2005:12 -0.96 -0.99 0.97
2003:1 1.01 0.82 -0.23
2003:2 -0.95 -0.88 1.08
2003:3 0.50 0.60 0.17
2003:4 -0.88 -1.00 0.88
2003:5 0.04 0.14 0.68
2003:6 -0.80 -0.82 0.97
2003:7 -0.20 -0.24 0.82
2003:8 0.42 0.42 0.00
2003:9 1.24 1.17 -0.07
2003:10 -0.36 -0.27 1.35
2003:11 0.39 0.35 -0.13
2003:12 -0.79 -0.85 0.92
2004:1 0.29 0.41 0.31
2004:2 -0.10 -0.10 0.98
2004:3 0.48 0.49 0.01
2004:4 -0.42 -0.37 1.13
2004:5 -0.03 -0.08 0.35
2004:6 -0.52 -0.54 0.97
2004:7 0.64 0.49 -0.30
2004:8 0.31 0.33 0.03
2004:9 0.21 0.27 0.20
2004:10 1.30 1.27 -0.03
2004:11 -0.89 -0.82 1.09
2004:12 -0.96 -1.01 0.95
Notes: EPIP is the ex ante inflation pressure. EAIP is the ex ante inflation pressure. MPE
is the monetary policy effectiveness.
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Table VIII.9: XIFC, XITC, and MPCI under Rational Expectations
XIFC XITC MPCI XIFC XITC MPCI
1998:12 0.25 -0.93 -3.79 2002:12 -0.60 -1.16 1.92
1999:1 0.93 1.50 1.62 2003:1 0.37 1.01 2.75
1999:2 -0.60 -1.53 2.55 2003:2 -0.69 -0.95 1.37
1999:3 1.13 0.89 0.79 2003:3 0.36 0.49 1.36
1999:4 0.11 0.82 7.49 2003:4 -0.11 -0.89 8.10
1999:5 -0.84 -1.81 2.17 2003:5 0.72 0.04 0.06
1999:6 0.92 0.34 0.37 2003:6 0.51 -0.80 -1.58
1999:7 0.20 0.59 2.91 2003:7 1.40 -0.20 -0.15
1999:8 -0.32 0.41 -1.30 2003:8 1.23 0.41 0.34
1999:9 -0.54 1.73 -3.21 2003:9 1.14 1.24 1.09
1999:10 -2.25 0.36 -0.16 2003:10 -0.05 -0.36 7.15
1999:11 -2.31 -1.98 0.86 2003:11 0.25 0.40 1.57
1999:12 -0.09 1.70 -18.86 2003:12 -0.16 -0.78 4.81
2000:1 -1.82 -0.99 0.55 2004:1 0.60 0.29 0.48
2000:2 -0.99 -1.06 1.08 2004:2 0.26 -0.10 -0.39
2000:3 0.37 -0.72 -1.95 2004:3 0.53 0.49 0.92
2000:4 1.13 -0.54 -0.48 2004:4 0.02 -0.42 -21.85
2000:5 1.75 -0.06 -0.04 2004:5 0.23 -0.03 -0.13
2000:6 1.82 -1.48 -0.81 2004:6 0.53 -0.52 -0.99
2000:7 2.96 1.58 0.53 2004:7 0.88 0.64 0.73
2000:8 1.66 -0.04 -0.02 2004:8 0.03 0.31 12.47
2000:9 1.82 0.92 0.50 2004:9 0.13 0.21 1.67
2000:10 1.03 0.06 0.06 2004:10 -0.13 1.30 -9.76
2004:11 -1.40 -0.89 0.64
2001:10 -4.94 0.25 -0.05 2004:12 -0.47 -0.96 2.06
2001:11 -3.25 -1.68 0.52 2005:1 0.46 0.26 0.56
2001:12 -1.20 -0.90 0.75 2005:2 0.04 -0.51 -13.18
2002:1 0.17 2.09 12.61 2005:3 0.66 0.26 0.40
2002:2 -1.92 -3.37 1.76 2005:4 0.29 0.47 1.61
2002:3 1.59 -0.48 -0.30 2005:5 -0.27 0.22 -0.82
2002:4 2.06 0.93 0.45 2005:6 -0.30 -0.79 2.63
2002:5 1.12 -1.38 -1.23 2005:7 0.32 -0.66 -2.09
2002:6 2.30 0.09 0.04 2005:8 0.91 1.44 1.58
2002:7 2.21 0.93 0.42 2005:9 -0.28 0.18 -0.65
2002:8 1.07 0.81 0.76 2005:10 -0.45 0.77 -1.70
2002:9 0.68 1.34 1.97 2005:11 -1.20 -0.37 0.31
2002:10 -0.61 -0.10 0.16 2005:12 -0.83 -0.96 1.16
2002:11 -0.73 -0.28 0.39
Notes: Estimates for Dec’1998 - Dec’2005. XIFC measures the change in expectations of infla-
tion under full credibility. XITC measures the change in expectations of inflation under true
credibility. MPCI is the monetary policy credibility index.
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Table VIII.10: XIFC, XITC, and MPCI under Adaptive Learning
XIFC XITC MPCI XIFC XITC MPCI
1998:12 . . . -0.99 . . . 2002:10 2.01 -0.15 -0.08
1999:1 . . . 1.55 . . . 2002:11 1.96 -0.43 -0.22
1999:2 . . . -1.65 . . . 2002:12 1.92 -1.25 -0.65
1999:3 . . . 0.86 . . . 2003:1 2.10 0.94 0.45
1999:4 . . . 0.82 . . . 2003:2 1.17 -1.01 -0.86
1999:5 . . . -1.94 . . . 2003:3 1.69 0.43 0.25
1999:6 . . . 0.31 . . . 2003:4 1.21 -1.02 -0.84
1999:7 . . . 0.57 . . . 2003:5 1.96 -0.03 -0.01
1999:8 . . . 0.39 . . . 2003:6 2.09 -0.86 -0.41
1999:9 . . . 1.77 . . . 2003:7 3.37 -0.30 -0.09
1999:10 . . . 0.33 . . . 2003:8 3.36 0.33 0.10
1999:11 . . . -2.11 . . . 2003:9 3.00 1.22 0.41
1999:12 . . . 1.74 . . . 2003:10 1.64 -0.43 -0.27
2000:1 . . . -1.10 . . . 2003:11 1.92 0.35 0.18
2000:2 . . . -1.14 . . . 2003:12 1.10 -0.85 -0.77
2000:3 . . . -0.79 . . . 2004:1 1.30 0.23 0.18
2000:4 . . . -0.59 . . . 2004:2 1.43 -0.16 -0.11
2000:5 . . . -0.11 . . . 2004:3 1.59 0.45 0.28
2000:6 . . . -1.54 . . . 2004:4 0.95 -0.45 -0.48
2000:7 4.86 1.49 0.31 2004:5 1.48 -0.07 -0.05
2000:8 3.11 -0.07 -0.02 2004:6 1.08 -0.53 -0.49
2000:9 3.21 0.88 0.27 2004:7 1.53 0.61 0.40
2000:10 2.33 0.02 0.01 2004:8 1.53 0.25 0.16
2004:9 1.09 0.22 0.20
2001:3 2.53 4.25 1.68 2004:10 0.84 1.28 1.52
2001:4 -1.62 4.28 -2.65 2004:11 -0.26 -0.95 3.64
2004:12 0.77 -0.97 -1.26
2001:9 1.26 2.87 2.28 2005:1 1.19 0.22 0.19
2001:10 -1.72 0.20 -0.11 2005:2 0.72 -0.51 -0.71
2001:11 -1.78 -1.88 1.05 2005:3 1.14 0.21 0.19
2001:12 0.29 -0.99 -3.44 2005:4 1.00 0.44 0.44
2002:1 2.91 2.10 0.72 2005:5 0.47 0.22 0.47
2002:2 0.46 -3.63 -7.89 2005:6 0.33 -0.81 -2.46
2002:3 4.41 -0.55 -0.12 2005:7 1.09 -0.66 -0.60
2002:4 4.33 0.85 0.20 2005:8 1.51 1.41 0.94
2002:5 3.30 -1.37 -0.41 2005:9 0.38 0.16 0.42
2002:6 4.55 -0.06 -0.01 2005:10 0.05 0.77 15.95
2002:7 4.45 0.88 0.20 2005:11 -0.67 -0.37 0.55
2002:8 3.50 0.75 0.21 2005:12 -0.11 -0.99 9.14
2002:9 2.98 1.28 0.43
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APPENDIX
A.1 Technical Appendix to IV
In order to derive ex ante inflation formulae, the expectation terms, Etpit+1, Et−1pit,
Et−2pit−1, and Et−1yt that appear in (IV.7) must be expressed in terms of it−2 and
earlier. I use the MSV solutions, (VII.8)-(VII.10), and make enough successive back-
ward substitutions until all variables are written in terms of variables dated at t− 2
and earlier. I begin by expressing Etpit+1 in terms it−2 and earlier. From (VII.8),
Etpit+1 can be shown as
Etpit+1 = g0 + g1pit + g2yt + g3it (A.1)
where Ett+1 = Etηt+1 = Etσt+1 = 0.
Substituting the MSV solutions, (VII.8)-(VII.10), into (A.1) produces:
Etpit+1 = g0 + g1[g0 + g1pit−1 + g2yt−1 + g3it−1 + g4t + g5ηt + g6σt]
+ g2[h0 + h1pit−1 + h2yt−1 + h3it−1 + h4t + h5ηt + h6σt]
+ g3[k0 + k1pit−1 + k2yt−1 + k3it−1 + k4t + k5ηt + k6σt] (A.2)
Collecting the common terms yields
Etpit+1 = G0 +G1pit−1 +G2yt−1 +G3it−1 (A.3)
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where
G0 = g0 + g1g0 + g2h0 + g3k0
G1 = g
2
1 + g2h1 + g3k1
G2 = g1g2 + g2h2 + g3k2
G3 = g1g3 + g2h3 + g3k3
Lagging the MSV solutions one period and inserting them into (A.3) gives:
Etpit+1 = G0 +G1[g0 + g1pit−2 + g2yt−2 + g3it−2 + g4t−1 + g5ηt−1 + g6σt−1]
+G2[h0 + h1pit−2 + h2yt−2 + h3it−2 + h4t−1 + h5ηt−1 + h6σt−1]
+G3[k0 + k1pit−2 + k2yt−2 + k3it−2 + k4t−1 + k5ηt−1 + k6σt−1]
Collecting the common terms yields
Etpit+1 = Q0 +Q1pit−2 +Q2yt−2 +Q3it−2 +Q4t−1 +Q5ηt−1 +Q6σt−1 (A.5)
where
Q0 = G0 +G1g0 +G2h0 +G3k0
Q1 = G1g1 +G2h1 +G3k1
Q2 = G1g2 +G2h2 +G3k2
Q3 = G1g3 +G2h3 +G3k3
Q4 = G1g4 +G2h4 +G3k4
Q5 = G1g5 +G2h5 +G3k5
Q6 = G1g6 +G2h6 +G3k6
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Similarly, I obtain
Et−1pit = G0 +G1pit−1 +G2yt−1 +G3it−1 (A.6)
Et−2pit−1 = g0 + g1pit−2 + g2yt−2 + g3it−2 (A.7)
Et−1yt = H0 +H1pit−2 +H2yt−2 +H3it−2 (A.8)
Et−2[Et−1yt] = H0 +H1pit−2 +H2yt−2 +H3it−2 (A.9)
where
H0 = h0 + h1g0 + h2h0 + h3k0
H1 = h1g1 + h2h1 + h3k1
H2 = h1g2 + h2h2 + h3k2
H3 = h1g3 + h2h3 + h3k3
Substituting (A.9), Et−2pit = piTt , Et−2[pit−1] = pi
T












Λ0 = α0 + α3(β0 + β2H0)
Λ1 = α3β2H2
Λ2 = α3(β1 + β2H1)
Λ3 = α3(β2H3 − β3)
Λ4 = α1 + α3β3
Λ5 = α2
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piTt − Λ0 − Λ1pit−2 − Λ2yt−2 − Λ4piTt−1 − Λ5piTt+1
}
(A.11)
A.2 Multiple Structural Change Analysis
This section is built upon Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) and borrows extensively from
Brady’s (2008) eloquent summary on how to set up the problem and conduct the
methodology to estimate multiple break dates at unknown dates. Bai and Perron






tδj + ut t = Tj−1 + 1, . . . Tj (A.12)
for j = 1, . . . ,m + 1. In this model, yt is the observed dependent variable at time t,
xt (px1), and zt (qx1) are vectors of regressors, β and δj are the corresponding vectors
of coefficients, and ut is the disturbance at time t. Equation (A.12) posits a partial
structural change model since the parameter vector β is not subject to shifts and is
estimated using the entire sample. If p = 0, equation (A.12) turns into complete
structural change model in which all of the coefficients are allowed to change across
m-partitions (T1, . . . , Tm). A complete structural change model, which I use in this
research, with m breaks can be written as
yt = z
′
tδj + ut t = Tj−1 + 1, . . . Tj (A.13)
Given the complete structural change model, the associated least squares estimates








Once δˆj are estimated for a given m-partition (T1, . . . , Tm), Bai and Perron (1998,
2003) suggests two techniques to locate structural break dates.
In the first, global, approach, m, the number of breaks, is obtained as the one that
minimizes the resulting sum of square residuals, ST (T1, . . . , Tm), obtained by substi-
tuting the estimators, δˆj, into the objective function. That is to say, the estimates for
break point locations are determined by (Tˆ1, . . . , Tˆm) = argminT1,...,TmST (T1, . . . , Tm),
where the minimization is taken over all partitions. Thus, in the first approach, the
break-point estimators are global minimizers of the objective function.
In the second approach, break dates are determined sequentially, starting with
the single break date that minimizes the sum of square residuals. Then the whole
sample is broken at the estimated break date into two partitions to test for other
structural breaks within each of the resulting partitions. The second break date is
the one that minimizes the sum of square residuals within each partition and has the
lower sum of square residuals across the two partitions. Next, the whole sample is
split at the second break date into two new partitions to continue searching for other
structural breaks in a similar fashion in the second round. The process of searching
for structural break dates is repeated sequentially to find all break dates regardless
of whether the determined break dates are statistically significant or not1.
1Bai and Perron’s (1998, 2003) sequential approach is different than the Altissimo and Corradi’s
(2003) sequential methodology where the focus is switched on the statistical significance of the break
dates. Altissimo and Corradi first find the single break that minimizes the sum of square residuals.
If this break is found to be statistically significant, then they move to find the second break, given
the existence and location of the first break that minimize the sum of squared residuals, and so
forth.
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In practice, Bai and Perron provide a much more detailed explanation using ma-
trix algebra and then explain the method for optimizing over each partition. Hence,
I refer the reader to Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) for more details.
The supF (m|0) and supF (m+ 1|m) tests for choosing break dates
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) recommend choosing the break dates by testing the null
hypothesis of m = 0 breaks versus the alternative of m = k breaks. In practice, this
is done by evaluating supF (m|0) and supF (k + 1|k) tests. Based on the application
of these tests, one can then choose the number of breaks, and hence, the final model.
SupF (m|0) is a generalized version of the supF test detailed in Andrews (1993) for
testing multiple structural breaks. The supF test is motivated by the fact that in
a hypothesis test of structural change, the break point, Tj, appears as a parameter
under the alternative hypothesis but not the null. Therefore, the usual Wald, LM, or
LR-statistics fail to have the standard asymptotic properties2. In practice, supF (m|0)
is constructed for every possible m-partition and compared to the asymptotic critical
values provided by Bai and Perron (1998).
In addition, the supF (k + 1|k) test provides a refined version of the supF test
for detecting the presence of k + 1 breaks conditional on existing k breaks. The
supF (k+1|k) test is a sequential method for choosing the number of breaks following
the initial supF test signaling statistical evidence for the existence of at least one
break. In practice, one can choose the number of breaks first by checking supF (m|0)
and confirm that there is at least one break. If so, then the largest k can be found
where the supF (k+1|k) value is no longer significant based on the asymptotic critical
values provided by Bai and Perron (1998). For example, if supF (2|1) is significant,
2Refer to Andrews (1993), Andrews, Lee, and Ploberger (1996) for a detailed discussion on this
issue.
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this suggests that there are two breaks, given one break has been found. If the next
test, if supF (3|2) is insignificant, then one can conclude that there are, in fact, only
two breaks given the two breaks confirmed by supF test.
A.3 The Model
The model consists of four structural equations, Phillips and IS curves, an Uncovered
Interest Parity (UIP) condition, and monetary policy reaction function. Phillips and
IS curve equations, and the UIP condition are identical across periods throughout the
period of 1996m1-2005m12, whereas the monetary reaction functions differ across pe-
riods of 1996m1-1998m11, 1998m12-2000m10, 2001m3-2003m9, and 2003m10-2005m12,
due to the structural breaks found in the data.
The Phillips curve is given by
pit = α0 + α1pit−1 + α2Etpit+2 + α3yt−4 − α4[pit−1 − pi∗t−1 − (et−1 − et−2)] + t
(A.14)
The IS curve is given by
yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + β2yt−2 + β3Etyt+1 + β4[it−2 − Et−2pit−1]
−β5[pit−1 − pi∗t−1 − (et−1 − et−2)] + ηt (A.15)
The monetary policy reaction function for each period is given by
Period I, 1996m1-1998m11 :
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) [γ0 + γpiEtpit+2 + γyyt−5 + σt] (A.16)
Period II, 1998m12-2000m10 :
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it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) [γ0 + γpiEtpit+3 + γyyt−5 + σt] (A.17)
Period III, 2001m3-2003m9 :
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) [γpiEtpit+2 + γyyt−6 + σt] (A.18)
Period IV, 2003m10-2005m12 :
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ) [γpiEtpit+3 + γyEtyt+1 + σt] (A.19)
The Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) condition is given by
et = φ1et−1 + φ2Etet+1 + φ3(it−1 − i∗t−1) + νt (A.20)
















A.4 Technical Appendix to VII.2
A.4.1 Rational Expectations Computational Algorithm
I used the computational program developed by Sims (2001) to find rational expec-
tations solution. Sims’ rational expectations solution algorithm requires the model
expressed in the following state-space form:
Γ0Xt = Γ1Xt−1 + C + Ψzt + Πωt (A.23)
t = 1, 2, 3, . . . T , where C is a vector of constants, zt is an exogenously evolving,
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possibly serially correlated, random disturbance, and ωt contains expectational errors,
satisfying Etωt+1 = 0 ∀ t.
In our model, the monetary reaction function differs across periods, which results in
four different state-space configurations.




I, zIt, and ω
I
t, consistent with the state-space form in (A.10)






































































































The auxiliary equations associated with the vectors, XIt,X
I
t−1,C
I, zIt, and ω
I
t, and




yt−4 = yt−4, Etpit+1 = Et−1pit+1 + θ1,t
it−1 = it−1, pit = Et−1pit + θ2,t
et−1 = et−1, yt = Et−1yt + θ3,t
Et−1pit = Et−1pit, et = Et−1et + θ4,t




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −α2 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −β3 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −(1− ρ)γpi 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −φ2
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





α′I 0 0 α4 α4 0 0 0 α3 0 0 −α4 0 0 0 0 0
−β5 β1 0 β5 β5 0 β2 0 0 0 β4 −β5 −β4 0 0 0 0
0 0 ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 γIy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 φ3 φ1 0 −φ3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 α∗1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ρ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

where α′I = α1 − α4, and γIy = (1− ρ)γy.
ΨI =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 (1− ρ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

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ii Period II: Dec’98 - Oct’00
The vectors, XIIt ,X
II
t−1,C
II, zIIt , and ω
II
t , consistent with the state-space form in










































































































The auxiliary equations associated with the vectors, XIIt ,X
II
t−1,C
II, zIIt , and ω
II
t , and




yt−3 = yt−3, Etpit+1 = Et−1pit+1 + θ1,t
yt−4 = yt−4, Etpit+2 = Et−1pit+2 + θ2,t
it−1 = it−1, pit = Et−1pit + θ3,t
et−1 = et−1, yt = Et−1yt + θ4,t
Et−1pit = Et−1pit et = Et−1et + θ5,t




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −α2 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −β3 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −(1− ρ)γpi 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −φ2
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





α′II 0 0 α4 α4 0 0 0 α3 0 0 −α4 0 0 0 0 0 0
−β5 β1 0 β5 β5 0 β2 0 0 0 β4 −β5 −β4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 γIIy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 φ3 φ1 0 −φ3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 α∗1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ρ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

where α′II = α1 − α4, and γIIy = (1− ρ)γy.
ΨII =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 (1− ρ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

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iii Period III: Mar’01 - Sep’03
The vectors, XIIIt ,X
III
t−1,C
III, zIIIt , and ω
III
t , consistent with the state-space form in










































































































The auxiliary equations associated with the vectors, XIIIt ,X
III
t−1,C
III, zIIIt , and ω
III
t ,






yt−5 = yt−5 Etpit+1 = Et−1pit+1 + θ1,t
it−1 = it−1 pit = Et−1pit + θ2,t
et−1 = et−1 yt = Et−1yt + θ3,t
Et−1pit = Et−1pit et = Et−1et + θ4,t




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −α2 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −β3 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −(1− ρ)γpi 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −φ2
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





α′III 0 0 α4 α4 0 0 0 α3 0 0 0 −α4 0 0 0 0 0
−β5 β1 0 β5 β5 0 β2 0 0 0 0 β4 −β5 −β4 0 0 0 0
0 0 ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 γIIIy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 φ3 φ1 0 −φ3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 α∗1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ρ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

where α′III = α1 − α4, and γIIIy = (1− ρ)γy.
ΨIII =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 (1− ρ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

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iv Period IV: Oct’03 - Dec’05
The vectors, XIVt ,X
IV
t−1,C
IV, zIVt , and ω
IV
t , consistent with the state-space form in





































































































The auxiliary equations associated with the vectors, XIVt ,X
IV
t−1,C
IV, zIVt , and ω
IV
t ,
and which must be added to the system are written as
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yt−1 = yt−1,
yt−2 = yt−2, Etpit+1 = Et−1pit+1 + θ1,t
yt−3 = yt−3, Etpit+2 = Et−1pit+2 + θ2,t
it−1 = it−1, pit = Et−1pit + θ3,t
et−1 = et−1, yt = Et−1yt + θ4,t
Et−1pit = Et−1pit, et = Et−1et + θ5,t




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −α2 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −β3 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −γIVpi −γIVy 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −φ2
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





α1 − α4 0 0 α4 α4 0 0 0 α3 0 −α4 0 0 0 0 0 0
−β5 β1 0 β5 β5 0 β2 0 0 β4 −β5 −β4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 φ3 φ1 0 −φ3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 α∗1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ρ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 (1− ρ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

A.4.2 Estimated Rational Expectations Solutions
The estimated rational expectations (RE) solutions are reported in Table VIII.1,
VIII.2, VIII.3, and VIII.4. These estimates are obtained using the computational
algorithm outlined in Appendix A.4.1, and the estimates obtained by the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation of the structural model displayed in Table
VII.1, VII.2, VII.3, and VII.4.
A.5 E-Stability
The estimated RE solutions can be written in the following form





















































































g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10 g11 g12 g13 g14 0 g15 g16
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 0 h15 h16
k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6 k7 k8 k9 k10 k11 k12 k13 k14 0 k15 k16
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14 0 s15 s16
0 0 0 0 α∗1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ρ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0





−g17 −g18 −g19 −g20 −g21 −g22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−h17 −h18 −h19 −h20 −h21 −h22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−k17 −k18 −k19 −k20 −k21 −k22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−s17 −s18 −s19 −s20 −s21 −s22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

A rational expectation equilibrium (REE) solution is E-stable if the eigenvalues
of Λ1 never leave the unit circle. Note that the vector x is an eigenvector of the
matrix Λ1 with eigenvalue λ if Λ1x = λx holds. Hence, the eigenvalues of Λ1 are the
solutions λ to the equation det(Λ1 − λI) = 0.
In Period I, Jan’96-Nov’98, the solution for det(Λ1 − λI) = 0 give eigenval-
ues of c1 = .3383, c2 = .6309, c3 = 0, c4 = .8609, c5 = .8609, c6 = −.5877, c7 =
−.5877, c8 = −.1923, c9 = −.1923, c10 = .3832, c11 = .3832, c12 = .5316, c13 =
.4656, c14 = −.0048, c15 = .0048, c16 = .0087, c17 = 0 where |ci| < 1 ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . 17.
Thus, the REE solution for the period of Jan’96-Nov’98 is E-stable.
In Period II, Dec’98-Oct’00, the solution for det(Λ1 − λI) = 0 give eigenval-
ues of c1 = .3383, c2 = .6309, c3 = 0, c4 = .8430, c5 = .8430, c6 = −.6439, c7 =
−.6439, c8 = −.2366, c9 = −.2366, c10 = .3814, c11 = .3814, c12 = .5338, c13 =
.4642, c14 = −.0077, c15 = .0110, c16 = .0054, c17 = 0 where |ci| < 1 ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . 17.
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Thus, the REE solution for the period of Dec’98-Oct’00 is E-stable.
In Period III, Mar’01-Sep’03, the solution for det(Λ1−λI) = 0 give eigenvalues of
c1 = .3383, c2 = .6309, c3 = 0, c4 = .8692, c5 = .8692, c6 = −.5762, c7 = −.4138, c8 =
−.4138, c9 = −.0289, c10 = −.0289, c11 = .4470, c12 = .4470, c13 = .5303, c14 =
.4703, c15 = −.0045, c16 = .0066, c17 = .0066 where |ci| < 1 ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . 17. Thus,
the REE solution for the period of Mar’01-Sep’03 is E-stable.
In Period IV, Oct’03-Dec’05, the solution for det(Λ1 − λI) = 0 give eigenvalues
of c1 = .3383, c2 = .6309, c3 = 0, c4 = .8613, c5 = .5382, c6 = .5244, c7 = .5244, c8 =
.0045, c9 = .0045, c10 = −.2197, c11 = −.0296, c12 = −.0193, c13 = −.0193, c14 =
.0194, c15 = .0194, c16 = .0072, c17 = 0 where |ci| < 1 ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . 17. Thus, the REE
solution for the period of Oct’03-Dec’05 is E-stable.
A.6 Technical Appendix to VII.6.1
Following the methodology described in Chapter IV, I express (VII.11) as function
of it−4 and earlier. The derivation is straightforward but tedious. After numerous
reverse substitutions of the type described in Appendix A.1, I obtain the following
formulae to solve for ex post inflation for the periods of (I) Jan’96-Nov’98, (II) Dec’98-
Oct’00, (III) Mar’01-Sep’03, and (IV) Oct’03-Dec’05. Notice that different interest
rate rules for each of these sub periods yield different formulations for the inflation
rate, pit.
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23Et−3pit + Z24Et−4pit−2 + Z25Et−6pit−5



















Z0 = α3β5 + α0
[
1 + (α1 − α4) + (α1 − α4)2 + (α1 − α4)3 + (α1 − α4)4
]
− α4φ3(1− ρ)γ0 + γ0(1− ρ) [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))]
Z
′
0 = Z0where γ0 = 0
Z1 = (α1 − α4)5 − α3β5
Z2 = α3[β1 + (α1 − α4)]
Z3 = α3[β2 + (α1 − α4)2]
Z4 = α3(α1 − α4)3 + α4φ3(1− ρ)γy
Z
′
4 = α3(α1 − α4)3
Z
′′
4 = α3(α1 − α4)3
Z5 = α3(α1 − α4)4 + [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γy
Z
′′
5 = α3(α1 − α4)4
Za5 = α3(α1 − α4)4 + α4φ3(1− ρ)γy
Zb5 = [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γy
Z6 = α4φ3(ρ
2 + φ21)− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(ρ+ φ1 + (α1 − α4))
Z7 = φ
3
1α4φ3 − α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(φ21 + φ1(α1 − α4) + (α1 − α4)2)
Z8 = φ
4
1α4φ3 + α3(β5φ3 + β4)
− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(φ31 + φ21(α1 − α4) + φ1(α1 − α4)2 + (α1 − α4)3)
Z9 = α4[φ
5
1 − (α1 − α4)4] + α3β5(φ1 − 1)
− α4[1− (α1 − α4)][φ41 + φ31(α1 − α4) + φ21(α1 − α4)2 + φ1(α1 − α4)3]
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Z10 = α4
Z11 = α4(α1 − α4)
Z12 = α4(α1 − α4)2
Z13 = α4(α1 − α4)3
Z14 = α4(α1 − α4)4 + α3β5
Z15 = −α4φ3
Z16 = α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))
Z17 = −φ21α4φ3 + α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))[φ1 + (α1 − α4)]
Z18 = −φ31α4φ3 + α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))[φ21 + φ1(α1 − α4) + (α1 − α4)2]
Z19 = −φ3(φ41α4 + α3β5)
+ α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))[φ31 + φ21(α1 − α4) + φ1(α1 − α4)2 + (α1 − α4)3]
Z20 = α2
Z21 = α2(α1 − α4)
Z22 = α2(α1 − α4)2 + α4φ3(1− ρ)γpi
Za22 = α2(α1 − α4)2
Zb22 = α4φ3(1− ρ)γpi
Z23 = α2(α1 − α4)3 + [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γpi
Za23 = α2(α1 − α4)3
Zb23 = [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γpi




Zb26 = α4φ3(1− ρ)γy
Zc26 = [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γy
Z27 = α4φ2
Z28 = −α4φ2(1− (α1 − α4))
Z29 = φ
2
1α4φ2 − α4φ2(1− (α1 − α4))[φ1 + (α1 − α4)]
Z30 = φ
3
1α4φ2 − α4φ2(1− (α1 − α4))[φ21 + φ1(α1 − α4) + (α1 − α4)2]
Z31 = −φ2(φ41α4 + α3β5)
− α4φ2(1− (α1 − α4))[φ31 + φ21(α1 − α4) + φ1(α1 − α4)2 + (α1 − α4)3]
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Z32 = 1
Z33 = (α1 − α4)
Z34 = (α1 − α4)2
Z35 = (α1 − α4)3
Z36 = (α1 − α4)4
Z37 = α3
Z38 = α4φ3(1− ρ)
Z39 = [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)
Z40 = α4
Z41 = −α4(1− (α1 − α4))
Z42 = φ
2
1α4 − α4(1− (α1 − α4))(φ1 + (α1 − α4))
Z43 = φ
3
1α4 − α4[1− (α1 − α4)][φ21 + φ1(α1 − α4) + (α1 − α4)2]
Z44 = φ
4
1α4 + α3β5 − α4[1− (α1 − α4)][φ31 + φ21(α1 − α4) + φ1(α1 − α4)2 + (α1 − α4)3]
Setting it−4 = it−5 = it−6 = it−7 in (A.25)-(A.28) gives the ex post counterfactual
inflation rate for each period as
pixpt = pit − Z6(it−4 − it−7)− Z7(it−5 − it−7)− Z8(it−6 − it−7)
= pit − Z6∆3it−4 − Z7∆2it−5 − Z8∆it−6 (A.29)





= ∆pit − Z6∆3it−4 − Z7∆2it−5 − Z8∆it−6 (A.30)
Solving for ex ante inflation pressure requires the expectations terms that appear
in (A.25)-(A.28) represented as functions of it−4 and earlier. I use the MSV solutions
(VII.8)-(VII.10) and (A.34) to express all of the expectations in terms of it−4 and
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earlier. The MSV solutions are given by:
pit = g0 + g1pit−1 + g2yt−1 + g3it−1 + g4et−1 + g5pi∗t−1 + g6i
∗
t−1 + g7pit−2 + g8yt−2
+g9yt−3 + g10yt−4 + g11yt−5 + g12yt−6 + g13it−2 + g14it−3 + g15et−3 + g16pi∗t−2
−g17t − g18ηt − g19σt − g20νt − g21∗t − g22σ∗t (A.31)
yt = h0 + h1pit−1 + h2yt−1 + h3it−1 + h4et−1 + h5pi∗t−1 + h6i
∗
t−1 + h7pit−2 + h8yt−2
+h9yt−3 + h10yt−4 + h11yt−5 + h12yt−6 + h13it−2 + h14it−3 + h15et−3 + h16pi∗t−2
−h17t − h18ηt − h19σt − h20νt − h21∗t − h22σ∗t (A.32)
et = s0 + s1pit−1 + s2yt−1 + s3it−1 + s4et−1 + s5pi∗t−1 + s6i
∗
t−1 + s7pit−2 + s8yt−2
+s9yt−3 + s10yt−4 + s11yt−5 + s12yt−6 + s13it−2 + s14it−3 + s15et−3 + s16pi∗t−2
−s17t − s18ηt − s19σt − s20νt − s21∗t − s22σ∗t (A.33)
it = k0 + k1pit−1 + k2yt−1 + k3it−1 + k4et−1 + k5pi∗t−1 + k6i
∗
t−1 + k7pit−2 + k8yt−2
+k9yt−3 + k10yt−4 + k11yt−5 + k12yt−6 + k13it−2 + k14it−3 + k15et−3 + k16pi∗t−2
−k17t − k18ηt − k19σt − k20νt − k21∗t − k22σ∗t (A.34)
Expressing the expectations in terms of it−4 and earlier is straightforward but
extremely tedious. Using (A.31)-(A.34) and after numerous reverse substitutions of
the type described in Appendix A.1, I obtain each of the expectations term in (A.25)-
(A.28) expressed in terms of it−4 and earlier.
In order to be able conduct the counterfactual experiment described in Chapter
IV, the counterfactual inflation rates, pixat , for each period must be obtained. Under
rational expectations, substituting the expectations that were expressed in terms of
it−4 and earlier into (A.25)-(A.28) and setting it−4 = it−5 = it−6 = it−7 yields the
following counterfactual inflation rates for period I-IV.
pixa,It = pit − (Z6 + Zxa,I6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zxa,I7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zxa,I8 )∆it−6 (A.35)
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pixa,IIt = pit − (Z6 + Zxa,II6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zxa,II7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zxa,II8 )∆it−6 (A.36)
pixa,IIIt = pit−(Z6 +Zxa,III6 )∆3it−4−(Z7 +Zxa,III7 )∆2it−5−(Z8 +Zxa,III8 )∆it−6 (A.37)
pixa,IVt = pit− (Z6 +Zxa,IV6 )∆3it−4− (Z7 +Zxa,IV7 )∆2it−5− (Z8 +Zxa,IV8 )∆it−6 (A.38)
Using (A.35)-(A.38) and the definition of EAIP result in the following formulae for
ex ante inflation pressure for each period
EAIP It = pi
xa,I
t − pit−1 (A.39)
= ∆pit − (Z6 + Zxa,I6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zxa,I7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zxa,I8 )∆it−6
EAIP IIt = pi
xa,II
t − pit−1 (A.40)
= ∆pit − (Z6 + Zxa,II6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zxa,II7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zxa,II8 )∆it−6
EAIP IIIt = pi
xa,III
t − pit−1 (A.41)
= ∆pit − (Z6 + Zxa,III6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zxa,III7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zxa,III8 )∆it−6
EAIP IVt = pi
xa,IV
t − pit−1 (A.42)



































































































































































































































































































































































































i , and e
′
i, for
i = 9, 10, 11 and j = 9, 10 are complex combinations of the MSV solution values
displayed in Table VIII.1-VIII.4.
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Under adaptive learning, I use least squares algorithm to estimate forecast series
corresponding the private agents’s expectations. However, the monetary authority
is assumed to have rational expectations. In (A.25)-(A.28), all expectation terms
are pooled together. I first re-write (A.25)-(A.28) distinguishing between the private
agents’ and the monetary authority’s expectations denoted by E˜ and E respectively.







































































































































































23Et−3pit + Z24E˜t−4pit−2 + Z25E˜t−6pit−5


















where the coefficients, Z, are as defined before.
Deriving the formulae for the ex ante inflation pressure index under adaptive
learning requires several ordinary least squares estimations to obtain private agents’
forecast series of future expectations and the corresponding counterfactual series.
After expressing all expectation terms in (A.43)-(A.46) as functions of it−4 and earlier,
I OLS estimate each of the private expectations term, denoted by E˜, to obtain forecast
series. I then set it−4 = it−5 = it−6 = it−7 and re-estimate the private expectations
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to find the corresponding counterfactual series, denoted as E˜cf . When it−4 = it−5 =
it−6 = it−7 is set, the counterfactual inflation rates under learning for period I-IV are
given by
picf,It = pit − (Z6 + Zre,I6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zre,I7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zre,I8 )∆it−6
− Z20[E˜tpit+2 − E˜cft pit+2]− Z21[E˜t−1pit+1 − E˜cft−1pit+1]
− Z ′22[E˜t−2pit − E˜cft−2pit]− Z
′
23[E˜t−3pit−1 − E˜cft−3pit−1]
− Z24[E˜t−4pit−2 − E˜cft−4pit−2]− Z25[E˜t−6pit−5 − E˜cft−6pit−5]
− Z26[E˜t−4yt−3 − E˜cft−4yt−3]− Z27[E˜t−1et − E˜cft−1et]
− Z28[E˜t−2et−1 − E˜cft−2et−1]− Z29[E˜t−3et−2 − E˜cft−3et−2]
− Z30[E˜t−4et−3 − E˜cft−4et−3]− Z31[E˜t−5et−4 − E˜cft−5et−4] (A.47)
picf,IIt = pit − (Z6 + Zre,II6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zre,II7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zre,II8 )∆it−6
− Z20[E˜tpit+2 − E˜cft pit+2]− Z21[E˜t−1pit+1 − E˜cft−1pit+1]
− Z ′22[E˜t−2pit − E˜cft−2pit]− Z
′
23[E˜t−3pit−1 − E˜cft−3pit−1]
− Z24[E˜t−4pit−2 − E˜cft−4pit−2]− Z25[E˜t−6pit−5 − E˜cft−6pit−5]
− Z26[E˜t−4yt−3 − E˜cft−4yt−3]− Z27[E˜t−1et − E˜cft−1et]
− Z28[E˜t−2et−1 − E˜cft−2et−1]− Z29[E˜t−3et−2 − E˜cft−3et−2]
− Z30[E˜t−4et−3 − E˜cft−4et−3]− Z31[E˜t−5et−4 − E˜cft−5et−4] (A.48)
picf,IIIt = pit − (Z6 + Zre,III6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zre,III7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zre,III8 )∆it−6
− Z20[E˜tpit+2 − E˜cft pit+2]− Z21[E˜t−1pit+1 − E˜cft−1pit+1]
− Z ′22[E˜t−2pit − E˜cft−2pit]− Z
′
23[E˜t−3pit−1 − E˜cft−3pit−1]
− Z24[E˜t−4pit−2 − E˜cft−4pit−2]− Z25[E˜t−6pit−5 − E˜cft−6pit−5]
− Z26[E˜t−4yt−3 − E˜cft−4yt−3]− Z27[E˜t−1et − E˜cft−1et]
− Z28[E˜t−2et−1 − E˜cft−2et−1]− Z29[E˜t−3et−2 − E˜cft−3et−2]
− Z30[E˜t−4et−3 − E˜cft−4et−3]− Z31[E˜t−5et−4 − E˜cft−5et−4] (A.49)
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picf,IVt = pit − (Z6 + Zre,IV6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zre,IV7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zre,IV8 )∆it−6
− Z20[E˜tpit+2 − E˜cft pit+2]− Z21[E˜t−1pit+1 − E˜cft−1pit+1]
− Z ′22[E˜t−2pit − E˜cft−2pit]− Z
′
23[E˜t−3pit−1 − E˜cft−3pit−1]
− Z24[E˜t−4pit−2 − E˜cft−4pit−2]− Z25[E˜t−6pit−5 − E˜cft−6pit−5]
− Z26[E˜t−4yt−3 − E˜cft−4yt−3]− Z27[E˜t−1et − E˜cft−1et]
− Z28[E˜t−2et−1 − E˜cft−2et−1]− Z29[E˜t−3et−2 − E˜cft−3et−2]
− Z30[E˜t−4et−3 − E˜cft−4et−3]− Z31[E˜t−5et−4 − E˜cft−5et−4] (A.50)
Using (A.47)-(p8A) and the definition of EAIP yields the following ex ante for-
mulae under adaptive learning for the periods I-IV.
EAIP It = pi
cf,I
t − pit−1
= ∆pit − (Z6 + Zre,I6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zre,I7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zre,I8 )∆it−6
− Z20[E˜tpit+2 − E˜cft pit+2]− Z21[E˜t−1pit+1 − E˜cft−1pit+1]
− Z ′22[E˜t−2pit − E˜cft−2pit]− Z
′
23[E˜t−3pit−1 − E˜cft−3pit−1]
− Z24[E˜t−4pit−2 − E˜cft−4pit−2]− Z25[E˜t−6pit−5 − E˜cft−6pit−5]
− Z26[E˜t−4yt−3 − E˜cft−4yt−3]− Z27[E˜t−1et − E˜cft−1et]
− Z28[E˜t−2et−1 − E˜cft−2et−1]− Z29[E˜t−3et−2 − E˜cft−3et−2]
− Z30[E˜t−4et−3 − E˜cft−4et−3]− Z31[E˜t−5et−4 − E˜cft−5et−4] (A.51)
EAIP IIt = pi
cf,II
t − pit−1
= ∆pit − (Z6 + Zre,II6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zre,II7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zre,II8 )∆it−6
− Z20[E˜tpit+2 − E˜cft pit+2]− Z21[E˜t−1pit+1 − E˜cft−1pit+1]
− Z ′22[E˜t−2pit − E˜cft−2pit]− Z
′
23[E˜t−3pit−1 − E˜cft−3pit−1]
− Z24[E˜t−4pit−2 − E˜cft−4pit−2]− Z25[E˜t−6pit−5 − E˜cft−6pit−5]
− Z26[E˜t−4yt−3 − E˜cft−4yt−3]− Z27[E˜t−1et − E˜cft−1et]
− Z28[E˜t−2et−1 − E˜cft−2et−1]− Z29[E˜t−3et−2 − E˜cft−3et−2]
− Z30[E˜t−4et−3 − E˜cft−4et−3]− Z31[E˜t−5et−4 − E˜cft−5et−4] (A.52)
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EAIP IIIt = pi
cf,III
t − pit−1
= ∆pit − (Z6 + Zre,III6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zre,III7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zre,III8 )∆it−6
− Z20[E˜tpit+2 − E˜cft pit+2]− Z21[E˜t−1pit+1 − E˜cft−1pit+1]
− Z ′22[E˜t−2pit − E˜cft−2pit]− Z
′
23[E˜t−3pit−1 − E˜cft−3pit−1]
− Z24[E˜t−4pit−2 − E˜cft−4pit−2]− Z25[E˜t−6pit−5 − E˜cft−6pit−5]
− Z26[E˜t−4yt−3 − E˜cft−4yt−3]− Z27[E˜t−1et − E˜cft−1et]
− Z28[E˜t−2et−1 − E˜cft−2et−1]− Z29[E˜t−3et−2 − E˜cft−3et−2]
− Z30[E˜t−4et−3 − E˜cft−4et−3]− Z31[E˜t−5et−4 − E˜cft−5et−4] (A.53)
EAIP IVt = pi
cf,IV
t − pit−1
= ∆pit − (Z6 + Zre,IV6 )∆3it−4 − (Z7 + Zre,IV7 )∆2it−5 − (Z8 + Zre,IV8 )∆it−6
− Z20[E˜tpit+2 − E˜cft pit+2]− Z21[E˜t−1pit+1 − E˜cft−1pit+1]
− Z ′22[E˜t−2pit − E˜cft−2pit]− Z
′
23[E˜t−3pit−1 − E˜cft−3pit−1]
− Z24[E˜t−4pit−2 − E˜cft−4pit−2]− Z25[E˜t−6pit−5 − E˜cft−6pit−5]
− Z26[E˜t−4yt−3 − E˜cft−4yt−3]− Z27[E˜t−1et − E˜cft−1et]
− Z28[E˜t−2et−1 − E˜cft−2et−1]− Z29[E˜t−3et−2 − E˜cft−3et−2]

































































































































A.7 Technical Appendix to VII.6.2
Following the methodology described in Chapter IV, I express (VII.11) as function
of it−6 and earlier. The derivation is extremely tedious. After numerous reverse
substitutions of the type described in Appendix A.1, I obtain the following equations
for the inflation rate the periods of (II) Dec’98-Oct’00, (III) Mar’01-Sep’03, and (IV)
Oct’03-Dec’05. Since there were not announced inflation targets before 1998, I don’t
derive formulae for the period of Jan’96-Nov’98.
piIIt = W0 +W1pit−5 +W2yt−5 +W3yt−6 +W4yt−7 +W5yt−8 +W6yt−9 +W7yt−10





























24Et−4pit−1 +W25Et−5pit−2 +W26Et−6pit−5 +W27Et−4yt−3
+W28Et−1et +W29Et−2et−1 +W30Et−3et−3 +W31Et−4et−3 +W32Et−5et−4
+W33t +W34t−1 +W35t−2 +W36t−3 +W37t−4 +W38ηt−4 +W39σt−2
+W40σt−3 +W41σt−4 +W42σt−5 +W43νt−1 +W44νt−2 +W45νt−3
+W46νt−4 +W47νt−5 (A.55)

































+W21Et−1pit+1 +W22Et−2pit +W23Et−3pit−1 +W24Et−4pit−2 +W25Et−5pit−2
+W26Et−6pit−5 +W27Et−4yt−3 +W28Et−1et +W29Et−2et−1 +W30Et−3et−3
+W31Et−4et−3 +W32Et−5et−4 +W33t +W34t−1 +W35t−2 +W36t−3
+W37t−4 +W38ηt−4 +W39σt−2 +W40σt−3 +W41σt−4 +W42σt−5
+W43νt−1 +W44νt−2 +W45νt−3 +W46νt−4 +W47νt−5 (A.56)
161
piIVt = W0 +W1pit−5 +W2yt−5 +W3yt−6 +W4yt−7 +W5yt−8 +W6yt−9 +W7yt−10





































+W30Et−3et−3 +W31Et−4et−3 +W32Et−5et−4 +W33t +W34t−1 +W35t−2
+W36t−3 +W37t−4 +W38ηt−4 +W39σt−2 +W40σt−3 +W41σt−4 +W42σt−5




0 = α3β5 + α0
[
1 + (α1 − α4) + (α1 − α4)2 + (α1 − α4)3 + (α1 − α4)4
]
W0 = α3β5 + α0
[
1 + (α1 − α4) + (α1 − α4)2 + (α1 − α4)3 + (α1 − α4)4
]




2 + φ21)− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(α1 − α4 + ρ+ φ1)
]
+ γ0(1− ρ)[α4φ3(ρ3 + ρφ21 + φ31)
− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(φ21 + (α1 − α4)2 + ρ(ρ+ φ1) + (ρ+ φ1)(α1 − α4))]
W1 = (α1 − α4)5 − α3β5
W2 = α3[β1 + (α1 − α4)]
W3 = α3[β2 + (α1 − α4)2]
W4 = α3(α1 − α4)3 + α4φ3(1− ρ)γy
W
′
4 = α3(α1 − α4)3
W5 = α3(α1 − α4)4 + [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γy
W
′
5 = α3(α1 − α4)4 + α4φ3(1− ρ)γy
W6 = [α4φ3(ρ
2 + φ21)− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(ρ+ φ1 + (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γy
W
′




1)− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))












1) + α3(β5φ3 + β4)
− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))[((ρ+ φ1) + (α1 − α4))(φ21 + (α1 − α4)2)
+ (ρ+ φ1)(ρ




1 − (α1 − α4)] + α3β5(φ1 − 1)
− α4[1− (α1 − α4)][φ41 + φ31(α1 − α4) + φ21(α1 − α4)2 + φ1(α1 − α4)3]
W10 = α4
W11 = α4(α1 − α4)
W12 = α4(α1 − α4)2
W13 = α4(α1 − α4)3
W14 = α4(α1 − α4)4 + α3β5
W15 = −α4φ3
W16 = α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))
W17 = −φ21α4φ3 + α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))[φ1 + (α1 − α4)]
W18 = −φ31α4φ3 + α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))[φ21 + φ1(α1 − α4) + (α1 − α4)2]
W19 = −φ3(φ41α4 + α3β5)
+ α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))[φ31 + φ21(α1 − α4) + φ1(α1 − α4)2 + (α1 − α4)3]
W20 = α2
W21 = α2(α1 − α4)
W22 = α2(α1 − α4)2 + α4φ3(1− ρ)γpi
W a22 = α2(α1 − α4)2
W b22 = α4φ3(1− ρ)γpi
W23 = α2(α1 − α4)3 + [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γpi
W a23 = α2(α1 − α4)3
W b23 = [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γpi
W24 = α2(α1 − α4)4
+ [α4φ3(ρ
2 + φ21)− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(ρ+ φ1 + (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γpi
W a24 = α2(α1 − α4)4
W b24 = [α4φ3(ρ
2 + φ21)− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(ρ+ φ1 + (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γpi
W25 = [α4φ3(ρ
3 + ρφ21 + φ
3
1)
− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(φ21 + (α1 − α4)2 + (ρ+ φ1)(ρ+ (α1 − α4)))](1− ρ)γpi
W26 = −α3β4
W27 = α3β3





W b27 = W27 + [α4φ3(ρ
2 + φ21)− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(ρ+ φ1 + (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γpi
W c27 = [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γy
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W d27 = α4φ3(1− ρ)γy
W28 = α4φ2
W29 = −α4φ2(1− (α1 − α4))
W30 = φ
2
1α4φ2 − α4φ2(1− (α1 − α4))[φ1 + (α1 − α4)]
W31 = φ
3
1α4φ2 − α4φ2(1− (α1 − α4))[φ21 + φ1(α1 − α4) + (α1 − α4)2]
W32 = −φ2(φ41α4 + α3β5)
− α4φ2(1− (α1 − α4))[φ31 + φ21(α1 − α4) + φ1(α1 − α4)2 + (α1 − α4)3]
W33 = 1
W34 = (α1 − α4)
W35 = (α1 − α4)2
W36 = (α1 − α4)3
W37 = (α1 − α4)4
W38 = α3
W39 = α4φ3(1− ρ)
W40 = [α4φ3ρ− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)
W41 = [α4φ3(ρ
2 + φ21)− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(ρ+ φ1 + (α1 − α4))](1− ρ)γpi
W42 = [α4φ3(ρ
3 + ρφ21 + φ
3
1)
− α4φ3(1− (α1 − α4))(φ21 + (α1 − α4)2 + (ρ+ φ1)(ρ+ (α1 − α4)))](1− ρ)γpi
W43 = α4
W44 = −α4[1− (α1 − α4)]
W45 = φ
2
1α4 − α4[1− (α1 − α4)][φ1 + (α1 − α4)]
W46 = φ
3
1α4 − α4[1− (α1 − α4)][φ21 + φ1(α1 − α4) + (α1 − α4)2]
W47 = φ
4
1α4 + α3β5 − α4[1− (α1 − α4)][φ31 + φ21(α1 − α4) + φ1(α1 − α4)2 + (α1 − α4)3]
Setting it−6 = it−7 in (A.55)-(A.57) while holding the post-policy expectations
constant produces counter factual inflation rate of picft = pit −W8∆it−6. Using the
counterfactual inflation rate, the measure for expectations of inflation under true




= ∆pit −W8∆it−6 (A.58)
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Taking expectation of both sides of (A.55)-(A.57) conditional on the information
available in period t− 6 results in:
Et−6piIIt = W0 +W1Et−6pit−5 +W2Et−6yt−5 +W3yt−6 +W4yt−7 +W5yt−8 +W6yt−9

























+W b24Et−6[Et−4pit−1] +W25Et−6[Et−5pit−2] +W26Et−6[Et−6pit−5]
+W27Et−6[Et−4yt−3] +W28Et−6[Et−1et] +W29Et−6[Et−2et−1]
+W30Et−6[Et−3et−3] +W31Et−6[Et−4et−3] +W32Et−6[Et−5et−4] (A.59)

































+W30Et−6[Et−3et−3] +W31Et−6[Et−4et−3] +W32Et−6[Et−5et−4] (A.60)
Et−6piIVt = W0 +W1Et−6pit−5 +W2Et−6yt−5 +W3yt−6 +W4yt−7 +W5yt−8 +W6yt−9




































where it has been assumed that the monetary authority observes all contemporaneous
variables and
Et−6t = Et−6t−1 = Et−6t−2 = Et−6t−3 = Et−6t−4 = 0
Et−6ηt−4 = 0
Et−6σt−2 = Et−6σt−3 = Et−6σt−4 = Et−6σt−5 = 0
Et−6νt−1 = Et−6νt−2 = Et−6νt−3 = Et−6νt−4 = Et−6νt−5 = 0
Step 1: Under the assumption that the monetary authority announces its in-
flation targets one period in advance, and that these targets are fully credible, the
following must hold: Et−6[Etpit+2] = piTt+2, Et−6[Et−1pit+1] = pi
T
t+1, Et−6[Et−2pit] = pi
T
t ,
Et−6[Et−2pit+1] = piTt+1, Et−6[Et−3pit−1] = pi
T
t−1, Et−6[Et−3pit] = pi
T
t , Et−6[Et−4pit−2] =
piTt−2, Et−6[Et−4pit−1] = pi
T
t−1, Et−6[Et−5pit−2] = pi
T
t−2, and Et−6[Et−6pit−5] = pi
T
t−5. It
must also be the case that Et−6pit = piTt and Et−6pit−5 = pi
T
t−5.
Step 2: After several reverse substitutions I express (A.21) and (A.22) in terms of




























































































Step 3: Using the MSV solutions (A.31)-(A.34), and after many reverse sub-
stitutions of the type described in Appendix A.1, the non inflationary expecta-
tion terms that appear in (A.55)-(A.57), Et−6yt−5, Et−6[Et−5yt−4], Et−6[Et−4yt−3],
Et−6[Et−3yt−2], Et−6[Et−2yt−1] Et−6[Et−1et], Et−6[Et−2et−1], Et−6[Et−3et−2], Et−6[Et−4et−3],
Et−6[Et−5et−4], can be expressed in terms of it−6 and earlier.
Substituting the outcomes of Step 1-3 into (A.55)-(A.57), and collecting the terms
give
piT,IIt = C + (w2 + w4h1)pit−6 + (w3 + w4h7)pit−7 + (w5 + w4h2)yt−6 + (w6 + w4h8)yt−7
+ (w7 + w4h9)yt−8 + (w8 + w4h10)yt−9 + (w9 + w4h11)yt−10 + (w10 + w4h12)yt−11
+ (w11 + w4h3)i
T
t−6 + (w12 + w4h13)it−7 + (w13 + w4h14)it−8 + (w14 + w4h4)et−6










































∗)5 + w25(ρ∗)4 + w26(ρ∗)3 + w27(ρ∗)2 + w28ρ∗1 + w29]i
∗
t−6 (A.62)
piT,IIIt = C + (w2 + w4h1)pit−6 + (w3 + w4h7)pit−7 + (w5 + w4h2)yt−6 + (w6 + w4h8)yt−7
+ (w7 + w4h9)yt−8 + (w8 + w4h10)yt−9 + (w9 + w4h11)yt−10 + (w10 + w4h12)yt−11
+ (w11 + w4h3)i
T
t−6 + (w12 + w4h13)it−7 + (w13 + w4h14)it−8 + (w14 + w4h4)et−6



























































































































































































∗ + (ρ∗)2 + (ρ∗)3 + (ρ∗)4) + w25γ∗0(1 + ρ























































































































































































































w17 = W10 +W28λ
b
15


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































w′17 = W10 +W28λ
b
15
































































































































































































































The W coefficients are defined above which I obtain using the empirical estimates of
the structural model depending on the way private expectations are formed. Other














i , and N
b
i for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . 27 are extremely
complex combinations of the MSV solutions reported in Table VIII.1-VIII.4.
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Rearranging the terms in (A.62)-(A.64) gives explicit formulae for iTt−6 for each
period. Setting iTt−6 = it−7 in (A.62)-(A.64) gives counterfactual inflation rate of pˆit
where pˆit = pi
T
t − (w11 + w4h3)[iTt−6 − it−7] holds if piTt is publicly known. As a result,
under rational expectations, the expectations of inflation under full credibility (XIFC)
index is obtained by
XIFCIIt = pˆit − pit−1
= (piTt − pit)− (w11 + w4h3)[iTt−6 − it−7] (A.65)
XIFCIIIt = pˆit − pit−1
= (piTt − pit)− (w11 + w4h3)[iTt−6 − it−7] (A.66)
XIFCIVt = pˆit − pit−1
= (piTt − pit)− (w′11 + w4h3)[iTt−6 − it−7] (A.67)
When agents are forming expectations based on the process of adaptive learning,




t −W8(iTt−6 − it−7)
−W27[E˜Tt−4yt−3 − E˜CFt−4yt−3]−W28[E˜Tt−1et − E˜CFt−1et]
−W29[E˜Tt−2et−1 − E˜CFt−2et−1]−W30[E˜Tt−3et−2 − E˜CFt−3et−2]




t −W8(iTt−6 − it−7)
−W27[E˜Tt−4yt−3 − E˜CFt−4yt−3]−W28[E˜Tt−1et − E˜CFt−1et]
−W29[E˜Tt−2et−1 − E˜CFt−2et−1]−W30[E˜Tt−3et−2 − E˜CFt−3et−2]
−W31[E˜Tt−4et−3 − E˜CFt−4et−3]−W32[E˜Tt−5et−4 − E˜CFt−5et−4] (A.69)
piXFC,IVt = pi
T
t −W8(iTt−6 − it−7)− [W a27 + (W b27 −W27) +W c27 +W d27]∆iTt−6
−W27[E˜Tt−4yt−3 − E˜CFt−4yt−3]−W28[E˜Tt−1et − E˜CFt−1et]
−W29[E˜Tt−2et−1 − E˜CFt−2et−1]−W30[E˜Tt−3et−2 − E˜CFt−3et−2]
−W31[E˜Tt−4et−3 − E˜CFt−4et−3]−W32[E˜Tt−5et−4 − E˜CFt−5et−4] (A.70)





is the forecast series predicted when iTt−6 = it−7 is set. Using (A.68)-(A.70) and
by definition, the expectations of inflation under full credibility (XIFC) index under




= (piTt − pit)−W8∆iTt−6
−W27[E˜Tt−4yt−3 − E˜CFt−4yt−3]−W28[E˜Tt−1et − E˜CFt−1et]
−W29[E˜Tt−2et−1 − E˜CFt−2et−1]−W30[E˜Tt−3et−2 − E˜CFt−3et−2]




= (piTt − pit)−W8∆iTt−6
−W27[E˜Tt−4yt−3 − E˜CFt−4yt−3]−W28[E˜Tt−1et − E˜CFt−1et]
−W29[E˜Tt−2et−1 − E˜CFt−2et−1]−W30[E˜Tt−3et−2 − E˜CFt−3et−2]





= (piTt − pit)−W8∆iTt−6 − [W a27 + (W b27 −W27) +W c27 +W d27]∆iTt−6
−W27[E˜Tt−4yt−3 − E˜CFt−4yt−3]−W28[E˜Tt−1et − E˜CFt−1et]
−W29[E˜Tt−2et−1 − E˜CFt−2et−1]−W30[E˜Tt−3et−2 − E˜CFt−3et−2]
−W31[E˜Tt−4et−3 − E˜CFt−4et−3]−W32[E˜Tt−5et−4 − E˜CFt−5et−4] (A.73)
Notice that in Period IV, unlike the other periods, there is a second component,
[W a27 +(W
b
27−W27)+W c27 +W d27]∆iTt−6, in the XIFC index. This term is due to expec-
tations of future output gap term that appear in the monetary authority’s reaction
function in period IV. Since the monetary authority is always assumed to be rational,
the term, [W a27 + (W
b
27−W27) +W c27 +W d27]∆iTt−6, indicates the impact of the interest
change policy on inflation via output changes through expectations channel.
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